Of the advancement of learning

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BACON’S ADVANCEMENT
OF LEARNING -: EDITED
BY G. W. KITCHIN, M.A.

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INTRODUCTION
By G. W. KITCHIN, M.A.

Lorp Bacon has given us his own estimate of the value and
position of the Advancement of Learning. ‘‘ This writing,”
says he, ‘‘ seemeth to me, s? nunquam fallit imago, not much
better than that noise or sound which musicians make while
they are tuning theirinstruments; whichis nothing pleasant
to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter after-
wards: so have I been content to tune the instruments of
the Muses, that they may play that have better hands.’?
Wherein he errs in two opposite ways: for, on the one side,

(the book is nobler than the senseless jargon to which he

likens it; while, on the other; the musicians that have taken
up the work have scarcely succeeded in playing harmoni-
ously together. He seems not to be aware of the intrinsic _
worth of the thoughts expressed in every page, while he also
seems to have imagined that a Millennium of Learning was
about to begin, to which this book should be, as it were, the
herald trumpet. Under so almost divine a sovereign as
King James I. learning will surely be fostered and advanced.

’ Controversies in religion, he thinks, are all but worn out

(and this on the eve of the great Puritan struggles and suc-
cesses !), and we shall have leisure to leave questions of faith
for the discovery of the Laws of Nature. And yet, with all
this, he does not discern the*value of mathematics, that
branch of learning which was then making great advance,
and was destined to work wonders. He scarcely cared to
have an opinion on the ‘‘ Copernican Theory ”’ of Astronomy.
He never mentions his famous countryman/Gilbert without
a sneer, or at least a disparaging remark; though he was
engaged on those discoveries in magnetism which have
tended to enlarge in many ways the empire of man over
Nature. He by no means emancipates himself thoroughly
from the thraldom of the old scholastic systems. He
regards Poetry as complete, requiring no farther develop-
ment: and is not conscious that he is living with those who
were above all others to be the pride of English Literature,
vil

Vill Bacon
and who should labour in broad fields of Poetry, which had
never yet been touched by mortal hand. In these and
other subjects the book is defective enough; yet, remem-
bering all things, we must marvel at the extraordinary
dth of knowledge and reading; the fertility of thought,
and happiness of expression; the complete arrangement of
subjects, and lucid order of the work, which show them-
selves throughout. Nor did Bacon himself fail to see the
importance of his pioneer-book—otherwise he would not
have expanded it so fully as he has done in the Latin—
translating it into that tongue that it might the more readily
gain access to all lands, and be read by the learned in every
place; and carefully expunging all passages which might
be distasteful abroad, lest the Roman Church should be
offended with the accidents, and so neglect the essence of
his writings.

The frontispiece of the original edition of the Novum
Organum expresses his feeling respecting the Advancement.
Between two pillars, the pillars of Hercules, the ship of

_learning sails forth upon a tossed sea, bound for lands as yet
unvisited, to bring thence goodly store of new and precious
merchandise. Behind her lie all those well-known shores
of knowledge, of which the Advancement gives the map and
chart. They were, if we may so speak, those Mediterranean
lands which were the heart of the fourth or Roman Empire
—trodden by every foot of learned men: familiar even to
children in knowledge. But beyond the straits is the great
outer sea, and continents as yet unknown, to be explored
by painful daring, and destined to increase the wealth of the
world in a million ways. The old empire should give place
to the new: just as the Mediterranean ceased to be all-
important, when once the boldness of Bartholomew Diaz
had shown an easier pathway to the wealth of India; and
the inspired dreams of Columbus had been realised by the
discovery of new continents across the main.

The Advancement of Learning was, therefore, the first
-work in Bacon’s great series. That series he styled the
“‘Instauratio Magna,”’ and under the first head of “ Parti-
tiones Scientiarum ”’ he placed this book. It was to be a
chart of the lands already discovered and known; so as to
direct the attention of the adventurer without loss of time
or labour to those parts which had not yet been explored.
Then came the Novum Organum ; a ‘“‘ Method ”’ or instru-

Introduction ix

ment by means of which men should arrive at these novelties
——the ship, in fact, of his frontispiece, on board of which
(to use his own motto),—

Multi pertransibunt, et augebitur scientia.

After that, the ‘‘ Instauratio’’ was to be composed of
successive works, ending with a “‘ Philosophia secunda,”’ or
complete system of knowledge. This, however, he felt
must be left to posterity.

Whoever, therefore, desires to acquaint himself with
Bacon’s philosophical works must begin with the Advance-
ment, referring to the De Augmentis Scientiarum from time
to time. Then, having thus become familiar with the style
of the great thinker, he will be able to go on to that noble
work, the Novum Organum ; wherein are contained the
seeds of marvellous wisdom, of knowledge which has grown
and flourished to this day; and has affected for ever the
course and fortunes of learning.

In preparing this edition of the Advancement of Learning
for the general reader, I have aimed at three things — a
faithful text, full verification of quotations, and brevity
and simplicity of notes.

As to the first of these matters, there was but little diffi-
culty. The variations in the text are very few, and very
unimportant. Wherever it was possible, I have followed
the edition of 1605, leaving myself little scope for conjecture.

As to the next point, I had the work already done for me,
to a great extent, both in the edition of Mr. Markby, and in
the De Augmentis of the great Ellis and Spedding edition.
I have been able here and there to supply missing references,
and have carefully verified those already found for me.

But with respect to notes, it is unnecessary that I say
more than that their aim is to be as unobtrusive as
possible, and that I hope they may be useful.

Lastly, I subjoin a brief analysis of the work.

Learning, with proofs, divine and human, of its dignity, orre-
sponds with De Augmentis, Bk. 1.)

Boox II. (On the main subject.) Commended to kings as nursing
fathers. (De Augm. ii. pref.)

Learning is twofold—Divine and Human. Divine postponed. (De
Augm. ii.)

HumAN LEARNING is threefold—I. History (which answers to the

Book I. (Pveliminary.) Briefly removes the prejudices a ea

x Bacon

Memory). II. Poesy (to Imagination). III. Philosophy (éo
Reason).

I. History.
1. Natural.
(a) Of Creatures.
(b) Marvels.
(c) Arts.

2. Civil.
(a2) Memorials.
(6) Antiquities.
{c) Perfect History.
i. Chronicles.
a. Ancient.
B. Modern.
11. Lives.
iii. Narrations.
iv. Annals.
v. Cosmography.

3. Ecclesiastical.
(a) Of the Church.
(b) Of Prophecy.
(c) Of Providence.

4. Literary, or appendices to History.

II. Poesy. (Herein is no deficiency.)
1. Narrative.
2. Representative.
3. Allusive or Parabolical.

III. Philosophy. (De Augm. iii.)
1. Divine (or Natural Theology, not=Divinity). Discussion
of the Philosophia Prima.

2. Natural.
Zt. Science.

(1) Physical (of material and efficient causes).

(2) Metaphysical (of formal and final causes), and
under Metaphysical come Mathematics, pure
and mixed.

u.. Pandence.

(1) Experimental.

(2) Philosophical.

(3) Magical.

3. Human. (De Augm. iv.)
i. Segregate (t.e. of individual men) of (a) Body and (bd)

Mind, first considered in combination with respect to

(a) Discovery and (8) Impression, and then separately;

Introduction X1

(a) Body.
(a) Medicine.
(8) Cosmetic Art.
(y) Athletics.
(6) Sensual Arts.
(5) Mind.
(a) Its Nature (with two Appendices on Divina-

tion and Fascination).
(8) Its Functions. (De Augm. v.)

A. Intellectual, whose Arts are four.

(i.) Of Invention.

(a) Of Arts (deficient).
(8) Of Speech.

(ii.) Of Judgment, whose Methods are—
(a) Of Direction (Analytics).
(b) Of Caution (Elenches).
(iii.) Of Custody.
(a) By Writing.
(6) By Memory.
(a) Prenotion.
(8) Emblem.

(iv.) Of Tradition. (De Augm. vi.)
(a) Its organ—speech, or writing (grammar).
(6) Its method (Logic).
(c) Its illustration (Rhetoric).
(With appendices.)

B. Moral. (De Augm. vii.)

(i.) Of the Nature of Good (omitting the summum
bonum, as belonging to another life).
(1) Private.
(a) Active.
(b) Passive.

(a) Conservative.
(8) Perfective.

(2) Relative.
(a) Of man as citizen.
(6) Of man as social being.

(ii.) Of Moral Culture.

ii. Congregate. (De Augm. viii.)
(a) In Conversation.
(5) In Negotiation (with rules for self-advancement).
(c) In Government (with notes on Laws).

X11 Bacon

In Conclusion. (De Augm. ix.)
Theology—refers to man’s Reason and Will.
Discussed as to—
1. The nature (or manner) of the Revelation.
(a) Its Limits.
(b) Its Sufficiency.
(c) Its Acquisition.

2. The thing revealed.
(a) Matter of Belief.
(a) Faith.
(8) Manners.

(Lb) Matter of Service.
(a) Liturgy
(8) Government.

The following list gives the chief editions of Bacon’s works:—

Essays, 1597 (2nd edition, 1598; 3rd edition, 1606; 5th edition, newly
written, 1625); Advancement of Learning, 1605, 1629, 1633; De Sapientia
Veterum, 1609, 1617, 1633, 1634; The Wisdome of the Ancients, done
into English by Sir A. G. Knight, 1619, 1658; (The) New Atlantis, 1660;
Novum Organum, 1620, 1645; Life of Henry VII., 1622, 1629; De
Augmentis Scientiarum, 1623, 1635, 1645, expanded from the Advance-
ment of Learning, translated in Latin under the supervision of Bacon;
Apophthegmes, New and Old, 1624 [B.M. 1625]; Sylva Sylvarum, pub-
lished after the author’s death by W. Rawley, 1627, 1635.

COLLECTED Works: Opera omnia que extant. Philosophica, Moralia
Politica, Historica, 1665 Opera Omnia. Life of Francis Bacon, by Dr.
Rawley. Edited by J. Blackbourne, 1730. Bacon’s works, with Life,
Mallet’s, 1740 and 1753. Montagu’s, 17 vols., 1825-26. Works, originally
collected and revised by R. Stephens and J. Locker, published after their
deaths by T. Birch, 5 vols., 1765. Works, collected and edited by J.
Spedding, R. L. Ellis and D. D. Heath, 14 vols., 1857-74.

ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING

THE FIRST BOOK
To the King

THERE were under the law, excellent King, both daily Sacri-
fices and free-will offerings; the one proceeding upon
ordinary Observance, the other upon a devout cheerfulness :
in like manner there belongeth to Kings from their servants
both tribute of duty and presents of affection. In the
former of these I hope I shall not live to be wanting, accord-
ing to my most humble duty, and the good pleasure of your
Majesty’s employments: for the latter, I thought it more
respective to make choice of some oblation, which might
rather refer to the propriety and excellency of your indivi-
dual person, than to the business of your crown and state.

Wherefore, representing your Majesty many times unto
my mind, and beholding you, not with the inquisitive eye of
presumption, to discover that which the Scripture telleth
me is inscrutable,’ but with the observant eye of duty and
admiration; leaving aside the other parts of your virtue and
fortune, I have been touched, yea, and possessed with an
extreme wonder at those your virtues and faculties, which
the Philosophers call intellectual; the largeness of your
capacity, the faithfulness of your memory, the swiftness of
your apprehension, the penetration of your judgment, and
the facility and order of your elocution: and I have often
thought that of all the persons living that I have known,
your Majesty were the best instance to make a man of
Plato’s opinion,” that all knowledge is but remembrance,
and that the mind of man by nature knoweth all things, and
hath but her own native and original notions * (which by
_ the strangeness and darkness of this tabernacle of the body
APYOV. XXV. 3. * Phado, i. 72.

* The edition 1605 has motions, a word which misses the point—
-editions 1629 and 1633 read notions.

2 Bacon

are sequestered) again revived and restored: such a light of
nature I have observed in your Majesty, and such a readi-
ness to take flame and blaze from the least occasion pre-
sented, or the least spark of another’s knowledge delivered.
And as the Scripture saith of the wisest king, That his heart
was as the sands of the sea ;+ which though it be one of the
largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the smallest and finest
portions; so hath God given your Majesty a composition of
understanding admirable, being able to compass and com-
prehend the greatest matters, and nevertheless to touch and
apprehend the least; whereas it should seem an impossi-
bility in nature for the same instrument to make itself fit for
great and small works. And for your gift of speech, I call
to mind what Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus Cesar:
Augusto profiuens, et que principem deceret, eloquentia fut.”
For, if we note it well, speech that is uttered with labour and
difficulty, or speech that favoureth of the affectation of art
and precepts, or speech that is framed after the imitation of
some pattern of eloquence, though never so excellent; all
this hath somewhat servile, and holding of the subject.
But your Majesty’s manner of speech is indeed prince-like,
flowing as from a fountain, and yet streaming and branching
itself into nature’s order, full of facility and felicity, imita-
ing none, and inimitable by any. And as in your civil
estate there appeareth to be an emulation and contention of
your majesty’s virtue with your fortune; a virtuous disposi-
tion with a fortunate regiment; a virtuous expectation
(when time was) of your greater fortune, with a prosperous
possession thereof in the due time; a virtuous observation of
the laws of marriage, with most blessed and happy fruit of
marriage; a virtuous and most Christian desire of peace,
with a fortunate inclination in your neighbour princes there-
unto: so likewise, in these intellectual matters, there
seemeth to be no less contention between the excellency of
your Majesty’s gifts of nature, and the universality and
perfection * of your learning. For I am well assured that
this which I shall say is no amplification at all, but a positive
and measured truth; which is, that there hath not been
since Christ’s time any King or temporal Monarch, which
has been so learned in all literature and erudition, divine and
4x Kings lv. 29. Tac. Annal. xiii. 3.
8 Edition 1605 has profection.

Advancement of Learning 3

human. For let a man seriously and diligently revolve and
peruse the succession of the emperors of Rome; of which
Cesar the Dictator, who lived some years before Christ, and
Marcus Antoninus were the best learned; and so descend,
to the emperors of Grecia, or of the West; and then to the
lines of France, Spain, England, Scotland, and the rest, and
he shall find this judgment is truly made. For it seemeth
much in a King, if, by the compendious extractions of other
men’s wits and labours, he can take hold of any superficial
ornaments and shows of learning; or if he countenance and
prefer learning and learned men: but to drink indeed of the
true fountains of learning, nay, to have such a fountain of
learning in himself, in a King, and in a King born, is almost
a miracle. And the more, because there is met in your
Majesty a rare conjuction as well of divine and sacred
literature, as of profane and human; so as your Majesty
standeth invested of that triplicity, which in great venera-
tion was ascribed to the ancient Hermes; the power and
fortune of a king, the knowledge and illumination of a priest,

_and the learning and universality of a philosopher.’ is

propriety inherent? and individual attribute in your
Majesty deserveth to be expressed not only in the fame and
admiration of the present time, nor in the history or tradi-
of the ages succeeding, but also in some solid work, fixed
memorial, and immortal monument, bearing a character
or signature both of the power of a King, and the difference
and perfection of such a King.

Therefore I did conclude with myself, that I could not
make unto your Majesty a better oblation than of some
Treatise tending to that end, whereof the sum will consist of
these two parts; the former, concerning the excell of
Learning and Knowledge, and the_excellency of the ment and.
true glory in the augme
the latter, what the particular acts and works are, which
have been embraced and undertaken for the Advancement
of Learning; and again, what defects and undervalues I
find in such particular acts: to the end, that though I can-
not positively or affirmatively advise your Majesty, or

1 Marsilius Ficinus, Arg. ad Herm. Trism.—Et philosophus maxi-
mus, et sacerdos maximus, et rex maximus.

* Propriety inherent ; the logical ‘‘ Proprium quod consequitur
essentiam rei.’’

es 8)

4 Bacon

propound unto you framed particulars; yet I may excite
your princely cogitations to visit the excellent treasure of
your own mind, and thence to extract particulars for this
purpose, agreeably to your magnanimity and wisdom.

In the entrance to the former of these, to clear the way, and
as it were to make silence, to have the true_testimonies
concerning the dignity of Leaming to be better heard,
without the interruption of tacit objections, I think good to
deliver it from the discredits and disgraces which it hath
received; all from ignorance; but ignorance severally
disguised, appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy
of Divines; sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of
Politiques; and sometimes in the errors and imperfections
of learned men themselves.

(1 I hear the former sort say, that Knowledge is of those
things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and
caution; that the aspiring to overmuch knowledge was the
original temptation and sin whereupon ensued the fall of
man; that Knowledge hath in it somewhat of the serpent,
and therefore where it entereth into a man it makes him
swell; Scientia inflat ;1 that Salomon gives a censure, That
there 1s no end of making books, and that much reading is
weariness of the flesh ;* and again in another place, That in
spacious knowledge there 1s much contristation, and that he
that increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety ;* that St. Paul
gives a caveat, That we be not spotled through vain philosophy,*
that experience been
arch-heretics, how learned times have been inclined_to
atheism, and how the contemplation of second causes
derogate from our dependence upon God, who is the first
cause.

To discover then the ignorance and error of this opinion,
and the misunderstanding in the grounds therof, it may well
appear these men do not observe or consider that it was
the pure knowledge of nature and universality, a knowledge
by the light whereof man did give names unto other crea-
tures in paradise,® as they were brought before him, accord-

11 Cor. viii. 1. *Eccl. xii. 12. * Ecel. 1. 18;
FCCIen, sae ® See Gen. ii. and iii.

Advancement of Learning 5

ing unto their proprieties, which gave the occasion to the
fall: but it was the proud knowledge of good and evil, with
an intent in man to give law unto himself, and to depend no
more upon God’s commandments, which was the form of
the temptation. Neither is it any quantity of knowledge,
how great soever, that can make the mind of man to swell;
for nothing can fill, much less extend the soul of man, but
God and the contemplation of God; and therefore Salomon,
speaking of the two principal senses of inquisition, the eye
and the ear, affirmeth that the eye is never satisfied with
seeing, nor the ear with hearing ;1 and if there be no fulness,
then is the continent greater than the content: so of know-
ledge itself, and the mind of man, whereto the senses are but
reporters, he defineth likewise in these words, placed after
that Kalendar or Ephemerides, which he maketh of the
diversities of times and seasons for all actions and purposes;
and concludeth thus:{ God hath made all things beautiful, or
decent, in the true return of their seasons: Also he hath placed
the world in man’s heart, vet cannot man find out the work
which God worketh from the beginning to the end :* declaring

not obscurely, that God hath framed the mind of man asa “

mirror or glass, capab]l the universal world, ,
and joyful to receive the impression thereof, as the eye

~

joyeth to receive light; and not only delighted in beholding «_.

the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but raised also
to find out and discern the ordinances and decrees, which
throughout all those changes are infallibly observed) And
although he doth insinuate that the supreme or simmary
law of nature, which he calleth the work which God worketh
from the beginning to the end, is not possible to-be found-out-
by man; yet that doth not derogate from the capacity of
the mind, but may be referred to the impediments, as of
shortness of life, 111 conjunction of labours, ill tradition of
knowledge over from hand to hand, and many other incon-
veniences, whereunto the condition of man is subject. For
that nothing parcel of the world is denied to man’s inquiry
and invention, he doth in another place rule over, when he
saith, The spirit of man is as the lamp of God, wherewtth he
searcheth the inwardness of all secrets.* If then such be the
capacity and receipt of the mind of man, it is manifest that
there is no danger at all in the proportion or quantity of

+ Eccl. i. 8. * Eccl. iii. 2. * Prov. x%. 2).

B 719

6 Bacon

‘ knowledge, how large soever, lest it should make it swell or

Heat Comipess itself; no, but itis merely the quality of know
ledge, which, be it in quantity more or less, if it be taken
without the true corrective thereof, hath in it some nature
of venom or malignity, and some effects of that venom,
which is ventosity or swelling. This corrective spice, the
mixture whereof maketh Knowledge so sovereign, is Charity,
which the Apostle immediately addeth to the former clause:
for so he saith, Knowledge bloweth up, but Charity burldeth up,
not unlike unto that which he delivereth in another place:
If I spake, saith he, with the tongues of men_and angels, and
had not charity, it were but as a tinkling cymbaL,;} not but that

_ it 1s an excellent thing to speak with the tongues of men and
angels, but because, if it be severed from charity, and not
referred to the good of men and mankind, it hath rather a
sounding and unworthy glory, than a meriting and substan-
tial virtue. And as for that censure of Salomon, concerning
the excess of writing and reading books, and the anxiety of
spirit which redoundeth from knowledge; and that admoni-
tion of St. Paul, That we be not seduced by vain pepe:
let those places be rightly understo

excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations, zhesdl
by human knowledge is confined and circumscribed; and
yet without any such contracting or coarctation, but that it
may comprehend all the universal | nature of things; for
‘these limitations are three: the first, “That we do not so place
our felicity in knowledge, as we forget our mortality: the
secondaT hat we make application of our knowledge, to give
ourselves repose and contentment, and not distaste or repining :
the third3JZhat we do not presume by the contemplation of
nature to attain to the mysteries of God. For as touching the
first of these, Salomon doth excellently expound himself in
another place of the same book, where he saith: ? I saw well
that knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance as light doth
from darkness ; and that the wise man’s eyes keep watch in his
head, whereas the fool roundeth about in darkness : but withal
I learned, that the same mortality involveth them both. And
for the second, certain it is, there is no vexation or anxiety
of mind which resulteth from knowledge otherwise than
merely by accident; for all knowledge and wonder (which is
the seed of knowledge) is is an impression of pleasure in itself:

¥ Cor. Sit, %, * Eccl. ii. ¥3, 14.

Advancement of Learning 5

but when men fall to framing conclusions out of their know-
ledge, applying it to their particular, and ministering to
themselves thereby weak fears or vast desires, there groweth
that carefulness and trouble of mind which is spoken of: for
then knowledge is no more Lumen siccum, whereof Hera-
clitus the profound ! said, Lumen siccum optima anima ; but
it becometh Lumen madidum, or maceratum, being steeped
_and infused in the humours of the affections.2_ And as for
the third point, it deserveth to be a little stood upon, and
not to be lightly passed over: for if any man shall think by

view and inquiry into these sensible and material things to

pain that heht. whereby he may reveal unto himself the
Be re-or Will of Gad. then indeed is he spoiled By vain.
philosophy: for the contemplation of God’s creatures and
works produceth (having regard to the works and creatures
themselves) knowledge, but having regard to God, no
perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge.
And therefore it was most aptly said by one of Plato’s
school,? That the sense of man carrieth a resemblance with the
sun, which, as we see, openeth and revealeth all the terrestrial
globe ; but then again it obscureth and concealeth the stars and
celestial globe : so doth the sense discover natural things, but it
darkeneth and shutteth up divine. And hence it is true that
it hath proceeded, that divers great learned men have been
heretical, whilst they have sought to fly up to the secrets of
the Deity by the waxen wings of the senses. And as for the
conceit that too much knowledge should incline a man to
Atheism,* and that the ignorance of second causes should
make a more devout dependence upon God, which is the
first cause; first, it is good to ask the question which Job
asked of his friends: Wall you lie for God, as one man will do
for another, to gratify him?® For certain it is that God

1 0 oxorecvos.
My raxvs ‘“Hpaxdelrov én’ éupardr eteo BiBdov-
Tod ’deciou pdra To SvcBaros arpamirés*
“Oppvn kal oxéros éoriv adduarerov, Ay 5€ ce wiorns
Kisaydayn, pavepov ANapmpdrep’ jediov.
Diog. Laert. ix.

* Avyn Enph ~uxh codwrary. A corruption of avy yuyh copwrdrn.
(See note in Ellis and Spedding’s edition.) The phrase occurs in
Stobeus, cf. Ritter, Hist. Philos. vol. i. Heraclitus.

* Philo Jud. de Somn.

“See Bacon’s Essays—On Atheism. ® Job xi. 9.

:

8 Bacon

worketh nothing in nature but by second causes: and if
they would have it otherwise believed, it is mere imposture,
as it were in favour towards God; and nothing else but to
ffer to the Author of Truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie.
ut farther, it is an assured truth, and a conclusion of
dean that a little or-superficial knowledge of Philo-
sopn hy may incline the mind of man to Atheism, but a
pastes proces ing therein doth bring the mind back again
‘0 Re Aeon : for in the entrance of Philosophy, when the
oad causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer them-
selves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there it may
induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man
asseth on farther, and seeth the dependence of causes, and
the works of Providence; then, according to the allegory of
e poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of
nature’s chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter’s
hair.) ') To conclude therefore, let no man upon a weak
uae of sobriety or an ill-applied moderation think or
maintain, that a man can search too far, or be too well
studied in the book of God’s word, or in the book of God’s
works; divinity or philosophy: but rather let men endeav-
our an endless progress or proficience in both; only let men
beware that they apply both to charity, and not to swelling;
to use, and not to ostentation; and again, that they do not
unwisely mingle or confound these learnings together.
E22) And{as for the disgraces which Learning receiveth from
Politig ues, they be of this nature; that Learning doth soften
men’sminds, .and makes them moreunapt for thehonout and
exercise of arms; nag doth mar an er ’s dispo-
siti matter of government and policy, in making
them too curious and irresolute by variety of reading, or too
peremptory or positive by strictness of rules and axioms,
or too immoderate and overweening by reason of the great-
ness of examples, or too incompatible and differing from the
times by reason of the dissimilitude of examples; or at
least, thatZit doth divert men’s travails from action and
business, and bringeth them to a love of leisure and private-

ness; and thatyit doth bring into states a relaxation of
discipline, whilst eyery man is more ready to argue than

_ to obey and execute) Out of this conceit, Cato,? surnamed

the Censor, one of the wisest men indeed that ever lived,
1 tiom., fi. vins-t6: 2 See Pliny, Nat. Hist. vii. 31.

Advancement of Learning 9
|
_ when Carneades the philosopher came in embassage to

Rome, and that the young men of Rome began to flock
about him, being allured with the sweetness and majesty
of his eloquence and learning, gave counsel in open senate
that they should give him his dispatch with all speed, lest
he should infect and enchant the minds and affections of
the youth, and at unawares bring in an alteration of the
manners and customs of the state.! Out of the same con-
ceit or humour did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage
of his country, and the disadvantage of his own profession,
make a kind of separation between policy and government,
and between arts and sciences, in the verses so much
renowned, attributing and challenging the one to the
Romans and leaving and yielding the other to the Grecians:

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento,
He tibi erunt artes, etc.?

So likewise we see that Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, laid
it as an article of charge and accusation against him, that
he did, with the variety and power of his discourses and
disputations, withdraw young men from due reverence to

_ the laws and customs of their country, and that he did
profess a dangerous and pernicious science, which was, to
make the worse matter seem the better, and to suppress
truth by force of eloquence and speech.

I.) But these, and the like imputations, have rather a
countenance of gravity than any ground of justice: for
experience doth warrant, that both in persons and in times,

_ there hath been a meeting and concurrence in Learning |
_ and Arms, flourishing and excelling in the same men and the
same ages. For, as for men, there cannot be a better nor
the like instance, as of that pair, Alexander the Great and
Julius Cesar the Dictator; whereof the one was Aristotle’s
_ scholar in philosophy, and the other was Cicero’s rival in
_ eloquence: or if any man had rather call for scholars that
were great generals, than generals that were great scholars,
let him take Epaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon the
Athenian; whereof the one was the first that abated the
power of Sparta, and the other was the first that made way
to the overthrow of the monarchy of Persia. And this con-

1 Plut. vit. Cat. *Virg, En. vi. 851.
3 Plato, Apol. Soc. i. 19, 24.

1O Bacon

currence is yet more visible in times than in persons, by how
much an age is a greater object than a man. For both in
Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Grecia, and Rome, the same times
that are most renowned for arms, are likewise most ad-
mired for learning, so that the greatest authors and philo-
sophers, and the greatest captains and governors have lived
in the same ages. Neither can it otherwise be: for as in
man the ripeness of strength of the body and mind cometh
much about an age, save that the strength of the body
cometh the more early:} so in states Arms and Learning,
whereof the one correspondeth to the body, the other to the
soul of,man, have a concurrence or near sequence in times.

(2.)(And for matter of Policy and Government, that
leatning should rather hurt, than enable thereunto, is a
thing very improbable: we see it is accounted an error to
commit a natural body to empiric physicians, which com-
monly have a few pleasing receipts whereupon they are
confident and adventurous, but know neither the causes
of diseases, nor the complexions of patients, nor peril of
accidents, nor the true method of cures: we see it is a like
error to rely upon advocates or lawyers, which are only
men of practice and not grounded in their books, who are
many times easily surprised when matter falleth out besides
their experience, to the prejudice of the causes they handle)

so by like reason it cannot be but a matter of doubtful
consequence if states be managed by empiric Statesmen,

not well mingled with men grounded in learning. But
contrariwise, it is almost without instance contradictory
that ever any government was disastrous that was in the
hands of learned governors.?, For howsoever it hath been
ordinary with politic men to extenuate and disable learned
men by the names of Pedantes ; yet in the records of time it
appeareth, in many particulars, that the governments of
princes in minority (notwithstanding the infinite disadvan-
tage of that kind of state) have nevertheless excelled the
government of princes of mature age, even for that reason
which they seek to traduce, which is, that by that occasion
the state hath been in the hands of Pedantes ; for so was the

state of Rome for the first five years, which are so much

1 Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 14, 4, where he says that the body reaches
perfection at the age of 35 (75), and the mind at 49 (7 <7).
*See Plato, icp. Vv. 493,

Advancement of Learning 4

magnified, during the minority of Nero, in the hands of
Seneca, a Pedanti ; so it was again, for ten years’ space or
more, during the minority of Gordianus the younger, with
great applause and contentation in the hands of Mistheus,
a Pedanti : so was it before that, in the minority of Alex-
ander Severus, in like happiness, in hands not much unlike,
by reason of the rule of the women, who were aided by
the teachers and preceptors. Nay, let a man look into the
government of the bishops of Rome, as, by name, into the
government of Pius Quintus, and Sextus Quintus, in our
times, who were both at their entrance esteemed but as
pedantical! friars, and he shall find that such popes do
greater things, and proceed upon truer principles of estate,
than those which have ascended to the papacy from an
education and breeding in affairs of estate and courts of
princes; for although men bred in learning are perhaps to
seek in points of convenience and accommodating for the
present, which the Italians call Ragioni di stato, whereof
the same Pius Quintus could not hear spoken with patience,
terming them inventions against religion and the moral
virtues; yet on the other side, to recompense that, they are _

perfect_in those same plain grounds of religion, justice,

_ honour, and moral virtue, which if they be well and watch-

(SAAS SRE Se AE ee A Ae
fully pursued, there will be seldom use of those other, no

more than of physic in a sound or well dieted body. Neither
can the experience of one man’s life furnish examples and
precedents for the events of one man’s life: for, as it hap-
peneth sometimes that the grandchild, or other descend-
ants, resembleth the ancestor more than the son; so many
times occurrences of present times may sort better with

ancient examples than with those of the latter or immedia-

ate times; and lastly, the wit of one man can no more

_countervail learning than one man’s means can hold way

with a common purse.
( 3) (And as for those particular seducements, or jndisposi-

tions of the mind for policy and government, which Learning

is pretended to insinuate; if it be granted that any such

thing be, it must be remembered withal, that Learning
ministereth in every of them greater strength of medicine

or remedy than it offereth cause of indisposition or infirmity.

1 Edition 1605, prejudicial. The Latin has “ fraterculis verum

eer. : ~ ?
“8 S(MAR UK ARLE We

12 Bacon

For if by a secret operation it make men perplexed and
irresolute, on the other side by plain precept it teacheth
them when and upon what ground to resolve; yea, and
how to carry things in suspense without prejudice, till
they resolve; if it make men positive and regular, it
teacheth them what. things are in their nature demonstra-
tive, and what are conjectural, and as well the use of
distinctions and exceptions, as the latitude of principles
and rules. If it mislead by disproportion or dissimili-
tude of examples, it teacheth men the force of circum-
stances, the errors of comparisons, and all the cautions

of application; so that in all these it doth rectify more_

effectually t than it can ‘an_pervert) And these medicines it
conveyeth into men’s minds much more forcibly by the
quickness and penetration of examples. For let a man
look into the errors of Clement the seventh, so lively de-
scribed by Guicciardine,! who served under him, or into the
errors of Cicero, painted out by his own pencil in his Epistles
to Atticus, and he will fly apace from being irresolute. Let
him look into the errors of Phocion, and he will beware how
he be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but read the fable of
Ixion,” and it will hold him from being vaporous or imagina-
tive. Let him look into the errors of Cato the second, and
he will never be one of the Antipodes, to tread opposite to
the present world.®

(4). And for the conceit that Learning should dispose men
to leisure and privateness, and make men slothful; it were
a strange thing if that which accustometh the mind to a
er petual motion an
whereas contrariwiselit may be truly affirmed, that no kind
of men love business for itself but those that are learned ;
for other persons love it for profit, as a hireling, that loves
the work for the wages; or for honour, as because it beareth
them up in the eyes of men, and refresheth their reputation,
which otherwise would wear; or because it putteth them
in mind of their fortune, and giveth them occasion to
pleasure and displeasure; or because it exerciseth some
faculty wherein they take pride, and so entertaineth them
in good humour and pleasing conceits towards themselves;
or because it advanceth any other their ends. So that, as

1 Guicciard. xvi. 5. 2 Pind. Pyth. il. 21, seq.
* Cic. ad Ait. ii. 1.

Advancement of Learning 13

it is said of untrue valours, that some men’s valours are in
the eyes of them that look on; so such men’s industries are
in the eyes of others, or at least in regard of their own
designments: only learned men love business as an action
according to nature, as agreeable to health of mind as

XeIcise j health of ing pleasure in the action —
itself, and not in the purchase} for that of all men they are

the most indefatigable, if it be towards any business which
can hold or detain their mind.

And if any man be laborious in reading and study and yet
idle in business and_action, it groweth from some weakness
of body or softness-of spirit; such as Seneca speaketh of:
Quidam tam sunt umbratiles, ut putent in turbido esse quicquid
in luce est ;+ and not of Learning: well may it be that such
a point of a man’s nature may make him give himself to
Learning, but it is not learning that breedeth any such point
in his nature.

And that Learning should take up too much time or
leisure; I answer, the most active or busy man that hath
been or can be, hath, no question, many vacant times of
leisure, while he expecteth the times and returns of busi-
ness (except he be either tedious and of no dispatch, or
lightly and unworthily ambitious to meddle in things that
may be better done by others:) and then the question is,
but how these spaces and times of leisure shall be filled
and spent; whether in pleasures or in studies; as was well
answered by Demosthenes to his adversary A‘schines, that
was a man given to pleasure, and told him, That his orations
did smell of the lamp : Indeed (said Demosthenes) there is a
great difference between the things that you and I do by lamp-
light? So as no man need doubt that learning will expulse
business, but rather it will keep and defend the possession
of the mind against idleness and pleasure, which otherwise
at unawares may enter to the prejudice of both.

(6) Again, for that other conceit that Learning should
undermine the reverence of laws and government, it is
assuredly a mere depravation and calumny, without all
shadow of truth. For to say that a blind custom of obedi-

‘Seneca, Epist. 3, quoted from Pomponius, ‘‘ Quidam adeo in
latebras refugerunt, ut” etc.

* Plutarch. Libanius, Vit. Demosth. (Edition Dindorf, p-. 6.)
Told of Pytheas, not of Aéschines.

14 Bacon

ence should be a surer obligation than duty taught and
understood, it is to affirm, that a blind man may tread surer
by a guide than a seeing man can by a light. And it is
without all controversy, that ee doth make the minds
of men gentle, generous, maniable,’ and pliant to govern-
ment; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, thwart, and
mutinous: and ihe evidence of time doth clear this asser-

tion, considering that the mgst_barbarous, rude, and_un-
learned times have been most subject to tumults, seditions,
‘and cha: changes.

URES And as to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he was
ll punished for his blasphemy against Learning, in the
same kind wherein he offended; for when he was past
threescore years old, he was taken with an extreme desire to
go to school again, and to learn the Greek tongue, to the end
to peruse the Greek authors; which doth well demonstrate
that his former censure of the Grecian learning was rather an
_ affected gravity, than according to the inward sense-of_his
own opinion. And as for Virgil's verses, though it pleased
him to brave the world in taking to the Romans the art of
empire, and leaving to others the art of subjects; Cet SO

much is manifest that the Remians never ascended toa

_height of empire, till the time they had
of other arts. For in the time of the two first eee

which had the art of government in greatest perfection,
there lived the best poet, Virgilius Maro; the best historio-|
grapher, Titus Livius; the best antiquary, Marcus Varro;)
and the best, or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that to the)
memory of man are known) As for the accusation of!
Socrates, the time must be remembered when it was prose-
cuted; which was under the Thirty Tyrants, the most base,
bloody, and envious persons that have governed; which
revolution of state was no sooner over, but Socrates, whom
they had made a person criminal, was made a_person hero-
ical, and his memory accumulate with honours divine and
yhuman; and those discourses of his which were then termed
corrupting of manners, were after acknowled e-
reign medicines of the mind and manners, and so have been
received ever since till this day. Let this, therefore, serve

ne

1 The edition of 1605 reads amiable, that of 1633 mantable. The
latter word answers best to the Latin, artes—teneros reddunt,
sequaces, Cerveos.

Advancement of Learning 15

for answer to Politiques, which in their humorous severity,
or in their feigned gravity, have presumed to throw imputa-
tions upon Learning; which redargution nevertheless (save
that we know not whether our labours may extend to other
ages) were not needful for the present, in regard of the love
and reverence towards Learning, which the example and
countenance of two so learned Princes, Queen Elizabeth,
and your Majesty, being as Castor and Pollux, Lucida sidera,>
stars of excellent light and most benign influence, hath
WI t in all men of place and authority in our nation.
Now therefore we come to that third sort of discredit
or diminution of credit that groweth unto Learning from
learned men themselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest :
it is either from their fortune; or from theix_manners; or
from the nature of their studies. For the first, it is not in
their power; and the second is accidental; the third only
is proper to be handled. But because we are not in hand
with true measure, but with popular estimation and conceit,
it is not amiss to speak somewhat of the two former. The
derogations therefore which grow to Learning from the
fortune or condition of learned men, are either in respect of
scarcity of means, or in respect of privateness of life and
meanness of employments.
I. (a) Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned
men usually to begin with little, and not to grow rich so fasta

as other men_by reason they convert not their labours
chiefly to lucre and increase: it were good to leave the com-
mon place in commendation of poverty to some friar to
handle, to whom much was attributed by(Machiavel in this
point; when he said, That the kingdom of the clergy had been
long before at an end, tf the reputation and reverence towards
the poverty of friars had not borne out the scandal of the super-
filmties and excesses of bishops and prelates? So a man
might say that the felicity and delicacy of princes and great

_ persons had long since turned to rudeness and barbarism, if

the poverty of Learning had not kept up civility and honour
af life{ but without any such advantages, it is worthy the
observation what a reverend and honoured thing poverty
was for some ages in the Roman state, which nevertheless

1 Hor. Carnz. iii. 2.
* Mach. Disc. sopra Tita. Liv. iii. 1., speaking of the Franciscan
and Dominican orders.

16 Bacon

was a state without paradoxes. For we see what Titus
Livius saith in his introduction: Ca@terum aut me amor -
negotit susceptr fallit, aut nulla unquam respublica nec major,
nec sanctior, nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit ; nec in quam tam
sereé avaritia luxuriaque immigraverint ; nec ubt tantus ac
tam diu paupertatt ac parsimonie honus fuerit.1 We see
likewise, after that the state of Rome was not itself, but did
degenerate, how that person that took upon him to be coun-
sellor to Julius Cesar after his victory where to begin his
restoration of the state, maketh it of all points the most
summary to take away the estimation of wealth: Verum
hec, et omnia mala pariter cum honore pecunie desinent ; si
neque magistratus, neque alia vulgo cupienda, venalia erunt.”
To conclude this point, as it was truly said, that Ruborest-
virtutts color, though sometime it come from vice; * so it may
be fitly said that Paupertas est virtutis fortuna, though some-
time it may proceed from misgovernment and accident.
Surely Salomon hath pronounced it both in censure, Qui
festinat ad divitias non erit insons ; * and in precept, Buy the
tvuth, and sell 1t not, and so of wisdom and knowledge ,;°
judging that means were to be spent upon Learning, and
not Learning to be applied to means.

(0) And as for the privateness, or obscureness (as it may
be in vulgar estimation accounted) of life of contemplative
men; it is a theme so common to extol a private life, not
taxed with sensuality and sloth, in comparison [with] and
to the disadvantage of a civil life, for safety, liberty, plea-
sure, and dignity, or at least freedom from indignity, as no
man handleth it but handleth it well; such a consonancy
it hath to men’s conceits in the expressing, and to men’s
consents in the allowing. This only I will add, that learned
men forgotten in states and not living in the eyes of men, are
like the images of Cassius and Brutus in the funeral of Junia:
of which not being represented, as many others were,
Tacitus saith, Eo ipso prefulgebant, quod non visebantur.®

(y){And for meanness of employment, that which is most
traduced to contempt is that the government of youth is
commonly allotted to them; which age, because it is the
age of least authority, it is transferred to the disesteeming

Livii Praf. 2 Epist. i. ad C. Cas. de Rep. ord.
_ *® Diog. Cyn. ap. Lert. vi. 54. ‘ Prov. xxviii. 22.
A PYOV. XXill, 23. Tac. Ann, ili. 76, ad fin.

”

Advancement of Learning 17

of those employments wherein youth is conversant, and
which are conversant about youth. But how unjust this
traducement is (if you will reduce things from popularity
of opinion to measure of reason) may appear in that we see
me

into a vessel seasoned; and what mould they lay about a
young plant than about a plant corroborate; so as the
weakest terms and times of all things use to have the
best applications and helps. And will you hearken to the
Hebrew rabbins? Your young men shall see visions, and
your old men shall dream dreams ;* say they” youth is the
worthier age, for that visions are nearer apparitions of God
than dreams) And iet it be noted, that howsoever the
condition? of life of Pedantes hath been scorned upon
theatres, as the ape of tyranny; and that the modern loose- _
ness or negligence ha o the choice.
of schoolmasters and tutors; yet the ancient wisdom of the
best times did always make a just complaint, that states
were too busy with their laws and too negligent in point of

_ education: which excellent part of ancient discipline hath

been in some sort revived of late times by the colleges of the
Jesuits; of whom, although in regard of their superstition I
may say, Quo meliores, eo detertores ; yet in regard of this,
and some other points concerning human learning and
moral matters, I may say, as Agesilaus said to his enemy
Pharnabazus, Talis quum sis, utinam noster esses. And
thus much touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes
of learned men.

2. As touching the manners of learned men, it is a thing
personal and individual: "and no doubt there be amongst
them, as in other professions, of all temperatures: but yet so

as it is not without truth, which is said, that Abeunt studia

| mores,’ studies have an influence and operation upon the

manners of those that are conversant in them.
(2) But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for
my part cannot find any disgrace to Learning can proceed

2 Joel ii. 28.

2 Edition 1629 and 1633 read “ say the.”

% Edition 1605 reads “‘ conditions . . . hath,’’ 1633 reads “ con-
ditions . . . have.”’

* Conference of Agesilaus and Pharnabazus. Plut. Vit. Ages.

5 Ovid, Ep. xv. 83.

18 Bacon

from the manners of learned men not inherent? to them as
they are learned; except it be a fault (which was the sup-
posed fault of Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato the second, Seneca,
and many more) that, because the times they read of are
commonly better than the times they live in, and the duties
taught better than the duties practised, they contend some-
times too far to bring things to perfection, and to reduce the
corruption of manners to honesty of precepts, or examples
of too great height. And yet hereof they have caveats
enough in their own walks. For Solon, when he was asked
whether he had given his citizens the best laws, answered —
wisely, Yea of such as they would receive :* and Plato, finding
that his own heart could not agree with the corrupt manners
of his country, refused to bear place or office, saying, That
a man’s country was to be used as his parents were, that 1s,
with humble persuasions, and not with contestations.? And
Cesar’s counsellor put in the same caveat, Non ad vetera
instituta revocans que jampridem corruptis moribus ludibrio
sunt:* and Cicero noteth this error directly in Cato the
second, when he writes to his friend Atticus; Cato optime
sentit, sed nocet interdum reipublice ; loquitur enim tanquam
in reipublicd Platonis, non tanquam in face Romuli.2 And
the same Cicero doth excuse and expound the philosophers
for going too far, and being too exact in their prescripts,
when he saith, Jsti 1pst preceptores virtutis et magistri, viden-
tur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet protulisse,
ut cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus, 1b1 tamen, ubr
oportet, consisteremus :® and yet himself might have said,
Monitis sum minor tpse mets," for it was his own fault,
though not in so extreme a degree.

(@) Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been
incident to learned men; which is, that they have esteemed

the preservation, good, and honour of their countries_or
masters before their own fortunes or safeties. For so saith

Demosthenes unto the Athenians; If it please you to note 1t,
my counsels unto you are not such whereby I should grow great

1De Augm. has nullum occurrit dedecus literis ex litteratorum
morvibus, quatenus, sunt literati, adherens, which explains it. The
not before inherent goes with cannot according to the rule of double
negative, as it prevailed in early English writers.

* Plutarch, Vzt. Solon. * Plato, Epist. Z. in. $31.

4Sall. Epist. de Rep. ord. * Cic. ad Att. ii, 1.

*Cic. pro Mur. xxxi. 65. ? Ovid, A. Am. ii. 548.

Advancement of Learning 19

amongst you, and you become little amongst the Grecians: but
they be of that nature, as they are sometimes not good for me to
give, but are always good for you to follow.1 And so Seneca,
after he had consecrated that Quinquennium Neronis? to
_ the eternal glory of learned governors, held on his honest
and loyal course of good and free counsel, after his master
grew extremely corrupt in his government. Neither can
this point otherwise be; for Learning endueth men’s minds
with a true sense of the frailty of their persons, the casualty
of their fortunes, and the dignity of their soul and vocation:
so that it is impossible for them to esteem that any greatness
of their own fortune can be a true or worthy end of their
being and ordainment; and therefore are desirous to give
their account to God, and so likewise to their masters under
od (as kings and states that they serve) in these words;
Ecce tibi lucrefeci, and not Ecce; mihi lucrefeci ;* whereas,
the corrupter sort of mere Politiques, that have not their
thoughts established by learning in the love and apprehen-
sion of duty, nor never look abroad into universality, do
refer all things to themselves, and thrust themselves into the
centre of the world, as if all lines should meet in them and
their fortunes; never caring in all tempests what becomes
of the ship of estates, so they may save themselves in the
cockboat of their own fortune: whereas men that feel the
weight of duty and know the limits of self love, use to make
good their places and duties, though with peril; and if they
stand in seditious and violent alterations, it is rather the
reverence which many times both adverse parts do give to
honesty, than any versatile advantage of their own carriage.
But for this point of tender sense and fast obligation of duty
which learning doth endue the mind withal, howsoever
fortune may tax it, and many in the depth of their corrupt
principles may despise it, yet it will receive an open allow-
ance, and therefore needs the less disproof or excusation.
(y) Another fault incident commonly to learned men,
which may be more properly defended than truly denied, is,

that they fail sometimes in applying themselves to particu-
lar persons: which want of exact application ariseth from

1 Demosth. Chers. 187, ad finem.

*The Quinguennitum Neronis refers to the first five years of
Nero’s reign, during which he was under Seneca’s influence.

3 Matt. xxv. 20.

20 Bacon

two causes; the one, because the largeness of their mind
can hardly confine itself to dwell in the exquisite observa-
tion or examination of the nature and customs of one person:
for it is a speech for a lover, and not for a wise man: Satis
magnum alter altert theatrum sumus.1_ Nevertheless I shall
yield, that he that cannot contract the sight of his mind as
well as disperse and dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But
there is a second cause, which is no inablity, but a rejection
upon choice and judgment. For the honest and just bounds
of observation by one person upon another, extend no
farther but to understand him sufficiently, whereby not to
give him offence, or whereby to be able to give him faithful
counsel, or whereby to stand upon reasonable guard and
caution in respect of a man’s self. But to be speculative
into another man to the end to know how to work him, or
wind him, or govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is
double and cloven and not entire and ingenuous; which as
in friendship it is want of integrity, so towards princes or
superiors is want of duty. For the custom of the Levant,
which is that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix their eyes
upon princes,” is in the outward ceremony barbarous, but
the moral is good: for men ought not by cunning and bent
observations to pierce and penetrate into the hearts of kings
which she scripture hath declared to be inscrutable.*

(5) Chere is yet another fault (with which I will conclude
this part) which is often noted in learned men, that they do
many times fail to observe decency and discretion in their

behaviour and carriage, and_commit errors in small and
ordinary points of action so as so as the vulgar sort of capacities
do make a judgment of them _in greater matters by that
which they Tint wanting in them in smaller. But this
consequence doth often deceive men, for which I do refer
them over to that which was said by Themistocles, arro-
gantly and uncivilly being applied to himself out of his own
mouth, but, being applied to the general state of this ques-
tion, pertinently and justly when, being invited to touch a
lute, he said, He could not fiddle, but he could make a small
iown a great state.*) So, no doubt, many may be well seen in
the passages of government and policy, which are to seek in

1A saying of Epicurus. Seneca, Epist. Mor. i. 7.
2 Herod. I. go. 8 PLOY. EX.’ 3
* Plutarch, Vit. Themist., ad init.

}

Advancement of Learning 21

little and punctual occasions. I refer them also to that
which Plato said of his master Socrates, whom he compared
to the gallipots of apothecaries, which on the outside had
apes and owls and antiques, but contained within sovereign
and precious liquors and confections; acknowledging that
to an external report he was not without superficial levities
and deformities, but was inwardly replenished with excel-
lent virtues and powers.1. And so much touching the point
of manners of learned men.

But in the mean time I have no purpose to ¢1 owance
to some conditions and courses base and erein

divers professors of learning have wronged themselves and
gone too far; such as were those trencher philosophers
which in the Jater age of the Roman state were usually in
the houses of great persons, being little better than solemn
parasites; of which kind Lucian maketh a merry descrip-
tion of the philosopher that the great lady took to ride with
her in her coach, and would needs have him carry her little
dog, which he doing officiously and yet uncomely, the page
scoffed and said, That he doubted, the philosopher of a Stotc
would turn to be a Cynic.2 But above all the rest, the gross
and palpable flattery, whereunto many not unlearned have
abased and abused their wits and pens, turning, as Du
Bartas saith, Hecuba into Helena, and Faustina into
Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and estimation of
learning. Neit either_is_the_moral* dedication of books and

~ for that books,
such as are worthy the name of books, ought to have no

patrons but t ason. And the ancient custom

was to dedicate them only to private and equal friends, or
to entitle the books with their names: or if to kings and

_ great persons, it was to some such as the argument of the

book was fit and proper for: but these and the like courses

_ may deserve rather reprehension than defence.

Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or appli-

1 Plat. Conv. iii. 215, where the thought is present, though the
exact similitude is wanting.
* Lucian. de Merc. Cond. 33, 34.

x == >"
3 See Bethulian’s Rescue, bk. v. Lao

““ Tous ces esprits dont la voix flattereuse
Change Hécube en Héléne, et Faustine en Lucréce.’
* Moral, here customary.
C79

s
aad

22 Bacon

cation of learned men to men in fortune. For the answer
was good that Diogenes made to one that asked him in
mockery, How it came to pass that philosophers were the fol-
lowers of rich men, and not rich men of philosophers ? He
answered soberly, and yet sharply, Because the one sort knew
what they had nzed of, and the other did not. And of the like
nature was the answer which Aristippus made, when having
a petition to Dionysius, and no ear given to him, he fell
down at his feet; whereupon Dionysius staid, and gave him
the hearing, and granted it; and afterward some person,
tender on the behalf of philosophy, reproved Aristippus that
he would offer the profession of philosophy such an indignity
as for a private suit to fall at a tyrant’s feet: but he
answered, Jt was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius
that had his ears in his feet.2, Neither was it accounted
weakness, but discretion in him that would not dispute his
best with Adrianus Cesar; excusing himself, That it was
reason to yield to him that commanded thirty legions.3 These
_and the like applications, and stooping to points-of-neces-
__ sity and_ convenience, cannot _be disallowed; for though
they may have some outward baseness, yet in a judgment
truly made they are to be accounted submissions to, the

occasion, and not to the person.
3. Now I proceed to those errors and vanities which have

intervened amongst the studies themselves of the learned,
which is that which is principal and proper to the present
aigument; wherein my purpose is not to make a justifica-
ion of the errors, but by a censure and separation of the
errors to make a justification of that which is good and
sound, and to deliver that from the aspersion of the other.
For we see that_it_is the manner of men to scandalize and
deprave that which retaineth the state * and virtue, by
taking advantage upon that_which is corrupt_and degener-
ate: as the heathens in the primitive church used to
blemish and taint the Christians with the faults and
corruptions of heretics. But nevertheless I have no

1Diog. Laert. Vit. Aristippi, ii. 69; the answer was given by
Aristippus. * Ibid. ii. 79. |
’Spartianus, Vit. Adriant, § 15. The excuse was made by
Favorinus. |
4Had Bacon been accustomed to use the then modern word #fs, —
it is probable he would have used it here. As it is “‘ the state and ©
virtue ’’’ must mean its pure and right condition.

Advancement of Learning 23

meaning at this time to make any exact animadversion
of the errors and impediments in matters of learning, which
are more secret and remote from vulgar opinion, but only
to speak unto such as do fall under or near unto a popular
observation.

There be therefore chiefly three vanities, in studies,

whereby learning hath been most traduced. For those

things we do esteem vain, which are either false or frivolous,
those which either have no truth or no use: and those
persons we esteem vain, which are either credulous or
curious; and curiosity is either in matter or words: so that
in reason, as well as in experience, there fall out to be these
three distempers, as I may term them, of learning: the first,

fantastical learning; the second, contentious learning; and
‘the last, delicate learning; vain imaginations, vain alterca-
tions, and vain affectations; and with the last I will begin.

(2) Martin Luther, conducted no doubt by a higher provi-|
dence, but in discourse of reason * finding what a province’
he had undertaken against the bishop of Rome and the |
degenerate traditions of the church, and finding his own
solitude, being no ways aided by the opinions of his own
time, was enforced to awake all antiquity, and to call
former times to his succours to make a party against the
present time. So that the_ancient authors, both in divinity
and in humanity, which had long time slept in libraries,
began-generally to be read and revolved. Thus by conse-.
quence did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite travail
in the languages original, wherein those authors did write,
for the better understanding of those authors, and the
better advantage of pressing and applying their words.

And thereof grew again a delight in their manner of style

and phrase, and an admiration of that kind of writing;

_ which was much furthered and precipitated by the enmity

and opposition that the propounders of those primitive but
seeming new opinions had against the schoolmen; who were
generally of the contrary part, and whose writings were
altogether in a different style and form; taking liberty to
coin and frame new terms of art to express their own sense,
and to avoid circuit of speech, without regard to the pure-

| ness, pleasantness, and, as I may call it, lawfulness of the

1 Discourse of reason ; a proper logical term. Cf. Sanderson, Ars
Log. 11. i.

24 Bacon

phrase or word. And again, because the great labour that }
then was with the people (of whom the Pharisees were wont
to say, Execrablis ista turba, que non novit legem)? for the
winning and persuading of them, there grew of necessity in
chief price and request eloquence and variety of discourse,
as the fittest and forciblest access into the capacity of
the vulgar sort: so that these four causes concurring, the
admiration of ancient authors, the hate of the schoolmen,
the exact study of languages, and the efficacy of preaching,
did bring in an affectionate study of eloquence and copie of
speech, which then began to flourish. This grew speedily
to an excess; for men began to hunt-more-after-words than
matter; more after the choiceness of the phrase, and the
round and clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet

~ falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustration of
“their works with tropes and figures, than after the weight
of matter, worth of subject,soundness of argument, life of
invention or depth of judgment. Then grew the flowing
and watery vein of Osorius * the Portugal bishop, to be in
price. Then did Sturmius spend such infinite and curious
pains upon Cicero the Orator, and Hermogenes the Rhetori-
cian, besides his own books of Periods and Imitation, and
the like. Then did Car_of Cambridge, and Ascham with
their lectures and writings almost deify Cicero andDemos-
thenes, and allure all young men that were studious, unto
that delicate and polished kind of learning. Then did
Erasmus take occasion to make the scoffing Echo: Decem
annos consumpst in legendo Cicerone ; andthe Echo answered
in Greek, “Ove, Asine.t Then grew the learning of the
schoolmen to be utterly despised as barbarous. In sum,
“the whole inclination and bent of those times was rather
towards copie than weight.

Here, therefore, is the first distemper of learning, when
men study words and not matter; whereof, though I have
represented an example of late times, yet it hath been and
will be secundum majus et minus in all time. And how is
it possible but this should have an operation to discredit
learning, even with vulgar capacities, when they see learned
men’s works like the first letter of a patent, or limned book;

1 Editions 1629 and 1633 omit that; but because here=because of.
2 John vii. 10. 3 Bishop of Silves, died 1580.
“ Collog. between Juvenis and Echo.

Advancement of Learning 25

which though it hath large flourishes, yet is but a letter?
It seems to me that Pygmalion’s frenzy is a good emblem
or portraiture of this vanity: ? for words are but the images
of matter; and except they have life of reason and inven-
tion, to fall in love with them-is_all-one as to fail in love
~with a picture.

But yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be
condemned, to clothe and adorn the obscurity even of Philo-
sophy itself with sensible and plausible elocution. For
hereof we have great examples in. Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca,
Plutarch, and of Plato also in some degree; and hereof like-
wise there is great use: for surely, to the severe inquisition
of truth and the deep progress into philosophy, it 1s some
hindrance; because it is too early satisfactory to the mind
of man, and quencheth the desire of further search, before
we come to a just period. But then if aman be to have any
use of such knowledge in civil occasions, of conference,
counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like; then shall he
find it prepared to his hands in those authors which write in
that manner. But the excess of this is so justly contemp-
tible that as Hercules, when he saw the image of Adonis,
Venus’ minion, in a temple, said in disdain, Nil sacri es ;?
s0 there is none of Hercules’ followers in learning, that is,
the more severe and laborious sort of inquirers into truth,
but will despise those delicacies and affectations, as indeed
capable of no divineness. And thus much of the first
disease or distemper of learning.

(8) The second which followeth is in nature worse than
the former: for as substance of matter is better than beauty
of words, so contrariwise vain matter is worse than vain
words: wherein it seemeth the reprehension of St. Paul was
not only proper for those times, but prophetical for the
times following; and not only respective to divinity, but
extensive to all knowledge; Devita profanas vocum novitates,
et oppositiones falsi nominis scienti@.’ For he assigneth two
marks and badges of suspected and falsified science: the
one, the novelty and strangeness of terms; the other, the
strictness of positions, which of necessity doth induce oppo-
sitions, and so questions and altercations. Surely, like as

1 Ovid, Metam. x. 243.
* Theocr, v. 2 (schol.) or Erasmi A dag.
* ¥ Tim. Vi. 20,

26 Bacon

many substances in nature which are solid do putrify and
corrupt into worms; so it is the property of good and sound
knowledge to putrify and dissolve into a number of subtle,
idle, unwholesome, and, as I may term them, vermiculate
questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and life of
spirit, but no soundness of matter or goodness of quality.

is kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst
the Schoolmen:! who having sharp and strong wits, and
abundance of leisure, and small variety of reading, but their
wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly
Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were shut up in the
cells of monasteries and colleges, and knowing little history,
either of nature or time, did out of no great quantity of
matter and infinite _agitation_of wit_spin_ouf_unto those
aborious webs of learning which are extant in their books.*
For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which
is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh
according to the stuff, and is limited thereby; but if it work
upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless,
and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for
the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or
profit)

This same unprofitable subtility or curiosity_is of two
sorts; either in the subject itself that they handle, when
it is a fruitless speculation or controversy, (whereof there >
are no small number both in Divinity and Philosophy,) or in

the manner or method of handling of a knowledge, which |

amongst them was this; upon every particular position
or assertion to frame objections, and to those objections,
solutions; which solutions were for the most part not con-
futations but distinctions: whereas indeed the strength of
all sciences is, as the strength of the old man’s fagot, in the
band. For the harmony of a science, supporting each part
the other, is and ought to be the true and brief confutation
and suppression of all the smaller sort of objections. But,

on the other side, if you take out every axiom, as the
sticks of the fagot, one by one, you may quarrel with them,

and bend them, and break them at your pleasure: so that,
as was said of Seneca, Verborum minuitis rerum frangit

1For his judgment—a harsh one—on the Schoolmen, see the
Nov. Org. i. 71.
2 See Hallam, Hist. of Lit. vol. i. init. § 18-23.

Advancement of Learning 27

pondera ;} soa man may truly say of the schoolmen, Quas-
tionum minutits scientiarum frangunt soliditatem. (For were
it not better for a man in a fair room to set up one great
light or branching candlestick of lights, than to go abou
with a small watch candle into every corner?). :

_ And such is their method, that rests not so much upon
evidence of truth proved by arguments, authorities,
similitudes, examples, as upon particular confutations and
solutions of every scruple, cavilation, and objection;
breeding for the most part one question as fast as it solveth
another; even asin the former resemblance, when you carry
the light into one corner, you darken the rest; so that the
fable and fiction of Scylla seemeth to be a lively image of
this kind of philosophy or knowledge; which was trans-
formed into a comely virgin forthe upper parts; but then

Canadda succinctam la—trantibus inguina monstris: ?

so the generalities of the schoolmen are for a while good
and proportionable; but then, when you descend into their
distinctions and decisions, instead of a fruitful womb for
the use and benefit of man’s life, they end in monstrous
altercations and barking questions. So as it is not possible

but this quality _of knowledge must fall under popular
contempt, the people being apt to contemn truth upon

occasion of controversies and altercations, and to think they

are all out of their way which never meet; and when they
see such digladiation about subtilties, and matters of no use
or moment, they easily fall upon that judgment of Diony-
sius of Syracuse, Verba ista sunt senum otiosorum.®
Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those Schoolmen
to their great_thirst of truth and unwearied travail of wit
had joined variety and universality of reading and con-
templation, they had proved excellent lights, to the great
advancement of all learning and knowledge: but as they
are, they are great undertakers indeed, and fierce with dark
keeping: but as in the inquiry of the divine truth, their
pride inclined to leave the oracle of God’s word, and to
vanish in the mixture of their own inventions; so in the
inquisition of nature, they ever left the oracle of God’s works,
1 Rerum pondera minutissimis sententiis fregit—Quint. de Inst.

Orat. x. i.
2 Virg. Ecl. vi. 75. * Diog. Laert. iii. 18 (Vit. Platonis).

“
5

:
f

28 Bacon

and adored the deceiving and deformed images which the
unequal mirror of their own minds, or a few received
authors or principles did represent unto them. And thus
much for the second disease of learning,

(y) For the third_vice or disease of learni hich eum

cerneth deceit or untruth, it is of all the rest the foulest; as
that which doth destroy the essential form of-knowledge,

which is nothing but a representation of truth: for the
truth of being and the truth of knowing are one, differing
no more than the direct beam and the beam reflected.
This vice therefore brancheth itself into two sorts; _de-
light in deceiving, and aptness to be deceived; imposture
and credulity; which, although they appear to be of a
diverse nature, the one seeming to proceed of cunning and
the other of simplicity, yet certainly they do for the most
part concur: for, as the verse noteth,
Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est,!

an inquisitive man is a prattler; so, upon the like reason
a credulous man is a deceiver: as we see it in fame, that he
that will easily believe rumours, will as easily augment
rumours, and add somewhat to them of his own; which
Tacitus wisely noteth, when he saith, Fingunt simul credunt-
que ;* so great an affinity hath fiction and belief.

This facility of credit and accepting or admitting things
weakly authorised or warranted, is of two kinds according
to the subject: for it is either a belief of history (as? the
lawyers speak, matter of fact); or else of matter of art and
opinion. As to the former, we see the experience and in-
convenience of this error in ecclesiastical history; which
hath too easily received and registered reports and nar-
rations of miracles wrought by martyrs, hermits, or
monks of the desert, and other holy men, and their relics,
shrines, chapels, and images: which though they had a
passage for a time by the ignorance of the people, the super-
stitious simplicity of some, and the politic toleration of
others holding them but as divine poesies; yet after a period
of time, when the mist began to clear up, they grew to be
esteemed but as old wives’ fables, impostures of the clergy,
illusions of spirits, and badges of Antichrist, to the great
scandal and detriment of religion.

1 Hor. Ed. 1. xvii. 69. * ‘Tac. Hest. 51.
5 I have here followed the reading of edition 1605.

Advancement of Learning 29

So in natural history, we see there hath not been that
choice and judgment used as ought to have been; as may
appear in the writings of Plinius, Cardanus,! Albertus,” and
divers of the Arabians, being fraught with much fabulous
matter, a great part not only untried, but notoriously un-
true, to the great derogation of the credit of natural philo-
sophy with the grave and sober kind of wits: wherein the
wisdom and integrity of Aristotle is worthy to be observed ;
that, having made so diligent and exquisite a history of
living creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with any vain or
feigned matter: and yet on the other sake,®? hath cast all
prodigious narrations, which he thought worthy the record-
ing, into one book: excellently discerning that matter of
manifest truth (such whereupon observation and rule were
to be built), was not to be mingled or weakened with matter
of doubtful credit; and yet again, that rarities and reports
that seem incredible are not to be suppressed or denied to
the memory of men.

And as for the facility of credit which is yielded to arts
and opinions, it is likewise of two kinds; either when too
much belief is attributed to the arts themselves, or to
certain authors in any art. The sciences themselves,
which have had better intelligence and confederacy with
the imagination of man than with his reason, are three in
number ; ~astrology, natural magic, and alchemy : of which
sciences, nevertheless, the ends or pretences are noble. For
astrology pretendeth to discover that correspondence or
concatenation which is between the superior globe and the
inferior: natural magic pretendeth to call and reduce natural
philosophy from variety of speculations to the magnitude of
works: and alchemy pretendeth to make separation of all
the unlike parts of bodies which in mixtures of nature are
incorporate. But the derivations and prosecutions to these
ends, both in the theories and in the practices, are full of
error and vanity; which the great professors themselves

1Cardan—born in Pavia, 1501—wrote about 122 works on

Physics, Mathematics, Astronomy, Astrology, Medicine, Ethics,
Music, etc.

* Albertus Magnus—born in Swabia, about 1198—the most
learned man of his age.

* So in all the early editions; side has been suggested.

* Oavudoww ’Axotcuara—a treatise now generally thought not to
be genuine.

30 Bacon

have sought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writ-
ings, and referring themselves to auricular traditions and
such other devices, to save the credit of impostures: and
yet surely to alchemy this right is due, that it may be com-
pared to the husbandman whereof AZsop makes the fable;
that, when he died, told his sons that he had left unto them
gold buried under ground in his vineyard; and they digged
over all the ground, and gold they found none; but by
reason of their stirring and digging the mould about the
roots of their vines, they had a great vintage the year follow-
ing: so assuredly the search and stir to make gold hath
brought to light a great number of good and fruitful inven-
tions and experiments, as well for the disclosing of nature as
for the use of man’s life.

And as for the overmuch credit that hath been given unto
authors in sciences, in making them dictators, that their
words should stand, and not counsellors! to give advice;
the damage is infinite that sciences have received thereby,
as the principal cause that hath kept them low at a stay
without growth or advancement. For hence it hath come,
that in arts mechanical the first deviser comes shortest, and
time addeth and perfecteth; but in sciences the first author
goeth farthest, and time leeseth and corrupteth. So we see,
artillery, sailing, printing, and the like, were grossly man-
aged at the first, and by time accommodated and refined:
but contrariwise, the philosophies and sciences of Aristotle,
Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of
most vigour at the first and by time degenerate and imbased ;
whereof the reason is no other, but that in the former many
wits and industries have contributed in one; and in the
latter many wits and industries have been spent about
the wit of some one, whom many times they have rather

\ depraved than illustrated. Forfas water will not ascend
iieie: than the level of the first springhead from whence it
'descendeth, so knowledge derived from Aristotle, and
‘exempted from liberty of examination, will not rise again
higher than the knowledge of Aristotle.¥ And therefore
jalthough the position be good, Oportet discentem credere,?

1 Editions 1629 and 1633 have consuls. De Augm.: ‘‘ Dictatoria
quadam potestate munivit ut edicant, non senatoria ut consulant.”
Ellis suggests that Bacon wrote counsellrs. It clearly should be
counsellors. 2 Arist. Soph. El. 2.

Advancement of Learning 31

yet it must be coupled with this, Oportet edoctum judtcare ,;
for disciples do owe unto masters only a temporary belief
and a suspension of their own judgment until they be fully
instructed, and not an absolute resignation or perpetual
captivity: and therefore, to conclude this point, I will say
no more, but so let great authors have their due, as time,
which is the author of authors, be not deprived of his due,
which is, further and further to discover truth.

4. Thus have I gone over these three diseases of learning ;
besides the which there are some other rather peccant
humours that formed diseases: which nevertheless are not
so secret and intrinsic but that they fall under a popular

observation and traducement, and therefore are not to be

passed over.

(a) The first of these is the extreme affecting of two
extremities; the one antiquity, the other novelty; wherein
it seemeth the children of time do take after the nature and
malice of the father. For as he devoureth his children, so

one of them seeketh to devour and suppress the other;
_ while antiquity envieth there should be new additions, and
novelty cannot be content to add but it must deface.

Surely the advice of the prophet is the true direction in this

matter, State super vias antiquas, et videte quanam fit via

recta et bona et ambulate in ea.' Antiquity deserveth that

reverence, that men should make a stand thereupon and
_ discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is

_ well taken, then to make progression. And to speak truly,
| Antiquitas seculi juventus mund1.2, These times are the

ancient times, when the world is ancient, and not those
which we account ancient ordine retrogrado, by a computa-
tion backward from ourselves.

(0) Another error induced by the former is a distrust that
anything should be now to be found out, which the world
should have missed and passed over so long time; as if the

fame objection were to be made to time, that Lucian maketh

_ to Jupiter and other the heathen gods; of which he won-

dereth that they. begot so many children in old time, and
begot none in his time; and asketh whether they were be-
come septuagenary, or whether the law Papia, made against
old men’s marriages, had restrained them. So it seemeth

-men doubt lest time is become past children and generation ;

1 Jerem. vi. 16. 2 See Nov. Org. i. 84.

32 Bacon

wherein, contrariwise, we see commonly the levity and in-
constancy of men’s judgments, which till a matter be done,
wonder that it can be done; and as soon as it is done, wonder
again that it was no sooner done: as we see in the expedition
of Alexander into Asia, which at first was prejudged as a
vast and impossible enterprise; and yet afterwards it
pleaseth Livy to make no more of it than this: Nil aliud
quam bene ausus vana contemnere; 1 and the fame happened
to Columbus in the western navigation. But in intellectual
matters it is much more common; as may be seen in most
of the propositions of Euclid; which till they be demonstrate,
they seem strange to our assent; but being demonstrate,

our mind accepteth of them by a kind of relation (as the |

lawyers speak), as if we had known them before.
3. Another error, that hath also some affinity with the

former, 1s a conceit that of former opinions or sects, after |

variety and examination, the best hath still prevailed and
suppressed the rest; so as, if a man should begin the labour
of a new search, he were but like to light somewhat formerly
rejected, and by rejection brought into oblivion: as if the
multitude, or the wisest for the multitude’s sake, were not
ready to give passage rather to that which is popular and

superficial than to that which is substantial and profound; ©

for the truth is that time seemeth to be of the nature of a

river or stream, which carrieth down to us that which is —
light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which |

is weighty and solid.
4. Another error, of a diverse nature from all the former,

is the over early and peremptory reduction of ledge —

into arts and methods; from which time commonly sciences
receive small or no augmentation. But as young men,
when they knit and shape perfectly, do seldom grow to a
further stature; so knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and
observations, it is in growth: but when it once is compre-
hended in exact methods, it may perchance be further
polished and illustrate? and accommodated for use and
practice; but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance.

5. Another error, which doth succeed that which we last
mentioned, is that after the distribution of particular arts
and sciences, men have abandoned universality, or philo-
sophia prima ; which cannot but cease and stop all progres-

tL iy. 1X. 17. 2 So in edition 1605.

a ee ee

" Advancement of Learning 33

sion. For no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat
or a level: neither is it possible to discover the more remote
and deeper parts of any science, if you stand but upon the
level of the same science, and ascend not to a higher science.

6. Another error hath proceeded from too great a rever-
ence, and a kind of adoration of the mind and understanding
of man; by means whereof men have withdrawn themselves
too_much_ fro ature, and the
observations of experience, and have tumbled up and down
in their own reason and conceits. Upon these intellectual-
ists, which are notwithstanding commonly taken for the
most sublime and divine philosophers, Heraclitus gave a
just censure, saying, Men sought truth in thew own little
worlds, and not in the great and common world; for they dis-
dain to spell, and so by degrees to read in the volume of

_God’s works: and contrariwise by continual meditation and

agitation of wit do urge and as it were invocate their own
spirits to divine and give oracles unto them, whereby they
are deservedly deluded.
7. Another error that hath some connection with this
latter, is, that men_have used to infect their meditations,
opinions, and doctrines, with some conceits which they have
most admired, or some sciences which they have most

applied; and given all things else a tincture according to them.
utterly untrue and unproper. So hath Plato intermingled his
philosophy with theology, and Aristotle with logic; and
the second school of Plato, Proclus and the rest, with the
mathematics.? For these were the arts which had a kind
of primogeniture with them severally. So have the alchym-
ists made a philosophy out of a few experiments of the
furnace; and Gilbertus,? our countryman, hath made a
philosophy out of the observations of a lodestone. So
Cicero, when reciting the several opinions of the nature of
the soul he found a musician that held the soul was but a
harmony, saith pleasantly, Hic ab arte sua non recessit, etc.*
But of these conceits Aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely,
when he saith, Qui respiciunt ad pauca de facilt pronunciant.®

1Sext. Empir. adv. Math. vii. 133.

* See Nov. Org. i. 63. 3 See Nov. Org. i. 64.

4 Tuscul. Disp. i. x. 20. He is speaking of Aristoxenus. Plato,
in the Phedo, pp. 56 and 61, introduces the same analogy.

5 De Gener. et Corrupt. 1. 2.

34. Bacon

8. Another error is an_impatience of doubt and haste to
assertion without due and mature suspension of judgment.
‘For the two ways of contemplation are not unlike the two
ways of action commonly spoken of by the ancients; the
one plain and smooth in the beginning, and in the end
impassable; the other rough and troublesome in the
entrance, but after a while fair and even. So it is in con-
templation; if a man will begin with certainties, he shall
end in doubts ; but if he will be content to begin with
doubts, he shall end in certainties.

eae

as may be soonest believed, and not easiliest examined. It
is true, that in compendious treatises for practice that form
is not to be disallowed: but in the true handling of know-
ledge, men ought not to fall either on the one side into the
vein of Velleius the Epicurean: Nil tam metuens, quam ne
dubitare aliqua de ve videretur ;+ nor on the other side into
Socrates his ironical doubting of all things;? but to pro-
pound things sincerely with more or less asseveration, as
they stand in a man’s own judgment proved more or less.

10. Other errors there are in the scope that men propound
to themselves, whereunto they bend their endeavours; for
whereas the more constant and devote® kind of professors
of any science ought to propound to themselves to make
some additions to their science, they convert their labours
to aspire to certain second prizes: as to be a profound
interpreter or commenter, to be a sharp champion or de-
fender, to be a methodical compounder or abridger; and

so the patrimony of knowledge cometh to be sometimes

improved, but eerenpesee

11. But the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking
or misplacing of the last or farthest end of knowledge: for
men have entered into a désire of learning and knowledge, |
sometimes upon a natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite;

sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight ;
sometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to

1Cic. De Nat. Deor. I. viii. 18.

2 His Eipdvera. See Plato, Apol. (p. 21), for the best instance of
this. He there explains his superiority to consist in the knowledge
of his own ignorance. 3 So edition 1605. |

Advancement of Learning 35

enable them to victory of wit and contradiction; and most
times for lucre and profession; and seldom sincerely to give
a true account of their gift of reason, to the benefit and use
of men: asif there were sought in knowledge a couch where-
upon to rest a searching and restless spirit ; or a tarrasse, for
a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with’
a fair prospect; or a tower of state, for a proud mind to raise j
itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground, for strife and
contention; or a shop, for profit or sale; and not a rich :

. storehouse, for the glory of the Creator and the relief of
man’s estate. ut this is that which will indeed dignify
and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and action may be
more nearly and straitly conjoined and united together
than they have been; a conjunction like unto that of the
two highest planets, Saturn, the planet of rest and contem- |
plation, and Jupiter, the planet of civil society and action)
howbeit, I do not mean, when I speak of use and actiorf,:
that end before-mentioned of the applying of knowledge

_ to lucre and profession; for I am not ignorant how much

- that diverteth and interrupteth the prosecution and advance-

ment of knowledge, like unto the golden ball thrown before

Atalanta, which while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take

up, the race is hindered ;

Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit.+

12. Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates,
to call philosophy down from heaven to converse upon the
earth;? that is, to leave natural philosophy aside, and to
apply knowledge only to manners and policy. But as both
heaven and earth do conspire and contribute to the use and
benefit of man; so the end ought to be, from both philo-
sophies to_ separate and reject vain speculations, and what-
soever is empty and void, and_to_preserve and augment
whatsoever is solid and fruitful: that knowledge may not
“be, as a curtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, or as a bond-
woman, to acquire and gain to her master’s use; but as a
spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort.

Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind of dissec-
tion, those peccant humours, (the principal of them,) which
hath? not only given impediment to the proficience of

1 Ovid, Metam. x. 667. *Cic. Tusc. Disp. v. 4, 10.
3 In all editions hath. For in Bacon’s time the verb singular was

36 Bacon

learning, but have given also occasion to the traducement
thereof: wherein if I have been too plain, it must be remem-
bered, fidelia vulnera amantis, sed dolosa oscula malignantis.1
This, J think, I have gained, that I ought to be the better
believed in that which I shall say pertaining to commenda-
tion; because I have proceeded so freely in that which
concerneth censure. And yet I have no purpose to enter
into a laudative of learning, or to make a hymn to the
Muses; (though I am of opinion that it is long since their
rites were duly celebrated:) but my intent is, without
varnish or amplification justly to weigh the dignity of
knowledge in the balance with other things, and to take
the true value thereof by testimonies and arguments divine
and human.

II. 1. First therefore let us seek the dignity of knowledge
in the archetype or first platform, which is in the attributes
and_acts of God, as far as they are revealed to man and —
wie ener
‘may_be observed with sobriety; wherein we may not seek
it by the name of Learning; for all Learning is Knowledge —
acquired, and all knowledge in God is original: and there-
fore we must look for it by another name, that of Wisdom
or Sapience, as the Scriptures call it.

It is so then, that in the wo creation we see a
double emanation of Virtue from God; the one referring
more properly to Power, the other to Wisdom; the one
expressed in making the subsistence of the matter, and the
other in disposing the beauty of the form. This being
supposed, it is to be observed that for anything which
appeareth in the history of the creation, the confused mass
and matter of Heaven and Earth was made in a moment; ~
and the order and disposition of that chaos or mass was
the work of six days; such a note of difference it pleased
God to put upon the works of Power, and the works of Wis-
dom; wherewith concurreth, that in the former it is not set
down that God said, Let there be heaven and earth, as it is
set down of the works following; but actually, that God
made Heaven and Earth: the one carrying the style of a
Manufacture, and the other of a Law, Decree, or Counsel.

To proceed to that which is next in order from God, to

very commonly used with more nominatives than one, and even
with plural nouns, as here.
_ Prov. XxVi. 6.

Advancement of Learning a7

Spirits;! we find, as far as credit is to be given to the
celestial hierarchy of that supposed Dionysius the senator
_ of Athens, the first place or degree is given to the angels of
Love, which are termed Seraphim; the second to the angels
of Light, which are termed Cherubim; and the third, and
so following places, to Thrones, Principalities, and the rest,
which are all angels of power and ministry; so as the angels
of Knowledge and Illumination are placed before the angels
of Office and Domination.?

To descend from Spirits and Intellectual Forms to Sensible
and Material Forms; we read the first Form that was
created was Light,? which hath a relation and correspond-
ence in nature and corporal things to Knowledge in Spirits
and incorporal things.

So in the distribution of days we see the day wherein God
did rest and contemplate His own works, was blessed above
all the days wherein He did effect, and accomplish them.‘

After the creation was finished, it is set down unto us
that man was placed in the garden to work therein; which
work, so appointed to him, could be no other than work of
Contemplation; that is, when the end of work is but for
exercise and experiment, not for necessity; for there being
then no reluctation of the creature, nor sweat of the brow,
man’s employment must of consequence have been matter
of delight in the experiment, and not matter of labour for

the use. Again, the first_acts which man performed in
Paradise consisted 0 of the two summary parts of knowledge ;
the view_of creatures, and the imposition of names.® As

for the knowledge which induced the fall, it was, as was
touched before, not the natural knowledge of creatures, but
the moral knowledge of good and evil; wherein the supposi-
tion was, that God’s commandments or prohibitions were
not the originals of good and evil, but that they had other
beginnings, which man aspired to know; to the end to make
a total defection from God and to depend wholly upon
himself.

To pass on: in the first event or occurrence after the fall
of man, we see, (as the Scriptures have infinite mysteries, not

* Ch. Hooker, E. P. I. iv. 1, 2.
2 Dionys. De Ce@lesti Hievarch. cap. 7, 8, 9. This work is, as
Bacon hints, spurious, though no other author is assigned.
*Gen. i. 3. “ih 3s "ai 10;
D 799

38 Bacon
violating at all the truth of the story or letter,) an image of
the two estates, the contemplative state and the_active
state, figured in the two persons of Abel and Cain, and in
the two simplest and most primitive trades of life; that of
the shepherd, (who, by reason of his leisure, rest in a place,
and living in view of heaven, is a lively image of a contem-
plative life,) and that of the husbandman: ! where we see
again the favour and election of God went to the shepherd,
and _ not to the tiller of the ground. ;
So in the age before the flood, the holy records within
those few memorials which are there entered and registered
have vouchsafed to mention and honour the name of the
inventors and authors of music and works in metal.? In
the age after the flood, the first great judgment of God upon
the ambition of man was the.confusion of ton ;° whereby
the_open trade and intercourse of learning and knowledge
was chiefly imbarred. eee
To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God’s first pen:
he is adorned by the Scripturés with this addition and
commendation, That he was seen in all the learning of the
Egyptians ; * which nation, we know, was one of the most
ancient schools of the world: for so Plato brings in the
Egyptian priest saying unto Solon: You Grecians are ever
children ; you have no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity
of knowledge Take a view of the ial law of Moses;
you shall find, besides the prefiguration of Christ, the badge
or difference of the people of God, the exercise and impres=~
sion of obedience, and other divine uses and fruits thereof,
that some of the most learned Rabbins have travailed
profitably and profoundly to observe,some of them a natural, —
some of them a moral sense, or reduction of many of the
ceremonies and ordinances. As in the law of the leprosy,
where it is said, If the whiteness have overspread the flesh, the _
patient may pass abroad for clean ; but if there be any whole
flesh remaining, he is to be shut up for unclean ,;* one of them
noteth a principle of nature, that putrefaction 1s more con-
tagious before maturity than after: and another noteth a
position of moral philosophy, that men abandoned to vice —
do not so much corrupt manners, as those that are half good

14sen. iv. 2. *1V. 2128.
xt. * Act. Ap. vii. 22.
® Plat. Tim. in. 22. 8 Levit. xiii. 12-14.

Advancement of Learning 39

and half evil. Soin this and very many other places in that
law, there is to be found, besides the theological sense,
much aspersion of philosophy.

So likewise in that excellent book of_Jab, if it be revolved
with diligence, it will be found pregnant and swelling with
- natural philosophy; as, for example, cosmography, and the
eoundiess of the world, Qut extendit aquilonem super vacuum,
et appendit terram super nililum ; * wherein the pensileness
of the earth, the pole of the north, and the finiteness or
convexity of heaven are manifestly touched. So again,
matter of astronomy; Spiritus ejus ornavit celos, et obstetri-
cante manu ejus eductus est coluber tortuosus.2, And in another
place; Nunqutd congungere valebis micantes stellas Pleiadas,
aut gyrum Arcturt poterts disstpare?*® Where the fixing of
the stars, ever standing at equal distance, is with great
elegancy noted. And in another place, Qui facit Arcturum,
et Oriona, et Hyadas, et intertora Ausint ;* where again he
takes knowledge of the depression of the southern pole,
calling it the secrets of the south, because the southern stars
were in that climate unseen. Matter of generation; Annon
sicut lac mulsisti me, et sicut caseum coagulastt me? etc.®
Matter of minerals; Habet argentum venarum suarum
principia : et auro locus est in quo conflatur, ferrum de terra
tollitur, et lapis solutus calore in @s vertitur :® and so for-
wards in that chapter.

So likewise in the person of Salomon the King, we see the
gift or endowment_of wisdom and learning, both in Salo-
mon’s petition and in God’s assent thereunto, preferred
before all other terrene and temporal felicity.?. By virtue
of which grant or donative of God Salomon became enabled
not only to write those excellent Parables or Aphorisms
concerning divine and moral philosophy; but also to com-
pile a Natural History of all verdure, from the cedar upon
the mountain to the moss upon the wall; (which is but a
rudiment between putrefaction and a herb,)® and also of
all things that breathe or move.? Nay, the same Salomon
the King, although he excelled in the glory of treasure and
magnificent buildings, of shipping and navigation, of service
and attendance, of fame and renown, and the like, yet he

1 Job. xxvi. 7. *XSVi. 13: § XXXViii. 31.

7 ax. 9. *x. 10. * xxviii. I.

71 Kings iii. 5, seq. ® Nov. Org. ii. 30. ®1 Kings iv. 33.

o

40 Bacon

maketh no claim to any of those glories, but only to the
glory of inquisition of truth; for so he saith expressly, The
glory of God ts to conceal a thing, but the glory of the king is to
find tt out ;* as if, according to the innocent play of children,
the Divine Majesty took delight to hide His works, to the
end to have them found out; and as if kings could not obtain
a greater honour than to be God’s playfellows in that game;
considering the great commandment of wits and means,
whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them.

Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the times
after our Saviour came into the world; for our Saviour
Himself did first show His power to subdue ignorance, by

_His conference with the priests_and_doctors of the law,”
before He showed His power to subdue nature by His
miracles. And the coming of the Holy Spirit was chiefly
figured and expressed in thé similitude and gift of tongues,?
which are but velicula sctentie.

His immediate working, and to abase all human wisdom or
knowledge; yet, nevertheless, that counsel of His was no
sooner performed, but in the next vicissitude and succession
He did send His Divine Truth into the world waited on with
other learnings, as with servants or handmaids; for so we
see St. Paul, who was the only learned amongst the Apostles,
had his pen most used in the Scriptures of the New Testa-
ment.

So again, we find that many of the ancient Bishops and
Fathers-of the Church were excellently read and studied in
all the learning of the heathen; insomuch that the_edict of

the Emperor Julianus,? whereby it was interdicted unto
_Christians to be admitted into schools, lectures, or exercises

of learning, was este and accounted a more pernicious
engi ination against the Christian Faith, than

were all the sanguinary prosecutions of his predecessors;

neither could the emulation and jealousy of Gregory the
first of that name, bishop of Rome,? ever obtain the opinion

1 Prov. xxv. 2. 2 Luke ii. 46. * Act. Ab. tits
4 Gibbon, vol. ii. c. 23, who quotes Ammian. xxv. 5.
5 Gibbon, vol. iv. c. 45. The story that St. Gregory destroyed

i Advancement of Learning 41

of piety or devotion; but contrariwise received the censure
of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity, even amongst holy
men; in that he designed to obliterate and extinguish the
memory of heathen antiquity and authors. But contrari-
wise, it was the Christian Church, which, amidst the inunda-
tions of the Scythians on the one side from the north-west,
and the Saracens from the east, did preserve in the sacred
lap and bosom thereof the precious relics even of heathen
learning, which otherwise had been extinguished as if no
such thing had ever been.

And we see before our eyes, that in the age of ourselves

and our fathers, when i C 1 the Church of ~
ome to account for their ate manners and cere--

Monies, and sundry doctrines obnoxious and framed to
Uphol hold the same abuses; at one and the same time it was

eee ee eae Providence that there should attend
withal a renovation and new spring of-all ather knowledges,
And on the other side we see the Jesuits, (who partly in
themselves, and partly by the emulation and provocation
of their example, have much quickened and strengthened
the state of learning, )) we see, I say, what notable service

and repar to the Roman see.
Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be observed, that

there be two principal duties and services, besides ornament
and illustration, which philosophy and human learning do_
ee The one, because they are an
effectual inducement to the exaltation of the glory of God:

for as the Psalms and other Scriptures do often invite us to
consider and magnify the great and wonderful works of
God,! so if we should rest only in the contemplation of the
exterior of them, as they first offer themselves to our senses,
we should do a like injury unto the Majesty of God, as if
we should judge or construe of the store of some excellent
jeweller, by that only which is set out toward the street in
his shop. The other, because they minister a singular hel

and preservative against unbelief and error: for our Saviour
saith, You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of
God ;* laying before us two books or volumes to study, if

the Palatine Library is now rejected; but as to his aversion to pro-
fane letters there can be no doubt. Milman’s Latin Christianity,
me. iii. Cc. 7.

1 Ps, xix. Civ. 3 Matt. xxii. 29.

42 Bacon

we will be secured from error; first, the Scriptures, reveal-
ing the Will of God; and then the creatures expressing His
Power ;* whereof the latter is a key unto the former: not
only opening our understanding to conceive the true sense
of the Scriptures, by the general notions of reason and rules
of speech; but chiefly opening our belief, in drawing us into
a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is
chiefly signed and engraven upon His works. Thus much
therefore for divine testimony and evidence concerning the
true dignity and value of Learning.

ii. As for human proofs, it is so large a field, as in a dis-
course of this nature and brevity it is fit rather to use choice
of those things which we shall produce, than to embrace the
variety of them. First, therefore, in the degrees of humaa
honour amongst the heathen, it was the highest to obtain to
a veneration and adoration as a God. This unto the Chris-
tians is as the forbidden fruit. But we speak now separately
of human testimony: according to which, that which the
Grecians call apotheosis, and the Latins, relatio inter divos,
was the supreme honour which man could attribute unto
man: especially when it was given, not by a formal decree
or act of state, as it was used among the Roman Emperors,
but by an inward assent and belief. Which honour, being
so high, had also a degree or middle term; for there were
reckoned above human honours, honours? heroical and
divine: in the attribution and distribution of which honours,
we see antiquity made this difference: that whereas
foundersand uniters of states and cities, law-givers, extirpers
of tyrants, fathers of the people, and other eminent persons
in civil merit, were honoured but with the titles of worthies
or demi-gods; such as were Hercules, Theseus, Minos,
Romulus, and the like: on the other side, such as were
inventors and authors of new arts, endowments, and com-
modities towards man’s life, were ever consecrated amongst
the gods themselves; as were Ceres, Bacchus, Mercurius,
Apollo, and others: and justly; for the merit of the former
is confined within the circle of an age or a nation; and is
like fruitful showers, which though they be profitable and
good, yet serve but for that season, and for a latitude of
ground where they fall; but the other is indeed like the
benefits of heaven, which are permanent and universal.

1Ct. Nov. Org. 1. 89. 2 All the old editions read honour.

Advancement of -Learning 43

The former, again, is mixed with strife and perturbation;
but the latter hath the true character of Divine Presence,
coming ! in aura leni, without noise or agitation.

Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in re-
pressing the inconveniences which grow from man to man,
much inferior to the former, of relieving the necessities
which arise from nature; which merit was lively set forth
by the ancients in that feigned relation of Orpheus’ theatre,
where all beasts and birds assembled; and, forgetting their
several appetites, some of prey, some of game, some of
quarrel, stood all sociably together listening to the airs and
accords of the harp; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or
was drowned by some louder noise, but every beast returned
to its own nature: wherein is aptly described the nature
and condition of men, who are full of savage and unre-
claimed desires of profit, of lust, of revenge; which as long
as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly
touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons,
of harangues, so long is society and peace maintained; but
if these instruments be silent, or that sedition and tumult
make them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and
confusion.

But this appeareth more manifestly, when kings them-
selves, or persons of authority under them, or other gover-
nors in commonwealths
with learning. For although he might be thought partial
to his own profession, that said, Then should people and
estates be happy, when either kings were philosophers, or philo-
sophers kings ;* yet so much is verified by experience, that
under learned princes and governors there have been ever
the best times: for howsoever kings may have their imper-
fections in their passions and customs; yet if they be illu-
minate by learning, they have those notions of religion,
policy, and morality, which do preserve them, and refrain
them from all ruinous and peremptory errors and excesses;
whispering evermore in their ears, when counsellors and
servants stand mute and silent. And senators or coun-
sellors likewise, which be learned, do proceed upon more
safe and substantial principles, than counsellors which are

1 In the edition 1605 com— ends a line, and the remainder of the
word has been omitted. The editions 1629 and 1633 read commonly.
2 Plat. Rep. v. 473.

44 Bacon

only men of experience: the one sort keeping dangers afar
off, whereas the other discover them not till they come near
hand, and then trust to the agility of their wit to ward or
avoid them.

Which felicity of times under learned princes, (to keep
still the law of brevity, by using the most eminent and
selected examples,) doth best appear in the age which
passed _from the death of Domitian the emperor until the
reign of Commodus; comprehending a succession of six
princes, all learned, or singular favourers and advancers
of learning, which age for temporal respects, was the most
happy and flourishing that ever the Roman empire, (which
then was a model of the world,) enjoyed: a matter revealed
and prefigured unto Domitian in a dream the night before
he was slain; for he thought there was grown behind upon
his shoulders a neck and head of gold: which came accord-
ingly to pass in those golden times which succeeded: of
which princes we will make some commemoration; wherein
although the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought
fitter for a declamation than agreeable to a treatise infolded
as this is, yet because it is pertinent to the point in hand,

Neque semper arcum
Tendit Apollo,?

and to name them only were too naked and cursory, I will
not omit it altogether. The first was Nerva; the excellent
temper of whose government is by a glance in Cornelius
Tacitus touched to the life: Postqguam divus Nerva res olim
insociabiles miscuisset, imperium et libertatem.2 And in
token of his learning, the last act of his short reign left to
memory, was a missive to his adopted son Trajan, proceed-
ing upon some inward discontent at the ingratitude of the
times, comprehended in a verse of Homer’s:

Telis, Phoebe, tuis lacrymas ulciscere nostras.*

Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not learned:
but if we will hearken to the speech of our Saviour, that
saith, He that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet,
shall have a prophet’s reward ;* he deserveth to be placed

4 Hor. Od. 1. 10, 19. * Agric. Vit. c. 3;

8 Ticeav Aavaol éua Sdxkpva goto. BédNeoow. Hom. Jl. a. 42.
Dionis. Eptt. (Xiphilini), xii.

* Matt. x. 41.

Advancement of Learning 45

amongst the most learned princes: for there was not a
greater admirer of learning, or benefactor of learning; a
founder of famous libraries, a perpetual advancer of learned
men to office, and a familiar converser with learned profes-
sors and preceptors, who were noted to have then most
credit in court. On the other side, how much Trajan’s
virtue and government was admired and renowned, surely
no testimony of grave and faithful history doth more lively
set forth, than that legend tale of Gregorius Magnus, bishop
of Rome, who was noted for the extreme envy he bore
towards all heathen excellency: and yet he is reported,
out of the love and estimation of Trajan’s moral virtues,
to have made unto God passionate and fervent prayers for
the delivery of his soul out of hell: 1 and to have obtained it,
with a caveat that he should make no more such petitions.
In this prince’s time also, the persecution against the Chris-
tians received intermission, upon the certificate of Plinius
Secundus, a man of excellent learning, and by Trajan
advanced.’

Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man that
lived, and the most universal inquirer; insomuch as it was
noted for an error in his mind, that he desired to compre-
hend all things, and not to reserve himself for the worthiest
things: falling into the like humour that was long before
noted in Philip of Macedon, who, when he would needs
over-rule and put down an excellent musician in an argu-
ment touching music, was well answered by him again,
God forbid, sir, saith he, that your fortune should be so bad,
as to know these things better than I.3 It pleased God like-
wise to use the curiosity of this emperor as an inducement
to the peace of His Church in those days. For having
Christ in veneration, not as a God or Saviour, but as a
wonder or novelty; and having His picture in his gallery,
matched with Apollonius, with whom in his vain imagina-
tion he thought he had some conformity; yet it served the
turn to allay the bitter hatred of those times against the
Christian name, so as the Church had peace during his time.
And for his government civil, although he did not attain to
that of Trajan’s glory of arms, or perfection of justice, yet

1 See Dante, Purgatorio, x., who seems to take it from the Life of
Gregory, by John the Deacon.
re Flin. Epsst. x. 97. 8 Plutarch, A pophth. 179.

46 Bacon

in deserving of the weal of the subject he did exceed him.
For Trajan erected many famous monuments and buildings;
insomuch as Constantine the Great in emulation was wont
to call him Parietaria, wall-flower, because his name was
upon so many walls: but his buildings and works were
more of glory and triumph than use and necessity. But
Adrian spent his whole reign, which was peaceable, in a
perambulation or survey of the Roman empire; giving
order and making assignation where he went, for re-edifying
of cities, towns, and forts decayed; and for cutting of rivers
and streams, and for making bridges and passages, and for
policing + of cities and commonalties with new ordinances
and constitutions, and granting new franchises and incor-
porations; so that his whole time was a very restoration
of all the lapses and decays of former times.

Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince excel-
lently learned; and had the patient and subtle wit of a
schoolman; insomuch as in common speech, which leaves
no virtue untaxed, he was called Cymini Sector,? a carver
or divider of cummin, which is one of the least seeds; such
a patience he had and settled spirit to enter into the least
and most exact differences of causes; a fruit no doubt of
the exceeding tranquillity and serenity of his mind; which
being no ways charged or incumbered, either with fears,
remorses, or scruples, but having been noted for a man of
the purest goodness, without all fiction or affectation, that
hath reigned or lived, made his mind continually present
and entire. He likewise approached a degree nearer unto
Christianity, and became, as Agrippa said unto St. Paul,
half a Christian;* holding their religion and law in good
opinion, and not only ceasing persecution, but giving way
to the advancement of Christians.

There succeeded him the first Divi fratres, the two adop-
tive brethren, Lucius Commodus Verus,* (son to A¢lius
Verus, who delighted much in the softer kind of learning,
and was wont to call the poet Martial his Virgil,>5) and
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus; whereof the latter, who

1 Editions 1605 and 1629, pollicing, edition 1633, pollishing.

2Unum de istis puto qui cuminum secant. Julian, Ces. So
Aristot. Eth. Nic. iv. 3, efs rv dtarplovrwy 76 kipivov, where, however,
the phrase is used of the “‘ skinflint,” or niggard.

3 Acts xxvi. 28. * Better known as L. Aurelius Verus.

5 See his life by Spartianus.

Advancement of Learning 47

obscured his colleague and survived him long, was named
the philosopher: who, as he excelled all the rest in learning,
so he excelled them likewise in perfection of all royal virtues ;
insomuch as Julianus the emperor, in his book entitled
Cesares, being as a pasquil or satire to deride all his prede-
cessors, feigned that they were all invited to a banquet of
the gods, and Silenus the jester sat at the nether end of the
table, and bestowed a scoff on every one as they came in;
but when Marcus Philosophus came in, Silenus was gravelled,
and out of countenance, not knowing where to carp at him;
save at the last he gave a glance at his patience towards his
wife. And the virtue of this prince, continued with that of
his predecessor, made the name of Antoninus so sacred in
the world, that though it were extremely dishonoured in
Commodus, Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bore the
name, yet when Alexander Severus refused the name,
because he was a stranger to the family, the senate with one
acclamation said, Quomodo Augustus, sic et Antoninus. In
such renown and veneration was the name of these two
princes in those days, that they would have it as a perpetual
addition in all the emperors’ style. In this emperor’s time
also the Church for the most part was in peace; so as in this
sequence of six princes we do see the blessed effects of
learning in sovereignty, painted forth in the greatest table
of the world.

But for a tablet, or picture of smaller volume, (not pre-
suming to speak of your majesty that liveth,) in my judg-}
ment the most excellent is that of Queen Elizabeth, yous
immediate predecessor in this part of Britain; a princess
that, if Plutarch were now alive to write lives! by parallels,
would trouble him, I think, to find for her a parallel amongst
women. This lady was endued with learning in her sex
singular, and great? even amongst masculine princes;
whether we speak of learning, of language, or of science,
modern or ancient, Divinity or Humanity: and unto the
very last year of her life she was accustomed to appoint set
hours for reading, scarcely any young student in a univer-
sity more daily, or more duly. As for her government, I
assure myself I shall not exceed, if I do affirm that this part

;
|

1 Edition 1605, lynes.
* Editions 1629, 1633, rave. Edition 1605, grace, t.e. “‘ learning in
her sex singular, and grace even amongst masculine princes.”

48 Bacon

of the island never had forty-five years of better times; and
yet not through the calmness of the season, but through the
wisdom of her regiment. For if there be considered of the
one side, the truth of religion established; the constant
peace and security; the good administration of justice; the
temperate use of the prerogative, not slackened, nor much
strained; the flourishing state of learning, sortable to so
excellent a patroness; the convenient estate of wealth and
means, both of Crown and subject; the habit of obedience,
and the moderation of discontents: and there be considered
on the other side the differences of religion; the troubles
of neighbour countries; the ambition of Spain, and opposi-
tion of Rome; and then, that she was solitary and of herself:
these things, I say, considered, as I could not have chosen an
instance so recent and so proper, so I suppose I could not
have chosen one more remarkable or eminent to the purpose
now in hand, which is concerning the conjunction of learn-
ing in the prince with felicity in the people.

Neither hath learning an influence and operation only
upon civil merit and moral virtue, and the arts or tempera-
ture of peace and peaceable government; but likewise it
hath no less power and efficacy in enablement towards
martial and military virtue and prowess; as may be notably
represented in the examples of Alexander the Great, and
Cesar the dictator, mentioned before, but now in fit place
to be resumed: of whose virtues and acts in war there needs
no note or recital, having been the wonders of time in that
kind: but of their affections towards learning, and perfec- —
tions in learning, it is pertinent to say somewhat.

Alexander ! was bred and taught under Aristotle, the great
philosopher, who dedicated divers of his books of philo-
sophy unto him: he was attended with Callisthenes and
divers other learned persons, that followed him in camp,
throughout his journeys and conquests. What price and ©
estimation he had learning in doth notably appear in these
three particulars: first, in the envy he used to express that
he bore towards Achilles, in this, that he had so good a
trumpet of his praises as Homer’s verses; secondly, in the
judgment or solution he gave touching that precious cabinet
of Darius, which was found among his jewels; whereof
question was made what thing was worthy to be put into it;

1 These anecdotes of Alexander come from Plutarch, Vit. Alex.

Advancement of Learning 49

and he gave his opinion for Homer’s works: thirdly, in his
letter to Aristotle, after he had set forth his books of nature,
wherein he expostulated with him for publishing the secrets
or mysteries of philosophy; and gave him to understand
that himself esteemed it more to excel other men in learning
and knowledge than in power and empire. And what use
he had of learning doth appear, or rather shine, in all his
speeches and answers, being full of science, and use of science,
and that in all variety.

And herein again it may seem a thing scholastical, and
somewhat idle, to recite things that every man knoweth;
but yet, since the argument I handle leadeth me thereunto,
I am glad that men shall perceive I am as willing to flatter,
if they will so call it, an Alexander, or a Cesar, or an Anto-
ninus, that are dead many hundred years since, as any that
now liveth: for it is the displaying of the glory of learning
in sovereignty that I propound to myself, and not an
humour of declaiming in any man’s praises. Observe then
the speech he used of Diogenes, and see if it tend not to the
true state of one of the greatest questions of moral philo-
sophy; whether the enjoying of outward things, or the
contemning of them, be the greatest happiness: for when
he saw Diogenes so perfectly contented with so little, he said
to those that mocked at his condition, Were I not Alexander,
I would wish to be Diogenes. But Seneca inverteth it, and
saith ; Plus erat, quod hic nollet acctpere, quam quod tlle posset
dare.' There were more things which Diogenes would have
refused, than there were which Alexander could have given.

Observe again that speech which was usual with him,
That he felt his mortality chiefly in two things, sleep and lust ; ?
and see if it were not a speech extracted out of the depth of
natural philosophy, and liker to have come out of the mouth
of Aristotle or Democritus, than from Alexander.

See again that speech of humanity and poesy; when upon
the bleeding of his wounds, he called unto him one of his
flatterers, that was wont to ascribe to him divine honour,
and said, Look, this ts very blood ; this is not such a liquor as
Homer speaketh of, which ran from Venus’ hand, when it was
pierced by Diomedes.*

1Sen. De Benef. v. 4. *Sen. Ep. Mor. vi. 7.
*’Ixap, olds mép re péer uaxdpeoor Oeoior. Il. «. 340. Cf. Seneca,
ad Luctl. $9.

5° Bacon

See likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic, in the
speech he used to Cassander, upon a complaint that was
made against his father Antipater: for when Alexander
happened to say, Do you think these men would have come
from so far to complain, except they had just cause of grief ?
And Cassander answered, Yea, that was the matter, because
they thought they should not be disproved. Said Alexander
laughing: See the subtilties of Aristotle, to take a matter both
ways, pro et contra, etc.

But note again how well he could use the same art, which
he reprehended, to serve his own humour: when bearing a
secret grudge to Callisthenes, because he was against the
new ceremony of his adoration, feasting one night where the
same Callisthenes was at the table, it was moved by some
after supper, for entertainment sake, that Callisthenes, who
was an eloquent man, might speak of some theme or purpose
at his own choice; which Callisthenes did; choosing the
praise of the Macedonian nation for his discourse, and per-
forming the same with so good manner, as the hearers were
much ravished: whereupon Alexander, nothing pleased,
said, Jt was easy to be eloquent upon so good a subject. But,
saith he, Turn your style, and let us hear what you can say
against us: which Callisthenes presently undertook, and
did with that sting and life, that Alexander interrupted
him, and said, The goodness of the cause made him eloquent
before, and despite made him eloquent then again.

Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that excellent use
of a metaphor or translation, wherewith he taxed Antipater,
who was an imperious and tyrannous governor: for when
one of Antipater’s friends commended him to Alexander
for his moderation, that he did not degenerate, as his other
lieutenants did, into the Persian pride, in use of purple, but
kept the ancient habit of Macedon, of black; Tywe, saith
Alexander, but Antipater is all purple within.” Or that
other, when Parmenio came to him in the plain of Arbela,
and showed him the innumerable multitude of his enemies,
especially as they appeared by the infinite number of lights, _
as it had been a new firmament of stars, and thereupon >
advised him to assail them by night: whereupon he an-
swered, That he would not steal the victory.

1 The Greek is \evxordpugos.
2 6rordppupos. Apop. Reg. et Imp.

Advancement of Learning 51

For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction,
so much in all ages embraced, that he made between his
two friends, Hephestion and Craterus, when he said, That
the one loved Alexander, and the other loved the king: describ-
ing the principal difference of princes’ best servants, that
some in affection love their person, and others in duty love
their crown.

Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error, ordinary
with counsellors of princes, that they counsel their masters
according to the model of their own mind and fortune, and
not of their masters’; when, upon Darius’ great offers,
Parmenio had said, Surely I would accept these offers, were
I as Alexander ; saith Alexander, So would I, were I as
Parmenio.

Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply, which he made
when he gave so large gifts to his friends and servants, and
was asked what he did reserve for himself, and he answered,
Hope : weigh, I say, whether he had not cast up his account
right, because hope must be the portion of all that resolve
upon great enterprises. For this was Cesar’s portion when
he went first into Gaul, his estate being then utterly over-
thrown with largesses. And this was likewise the portion
of that noble prince, howsoever transported with ambition,
Henry Duke of Guise, of whom it was usually said, that he
was the greatest usurer in France, because he had turned
all his estate into obligations.

To conclude, therefore: as certain critics are used to say
hyperbolically, That if all sciences were lost they might be
found in Virgil! so certainly this may be said truly, there
are the prints and footsteps of learning in those few speeches
which are reported of this prince: the admiration of whom,
when I consider him not as Alexander the Great, but as
Aristotle’s scholar, hath carried me too far.

As for Julius Cesar, the excellency of his learning needeth
not to be argued from his education, or his company, or his
speeches; but in a further degree doth declare itself in his
writings and works; whereof some are extant and perma-
nent, and some unfortunately perished. For, first, we see
there is left unto us that excellent history of his own wars,
which he entitled only a Commentary, wherein all succeed-
ing times have admired the solid weight of matter, and the
real passages and lively images of actions and persons,

c2 Bacon

expressed in the greatest propriety of words and perspicuity
of narration that ever was; which that it was not the effect
of a natural gift, but of learning and precept, is well wit-
nessed by that work of his, entitled, De Analogia,’ being a
grammatical philosophy, wherein he did labour to make
this same Vox ad placitum to become Vox ad licitum, and to
reduce custom of speech to congruity of speech; and took,
as it were, the picture of words from the life of reason.

So we receive from him, as a monument both of his power
and learning, the then reformed computation of the year;
well expressing that he took it to be as great a glory to him-
self to observe and know the law of the heavens, as to give
law to men upon the earth.

So likewise in that book of his, Anti-Cato,? it may easily
appear that he did aspire as well to victory of wit as
victory of war: undertaking therein a conflict against the
greatest champion with the pen that then lived, Cicero
the Orator.

So again in his book of Apophthegms, which he collected,
we see that he esteemed it more honour to make himself
but a pair of tables to take the wise and pithy words of
others, than to have every word of his own to be made an
apophthegm or an oracle; as vain princes, by custom of
flattery, pretend to do. And yet if I should enumerate
divers of his speeches, as I did those of Alexander, they are
truly such as Solomon noteth, when he saith, Verba sapien-
tum tanquam aculer, et tanquam clavt in altum defixi:*
whereof I will only recite three, not so delectable for
elegancy, but admirable for vigour and efficacy.

As, first, it is reason he be thought a master of words,
that could with one word appease a mutiny in his army,
which was thus: The Romans, when their generals did
speak to their army, did use the word muilztes, but when the
magistrates spake to the people, they did use the word
Quirites. The soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously
prayed to be cashiered; not that they so meant, but by
expostulation thereof to draw Cesar to other conditions; —
wherein he being resolute not to give way, after some silence, |
he began his speech, Ego, Quirites,> which did admit

1Cic. Brutus, 72. *Cic. ad. Ait. xii. 40, 41; Xili. 50.

*Cic. Epist. ad Div. ix. 16. * Feel, xi. 215
®Suet. Jul. Cas. c. 70.

Advancement of Learning 53

them already cashiered; wherewith they were so surprised,
crossed, and confused, as they would not suffer him to go
on in his speech, but relinquished their demands, and made
it their suit to be again called by the name of milites.

The second speech was thus: Cesar did extremely affect
the name of king; and some were set on as he passed by in
popular acclamation to salute him king: whereupon, find-
ing the cry weak and poor, he put it off thus, in a kind of
jest, as if they had mistaken his surname; Non Rex sum,
sed Casar;1 a speech that if it be searched the life and
fulness of it can scarce be expressed. For, first, it was
a refusal of the name, but yet not serious: again, it did
signify an infinite confidence and magnanimity, as if he
presumed Cesar was the greater title; as by his worthiness
it is come to pass till this day: but chiefly it was a speech
of great allurement toward his own purpose; as if the state
did strive with him but for a name, whereof mean families
were vested; for Rex was a surname with the Romans, as
well as King is with us.”

The last speech which J will mention, was used to Metellus,
when Cesar after war declared did possess himself of the
city of Rome; at which time entering into the inner
treasury to take the money there accumulated, Metellus
being tribune forbade him: whereto Cesar said, That if he
did not desist, he would lay him dead 1n the place. And pre-
sently taking himself up, he added, Adolescens, durius est
mtht hoc dicere quam facere. Young man, it is harder for me
to speak than to do 1t.2 A speech compounded of the greatest
terror and greatest clemency that could proceed out of the
mouth of man.*

But to return and conclude with him; it is evident, him-
self knew well his own perfection in learning, and took it
upon him; as appeared when, upon occasion that some
spake what a strange resolution it was in Lucius Sylla to
resign his dictature; he scoffing at him to his own advan-
tage answered, That Sylla could not skill of letters, and there-
fore knew not how to dictate.®

1Suet. Jul. Ces. c. 70. * Cf. Hor. Sat. I. vii.
Plutarch, Jul. Ces.
‘To these might have well been added Czsar’s exhortation to
the boatman, ‘‘ Thou carriest Cesar and his fortunes.”’
aSuet. Jul. Cas. c. 77.
E 719

54 Bacon

And here it were fit to leave this point, touching the con-
currence of military virtue and learning; (for what example
would come with any grace after those two of Alexander
and Czesar?) were it not in regard of the rareness of circum-
stances that I find in one other particular, as that which did
so suddenly pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder;
and it is of Xenophon the philosopher, who went from
Socrates’ school into Asia, in the expedition of Cyrus the
younger, against King Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that
time was very young, and never had seen the wars before;
neither had any command in the army, but only followed
the war as a voluntary, for the love and conversation of
Proxenus his friend.1. He was present when Phalynus came
in message from the great king to the Grecians, after that
Cyrus was slain in the field, and they a handful of men left
to themselves in the midst of the king’s territories, cut off
from their country by many navigable rivers, and many
hundred miles. The message imported, that they should
deliver up their arms, and submit themselves to the king’s
mercy. To which message before answer was made, divers
of the army conferred familiarly with Phalynus, and
amongst the rest Xenophon happened to say, Why, Phaly-
nus, we have now but these two things left, our arms and our
virtue ; and if we yield up our arms, how shall we make use
of our virtue? Whereto Phalynus smiling on him, said,
If I be not deceived, young gentleman, you are an Athenian :
and, I believe vou study philosophy, and tt is pretty that you
say: but you are much abused, if you think your virtue can
withstand the king’s power.” Here was the scorn; the won-
der followed: which was, that this young scholar or philo-
sopher, after all the captains were murdered in parley by
treason, conducted those ten thousand foot through the
heart of all the king’s high countries from Babylon to Grecia
in safety, in despite of all the king’s forces, to the astonish-
ment of the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians
in time succeeding to make invasion upon the kings of
Persia: as was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian,
attempted by Agesilaus the Spartan, and achieved by
Alexander the Macedonian, all upon the ground of the act
of that young scholar.

To proceed now from imperial and military virtue to moral

1 Xen. Anab. ii. ad fin. 2 Xen. Anab. il. 1, 12.

Advancement of Learning 5 5

and private virtue: first, it is an assured truth, which is
contained in the verses:

Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes,
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.! tak.

It taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness y
of men’s minds; but indeed the accent had need be upon
jideliter : for a little superficial learning doth rather work “4
a contrary effect. It taketh away all levity, temerity, and
insolency, by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficul-
ties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both
sides, and to turn back the first offers and conceits of the
mind, and to accept of nothing but examined and tried.
It taketh away vain admiration of anything, which is the
root of all weakness: for all things are admired either
because they are new, or because they are great. For
novelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation
thoroughly, but will find that printed in his heart Nil novt
super terram.” Neither can any man marvel at the play of
puppets, that goeth behind the curtain, and adviseth well
ofthe motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander the Great,
after that he was used to great armies, and the great con-
quests of the spacious provinces in Asia, when he received
letters out of Greece, of some fights and services there,
which were commonly for a passage or a fort, or some walled
town at the most, he said, Jt seemed to him that he was
advertised of the Battle of the Frogs and the Mice, that the old
tales went of.? So certainly, if a man meditate much upon
the universal frame of nature, the earth with men upon it
(the divineness of souls except,) will not seem much other
than an ant-hill, whereas some ants carry corn, and some
carry their young, and some go empty, and all to-and-fro a
little heap of dust. It taketh away or mitigateth fear of
death, or adverse fortune; which is one of the greatest
impediments of virtue, and imperfections of manners. For
if a man’s mind be deeply seasoned with the consideration
of the mortality and corruptible nature of things, he will
easily concur with Epictetus, who went forth one day and
saw a woman weeping for her pitcher of earth that was

1 Ov. Ep. Pont, ii. ix. 47. > 0cl. 1, G,

*"Eocxev, & dvdpes, d7€ Aapetov quets évixGmev évradéa, éxet Tis €v’ Apxadla
yeyovévat pvouaxla. Plut. Ages. c. 15.

56 Bacon

broken; and went forth the next day and saw a woman
weeping for her son that was dead, and thereupon said:
Hert vidi fragilem frangi, hodie vidi mortalem mori.. And
therefore Virgil did excellently and profoundly couple the
knowledge of causes and the conquest of all fears, together,
as concomitantia :

Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.*

It were too long to go over the particular remedies
which learning doth minister to all the diseases of the mind;
sometimes purging the ill-humours, sometimes opening the
obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, sometimes
increasing appetite, sometimes healing the wounds and
exulcerations thereof, and the like; and, therefore, I will
conclude with that which hath vationem totius, which 1s,
that it disposeth the constitution of the mind not to be
fixed or settled in the defects thereof, but still to be capable
and susceptible of growth and reformation. For the un-
learned man knows not what it is to descend into himself,
or to call himself to account; nor the pleasure of that
suavissima vita, indies sentire se fiert meliorem.® The good
parts he hath he will learn to show to the full, and use them
dexterously, but not much to increase them: the faults he
hath he will learn how to hide and colour them, but not
much to amend them: like an ill mower, that mows on still,
and never whets his scythe: whereas with the learned man
it fares otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction
and amendment of his mind with the use and employment
thereof. Nay, further, in general and in sum, certain it is
that Veritas and Bonitas differ but as the seal and the print:
for Truth prints Goodness; and they be the clouds of error
which descend in the storms of passions and perturbations.

From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and
commandment, and consider whether in right reason there
be any comparable with that wherewith knowledge invest-
eth and crowneth man’s nature. We see the dignity of the
commandment is according to the dignity of the com-

1 There is no such tale in Epictetus, but see Simplicit in Epict.
Comment. cap. 33.
* Virg. Georg. il. 490. 3 Xen. Mem. i. 6.

Advancement of Learning oF

manded: to have commandment over beasts, as herdmen
have, is a thing contemptible; to have commandment over
children, as schoolmasters have, is a matter of small honour;
to have commandment over galley-slaves is a disparage-
ment rather than an honour. Neither is the command-
ment of tyrants much better, over people which have put
off the generosity of their minds: and therefore it was ever
holden that honours in free monarchies and commonwealths
had a sweetness more than in tyrannies; because the com-
mandment extendeth more over the wills of men, and not
only over their deeds and services. And therefore, when
Virgil putteth himself forth to attribute to Augustus Cesar
the best of human honours, he doth it in these words:

Victorque volentes
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo.!

But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher
than the commandment over the will; for it is a command-
ment over the reason, belief, and understanding of man,
which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth law to the
will itself. For there is no power on earth which setteth
up a throne or chair of state in the spirits and souls of men,
and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and
beliefs, but knowledge and learning. And therefore we
see the detestable and extreme pleasure that arch-heretics,
and false prophets, and impostors are transported with,
when they once find in themselves that they have a superior-
ity in the faith and conscience of men; so great as if they
have once tasted of it, it is seldom seen that any torture or
persecution can make them relinquish or abandon it. But
as this is that which the author of the Revelation calleth
the depth or profoundness of Satan:? so by argument of
contraries, the just and lawful sovereignty over men’s
understanding, by force*® of truth rightly interpreted, is
that which approacheth nearest to the similitude of the
Divine Rule.

As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of
learning is not so confined to give fortune only to states and
commonwealths, as it doth not likewise give fortune to
particular persons. For it was well noted long ago, that

1 Georg. iv. 561, 562. 2 Rev. ii. 24.
* Edition 1605 reads face. ;

58 Bacon

Homer hath given more men their livings, than either Sylla,
or Cesar, or Augustus ever did, notwithstanding their great
largesses and donatives, and distributions of lands to so
many legions. And no doubt it is hard to say, whether
arms or learning have advanced greater numbers. And in ©
case of sovereignty we see, that if arms or descent have
carried away the kingdom, yet learning hath carried the
priesthood, which ever hath been in some competition with
empire.!

Again, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and
learning, it far surpasseth all other in nature: for, shall the
pleasures of the affections so exceed the senses, as much as
the obtaining of desire or victory exceedeth a song or a
dinner; and must not, of consequence, the pleasures of the
intellect or understanding exceed the pleasures of the
affections? We see in all other pleasures there is satiety,
and after they be used, their verdure departeth; which
showeth well they be but deceits of pleasure, and not
pleasures: and that it was the novelty which pleased, and
not the quality; and therefore we see that voluptuous men
turn friars, and ambitious princes turn melancholy. But
of knowledge there is no satiety, but satisfaction and appe-
tite are perpetually interchangeable; and therefore appear-
eth to be good in itself simply, without fallacy or accident.
Neither is that pleasure of small efficacy and contentment
to the mind of man which the poet Lucretius describeth
elegantly,

Suave mari magno, turbantibus zquora ventis, etc.?

It 1s a view of delight, saith he, to stand or walk upon the
shore side, and to see a ship tossed with tempest upon the sea ;
or to be in a fortified tower, and to see two battles join upon a
plain ,; but it is a pleasure incomparable, for the mind of man
to be settled, landed, and fortified in the certainty of truth ;
and from thence to descry and behold the errors, perturbations,
labours, and wanderings up and down of other men.

Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learning
man excelleth man in that wherein man excelleth beasts;
that by learning man ascendeth to the heavens and their
motions, where in body he cannot come, and the like; let
us conclude with the dignity and excellency of knowledge

1Cf. Herod. ii. 141, for the ascendency of the Priesthood in
Egypt. 2 De Rer. Nat. ii. 1-10.

Advancement of Learning 59

and learning in that whereunto man’s nature doth most
aspire, which is, immortality or continuance: for to this
tendeth generation, and raising of houses and families; to
this buildings, foundations, and monuments; to this tendeth
the desire of memory, fame, and celebration, and in effect
the strength of all other human desires. We see then how
far the monuments of wit and learning are more durable
than the monuments of power or of the hands. For have
not the verses of Homer continued twenty-five hundred
years, or more, without the loss of a syllable or letter; dur-
ing which time, infinite palaces, temples, castles, cities, have
been decayed and demolished? It is not possible to have
the true pictures or statues of Cyrus, Alexander, Cesar; no,
nor of the kings or great personages of much later years;
for the originals cannot last, and the copies cannot but
leese of the life and truth. But the images of men’s wits
and knowledges remain in books, exempted from the wrong
of time, and capable of perpetual renovation. Neither are
they fitly to be called images, because they generate still,
and cast their seeds in the minds of others, provoking and
causing infinite actions and opinions in succeeding ages:
so that, if the invention of the ship was thought so noble,
which carrieth riches and commodities from place to place,
and consociateth the most remote regions in participation of
their fruits, how much more are letters to be magnified,
which, as ships, pass through the vast seas of time, and make
ages so distant to participate of the wisdom, illuminations,
and inventions, the one of the other? Nay further, we see
some of the philosophers which were least divine, and most
immersed in the senses, and denied generally the immor-
tality of the soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever
motions the spirit of man could act and perform without
the organs of the body, they thought might remain after
death, which were only those of the understanding, and not
of the affection: so immortal and incorruptible a thing did
knowledge seem unto them to be. { But we, that know by
divine revelation that not only the understanding but the
affections purified, not only the spirit but the body changed,
shall be advanced to immortality, do disclaim in! these

1So all three editions. The Latin has Nos autem... concul-
cantes hac rudimenta . . . novimus. Perhaps in should be omitted
—‘‘ do disclaim these rudiments of the senses.”’

60 Bacon

rudiments of the senses.) But it must be remembered both
in this last point, and so it may likewise be needful in other
places, that in probation of the dignity of knowledge or
learning, I did in the beginning separate divine testimony
from human, which method I have pursued, and so handled
them both apart.

Nevertheless, I do not pretend, and I know it will be
impossible for me, by any pleading of mine, to reverse the
judgment, either of AZsop’s Cock, that preferred the barley-
corn before the gem; or of Midas, that being chosen judge
between Apollo, president of the Muses, and Pan, god of the
flocks, judged for plenty:! or of Paris, that judged for
beauty and love against wisdom and power; nor of Agrip-
pina, Occidat matrem, modo imperet, that preferred empire
with conditions never so detestable;? or of Ulysses, Qui
vetulam pretulit immortalitati,® being a figure of those which
prefer custom and habit before all excellency; or of a num-
ber of the like popular judgments. For these things con-
tinue as they have been: but so will that also continue
whereupon learning hath ever relied, and which faileth not:
Justificata est sapientia a filits suis.4

Ov. Met. xi..153, seg. * Tacit. Annal. xiv. 9.

3 Cf. Cic. de Orat. i. 44, where it is Ithaca, not his old wife, that
Ulysses is said to prefer to immortality.

* Matt. xi, 10:

Advancement of Learning 61

THE SECOND BOOK
To the King

Ir might seem to have more convenience, though it come
often otherwise to pass, excellent King, that those, which
are fruitful in their generations, and have in themselves the
foresight of immortality in their descendants, should like-
wise be more careful of the good estate of future times, unto
which they know they must transmit and commend over
their dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth was a sojourner
in the world in respect of her unmarried life, and was a
blessing to her own times; and yet so as the impression of
her good government, besides her happy memory, is not
without some effect which doth survive her. But to your
Majesty, whom God hath already blessed with so much
royal issue, worthy to continue and represent you for ever,
and whose youthful and fruitful bed doth yet promise many
of the like renovations; it is proper and agreeable to be con-
versant not only in the transitory parts of good government,
but in those acts also which are in their nature permanent
and perpetual: amongst the which, if affection do not
transport me, there is not any more worthy than the further
endowment of the world with sound and fruitful knowledge.
For why should a few received authors stand up like Her-
cules’ columns,! beyond which there should be no sailing
or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star
as your Majesty to conduct and prosper us? To return
therefore where we left, it remaineth to consider of what
kind those acts are which have been undertaken and per-
formed by kings and others for the increase and advance-
ment of learning: wherein I purpose to speak actively
without digressing or dilating.

Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are over-
come by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction,

1A favourite thought of Bacon’s, and expressed afterwards on
the engraved title-page of the first edition of the Novum Organum,
A.D. 1620.

62 Bacon

and by the conjunction of labours. The first multiplieth
endeavour, the second preventeth error, and the third
supplieth the frailty of man: but the principal of these is
direction: for Claudus tn via antevertit cursorem extra viam ;
and Salomon excellently setteth it down, Jf the ivon be not
sharp, tt requireth more strength ; but wisdom is that which
prevaileth ;) signifying that the invention or election of the
mean is more effectual than any inforcement or accumula-
tion of endeavours. This I am induced to speak, for that
(not derogating from the noble intention of any that have
been deservers towards the state of learning) I do observe,
nevertheless, that their works and acts are rather matters of
magnificence and memory, than of progression and pro-
ficience; and tend rather to augment the mass of learning
in the multitude of learned men, than to rectify or raise the
sciences themselves.

The works or acts of merit towards learning are conver-
sant about three objects: the places of learning, the books
of learning, and the persons of the learned. For as water,
whether it be the dew of heaven, or the springs of the earth,
doth scatter and leese itself in the ground, except it be
collected into some receptacle, where it may by union com-
fort and sustain itself, (and for that cause the industry of
man hath made and framed spring-heads, conduits, cisterns,
and pools, which men have accustomed likewise to beautify
and adorn with accomplishments of magnificence and state,
as well as of use and necessity) so this excellent liquor of
knowledge, whether it descend from divine inspiration, or
spring from human sense, would soon perish and vanish to
oblivion, if it were not preserved in books, traditions, con-
ferences, and places appointed, as universities, colleges, and
schools, for the receipt and comforting of the same.

The works which concern the seats and places of learning
are four; foundations and buildings, endowments with
revenues, endowments with franchises and privileges, insti-
tutions and ordinances for government; all tending to
quietness and privateness of life, and discharge of cares and
troubles; much like the stations which Virgil prescribeth
for the hiving of bees:

Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda,
Quo neque fit ventis aditus, etc.?
- Eccl, x. 10; *'Vitg. Georg: iv..3;

Advancement of Learning 63

The works touching books are two: first, libraries, which
are as the shrines where all the relics of the ancient saints,
full of true virtue, and that without delusion or imposture,
are preserved and reposed: secondly, new editions of
authors, with more correct impressions, more faithful trans-
lations, more profitable glosses, more diligent annotations,
and the like.

The works pertaining to the persons of learned men,
besides the advancement and countenancing of them in
general, are two: the reward and designation of readers in
sciences already extant and invented; and the reward and
designation of writers and inquirers concerning any parts
of learning not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.

These are summarily the works and acts, wherein the
merits of many excellent princes and other worthy person-
ages have been conversant. As for any particular com-
memorations, I call to mind what Cicero said, when he gave
general thanks; Dzfficile non aliquem, ingratum quenquam
preterive.. Let us rather, according to the Scriptures,” look
unto that part of the race which is before us than look back
to that which is already attained.

First, therefore, amongst so many great foundations of
coileges in Europe, I find it strange that they are all dedi-
cated to professions, and none left free to arts and sciences
at large. For if men judge that learning should be referred
to action, they judge well; but in this they fall into the
error described in the ancient fable,? in which the other parts
of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because
it neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do,
nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet, notwithstanding,
it is the stomach that digesteth and distributeth to all the
rest: so if any man think philosophy and universality to be
idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are
from thence served and supplied. And this I take to bea
great cause that hath hindered the progression of learning,
because these fundamental knowledges have heen studied
but in passage. For if you will have a tree bear more fruit
than it hath used to do, it is not anything you can do to the

1Orvat. post Redit. in Sen. xii. 30, which in Bacon’s day was
counted genuine. The actual passage is something stronger, for it
has nefas instead of ingratum.

* Philip. iii. 13. * Liv. i 32.

64 Bacon

boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth and putting new
mould about the roots that must work it. Neither is it to
be forgotten, that this dedicating of foundations and dota-
tions to professory learning hath not only had a malign
aspect and influence upon the growth of sciences, but hath
also been prejudicial to states and governments. For
hence it proceedeth that princes find a solitude in regard of
able men to serve them in causes of state, because there is
no education collegiate which is free; where such as were
so disposed might give themselves to histories, modern
languages, books of policy and civil discourse, and other the
like enablements unto service of estate.

And because Founders of Colleges do plant, and Founders
of Lectures do water, it followeth well in order to speak of
the defect which is in public lectures; namely, in the small-
ness and meanness of the salary or reward which in most
places is assigned unto them; whether they be lectures of
arts, or of professions. For it is necessary to the progres-
sion of sciences that Readers be of the most able and suffi-
cient men; as those which are ordained for generating and
propagating of sciences, and not for transitory use. This
cannot be, except their condition and endowment be such
as may content the ablest man to appropriate his whole
Jabour and continue his whole age in that function and
attendance; and therefore must have a proportion answer-
able to that mediocrity or competency of advancement,
which may be expected from a profession or the practice of
a profession. So as, if you will have sciences flourish, you
must observe David’s military law, which was, That those
which staid with the carriage should have equal part with those
which were in the action; else will the carriages be ill
attended. So Readers in sciences are indeed the guardians
of the stores and provisions of sciences, whence men in
active courses are furnished, and therefore ought to have
equal entertainment with them: otherwise if the fathers in
sciences be of the weakest sort, or be ill-maintained,

Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati.?

Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some alche-
mist to help me, who call upon men to sell their books, and
to build furnaces; quitting and forsaking Minerva and the
| Lt Sam. XXm. 22, 2 Virg. Georg. iil, 128.

Advancement of Learning 65

Muses as barren virgins, and relying upon Vulcan. But
certain it is, that unto the deep, fruitful, and operative -
study of many sciences, especially Natural Philosophy and
Physic, books be not the only instrumentals; wherein also
the beneficence of men hath not been altogether wanting:
for we see spheres, globes, astrolabes, maps, and the like,
have been provided as appurtenances to astronomy and
cosmography, as well as books: we see likewise that some
places instituted for physic have annexed the commodity
of gardens for simples of all sorts, and do likewise command
the use of dead bodies for anatomies. But these do respect
but afew things. In general, there will hardly be any main
proficience in the disclosing of nature, except there be some
allowance for expenses about experiments; whether they
be experiments appertaining to Vulcanus or Dedalus,
furnace or engine, or any other kind: and therefore as
secretaries and spials of princes and states bring in bills for
intelligence, so you must allow the spials and intelligencers
of nature to bring in their bills; or else you shall be ill
advertised.

And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to
Aristotle of treasure ? for the allowance of hunters, fowlers,
fishers, and the like, that he might compile a History of
Nature, much better do they deserve it that travail in
Arts of Nature.

Another defect which I note, is an intermission or neglect
in those which are governors in universities, of consultation ;
and in princes or superior persons, of visitation: to enter
into account and consideration, whether the readings,

1 See Nov. Org. ii. 7: ‘“ Transeundum plane a Vulcano ad Miner-
vam, si in animo sit veras corporum texturas et schematismos

. in lucem protrahere.”’

* Elian, Var. Hist. iv. 19, says that Philip held him, and Athenzus,
ix. 398 f., states the amount said to have been allowed him by
Alexander, 800 talents. But Bacon takes his statement here from
Plin. Nat. Htst. viii. 17.

* The Latin has for “ travail in arts of Nature,” “ in labyrinthis
artium viam stbt apertunt,’’—where Art is opposed to Nature. So
that the phrase “‘ Arts of Nature ’’ must be modified to mean “‘ Arts
concerned with Nature.’’ Or, possibly, there is some mistake in
the reading. All the old editions have ¢travatles. If the reading is
correct, the sense will be that they who lay down rules and general
principles of Arts in things Natural are worthy of higher reward

than are they who only collect Histories, t.e. catalogues or registers
of detached facts.

66 Bacon

exercises, and other customs appertaining unto learning,
anciently begun, and since continued, be well instituted or
no; and thereupon to ground an amendment or reformation
in that which shall be found inconvenient. For it is one
of your majesty’s own most wise and princely maxims,
That im all usages and precedents, the tumes be considered
wherein they first began ; which, tf they were weak or 1gnorant,
it derogateth from the authority of the usage, and leaveth it for
suspect. And therefore inasmuch as most of the usages
and orders of the universities were derived from more
obscure times, it is the more requisite they be re-examined.
In this kind I will give an instance or two, for example sake,
of things that are the most obvious and familiar. The one
is a matter, which though it be ancient and general, yet I
hold to be an error; which is, that scholars in universities
come too soon and too unripe to logic and rhetoric arts
fitter for graduates than children and novices: for these
two, rightly taken, are the gravest of sciences, being the
arts of arts; the one for judgment, the other for ornament:
and they be the rules and directions how to set forth and
dispose matter; and therefore for minds empty and un-
fraught with matter, and which have not gathered that
which Cicero calleth Sylva and Supellex,! stuff and variety,
to begin with those arts (as if one should learn to weigh,
or to measure, or to paint the wind), doth work but this
effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and
universal, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerate
into childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation. And
further, the untimely learning of them hath drawn on, by
consequence, the superficial and unprofitable teaching and
writing of them, as fitteth indeed to the capacity of children.
Another is a lack I find in the exercises used in the Univer-
sities, which do make too great a divorce between invention
and memory; for their speeches are either premeditate, In
verbis conceptis, where nothing is left to invention, or merely
extemporal, where little is left to memory: whereas in life
and action there is least use of either of these, but rather
of intermixtures of premeditation and invention, notes
and memory; so as the exercise fitteth not the practice,
nor the image the life; and it is ever a true rule in exercises,
that they be framed as near as may be to the life of practice;
1 Sylva, de Orat. ili. 26 (103). Supellex, Orat. 24 (80).

Advancement of Learning 67

for otherwise they do pervert the motions and faculties of
the mind, and not prepare them. The truth whereof is not
obscure, when scholars come to the practices of professions,
or other actions of civil life; which when they set into, this
want is soon found by themselves, and sooner by others.
But this part, touching the amendment of the institutions
and orders of Universities, I will conclude with the clause of
Ceesar’s letter to Oppius and Balbus, Hoc guemadmodum
fiert possit, nonnulla miht in mentem veniunt, et multa
reperiyt possunt; de ws rebus rogo vos ut cogitationem
suscipiatis.1

Another defect which I note, ascendeth a little higher
than the precedent: for as the proficience of learning con-
sisteth much in the orders and institutions of Universities
in the same states and kingdoms, so it would be yet more
advanced, if there were more intelligence mutual between
the Universities of Europe than now there is. We see there
may be many orders and foundations, which though they
be divided under several sovereignties and territories, yet
they take themselves to have a kind of contract, fraternity,
and correspondence one with the other; insomuch as they
have provincials and generals. And surely, as nature
createth brotherhood in families, and arts mechanical con-
tract brotherhoods in commonalties, and the anointment
of God superinduceth a brotherhood in kings and bishops;
so in like manner there cannot but be a fraternity in learn-
ing and illumination, relating to that paternity which is
attributed to God, who is called the Father of illuminations
or lights.?

The last defect which I will note is, that there hath not
been, or very rarely been, any public designation of writers
or inquirers concerning such parts of knowledge as may
appear not to have been already sufficiently laboured or
undertaken; unto which point it is an inducement to enter
into a view and examination what parts of learning have
been prosecuted, and what omitted: for the opinion of
plenty is among the causes of want, and the great quantity
of books maketh a show rather of superfluity than lack;
which surcharge, nevertheless, is not to be remedied by
making no more books, but by making more good books,

1 Cic. ad Ait. 1x. 7, C.
*.James i, 17.

68 Bacon

which, as the serpent of Moses, might devour the serpents
of the enchanters.?

The removing of all the defects formerly enumerated,
except the last, and of the active part also of the last
(which is the designation of writers), are opera basilica ;
towards which the endeavours of a private man may be
but as an image in a crossway, that may point at the way,
but cannot go it: but the inducing part of the latter, which
is the survey of learning, may be set forward by private
travail. Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general
and faithful perambulation of learning, with an inquiry
what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved
and converted by the industry of man; to the end that such
a plot made and recorded to memory, may both minister
light to any public designation, and also serve to excite
voluntary endeavours: wherein, nevertheless, my purpose
is at this time to note only omissions and deficiencies, and
not to make any redargution of errors or incomplete prose-
cutions; for it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth
unmanured, and another thing to correct ill husbandry in
that which is manured.

In the handling and undertaking of which work I am not
ignorant what it is that I do now move and attempt, nor
insensible of mine own weakness to sustain my purpose;
but my hope is, that if my extreme love to learning carry
me too far, I may obtain the excuse of affection; for that [¢
as not granted to man to love and to be wise. But I know well
I can use no other liberty of judgment than I must leave to
others; and I for my part shall be indifferently glad either
to perform myself, or accept from another, that duty of
humanity; Nam qui errantt comiter monstrat viam, etc. I
do foresee likewise that of those things which I shall enter
and register as deficiencies and omissions, many will con-
ceive and censure that some of them are already done and
extant; others to be but curiosities, and things of no great
use; and others to be of too great difficulty, and almost
impossibility to be compassed and effected. But for the
two first, I refer myself to the particulars; for the last,
touching impossibility, I take it those things are to be held

1 Exod. vii. 10. It was Aaron’s rod that became a serpent.
? Publ. Syr. Sentent. 166: Amare et sapere vix Deo conceditur.
* Ennuis, quoted by Cic. de Off. i. 16 (5).

Advancement of Learning 69

possible which may be done by some person, though not
by every one; and which may be done by many, though
not by any one; and which may be done in the succession
of ages, though not within the hour-glass of one man’s life;
and which may be done by public designation, though not
by private endeavour. But, notwithstanding, if any man
will take to himself rather that of Salomon, Dicit piger, Leo
est in via, than that of Virgil, Possunt quia posse videntur,?
I shall be content that my labours be esteemed but as the
better sort of wishes: for as it asketh some knowledge to
demand a question not impertinent, so it required some
sense to make a wish not absurd.

THE parts of human learning have reference to the three
parts of man’s understanding, which is the seat of learning:
history to his memory, poesy to his wmagination, and philo-
sophy to his reason. Divine learning receiveth the same
distribution; for the spirit of man is the same, though the
revelation of oracle and sense be diverse: so as theology
consisteth also of the history of the church; of parables,
which is divine Poesy ;, and of holy doctrine or precept: for
as for that part which seemeth supernumerary, which is
prophecy, it is but Divine History; which hath that preroga-
tive over human, as the narration may be before the fact
as well as after.

History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary ; whereof
the first three I allow as extant, the fourth I note as
deficient. For no man hath propounded to himself the
general state of learning to be described and represented
from age to age, as many have done the works of nature,
and the state civil and ecclesiastical; without which the
history of the world seemeth to me to be as the statua of
Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being wanting
which doth most show the spirit and life of the person: and
yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular sciences, as
of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians, the rhetoricians,
the philosophers, there are set down some small memorials
of the schools, authors, and books; and so likewise some
barren relations touching the invention of arts or usages.

1 Prov, xxii. 13. *Vitg, 42K. Vv. 231,
F 799

70 Bacon

But a just story of learning, containing the antiquities and
originals of knowledges and their sects, their inventions,
their traditions, their diverse administrations and manag-
ings, their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depres-
sions, oblivions, removes, with the causes and occasions of
them, and all other events concerning learning, throughout
the ages of the world, I may truly affirm to be wanting.
The use and end of which work I do not so much design for
curiosity or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of
learning, but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose;
which is this in few words, that it will make learned men
wise in the use and administration of learning. For it is
not St. Augustine’s nor St. Ambrose’s works that will make
so wise a divine, as ecclesiastical history, thoroughly read
and observed; and the same reason is of learning.

History of nature is of three sorts; of nature in course, of
nature erring or varying, and of nature altered or wrought;
that is, history of creatures, history of marvels, and history of
arts. The first of these, no doubt, is extant, and that in
good perfection; the two latter are handled so weakly and
unprofitably, as I am moved to note them as deficient.
For I find no sufficient or competent collection of the works
of nature which have a digression and deflection from the
ordinary course of generations, productions, and motions;
whether they be singularities of place and region, or the
strange events of time and chance, or the effects of yet
unknown properties, or the instances of exception to
general kinds. It is true, I find a number of books of
fabulous experiments and secrets, and frivolous impostures
for pleasure and strangeness; but a substantial and severe
collection of the heterochites or ivregulars of nature,’ well
examined and described, I find not: especially not with due
rejection of fables and popular errors: for as things now are,
if an untruth in nature be once on foot, what by reason of
the neglect of examination and countenance of antiquity,
and what by reason of the use of the opinion in similitudes
and ornaments of speech, it is never called down.

The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in Aris-
tole,? is nothing less than to give contentment to the appe-

-1Cf. Nov. Org. i. 45, and ii. 28. These “‘ instances of exception to
general kinds” he there terms instantie monodice, quas etiam

tvregulaves five heteroclitas appellare consuevimus.
2 De Miris Auscultationibus; (Oavudow dxovouara), See Pp. 30.

»

Advancement of Learning 71

tite of curious and vain wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries !

’ isto do; but for two reasons, both of great weight; the one

to correct the partiality of axioms and opinions, which are
commonly framed only upon common and familiar ex-
amples; the other because from the wonders of nature is the
nearest intelligence and passage towards the wonders of art:
for it is no more but by following, and as it were hounding
nature in her wanderings, to be able to lead her afterwards
to the same place again. Neither am I of opinion, in this
history of marvels, that superstitious narrations of sorceries,
witchcrafts, dreams, divinations, and the like, where there
is an assurance and clear evidence of the fact, be altogether
excluded. For it is not yet known in what cases and
how far effects attributed to superstition do participate of
natural causes: and therefore howsoever the practice of such
things is to be condemned, yet from the speculation and
consideration of them light may be taken, not only for the
discerning of the offences, but for the further disclosing of
nature. Neither ought a man to make scruple of entering
into these things for inquisition of truth, as your majesty
hath showed in your own example; who with the two clear
eyes of religion and natural philosophy have looked deeply
and wisely into these shadows, and yet proved yourself to
be of the nature of the sun, which passeth through pollutions
and itself remains as pure as before.” But this I hold fit,
that these narrations, which have mixture with supersti-
tion, be sorted by themselves, and not be mingled with the
narrations which are merely and sincerely natural. But as
for the narrations touching the prodigies and miracles of
religions, they are either not true, or not natural; and there-
fore impertinent for the story of nature.

For Mustory of nature wrought or mechanical, 1 find some
collections made of agriculture, and likewise of manual arts;
but commonly with a rejection of experiments familiar
and vulgar. For it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto
learning to descend to inquiry or meditation upon matters
mechanical, except they be such as may be thought secrets,

1 Mivabilaries. In De Augm. Sc. ii., he calls them ‘‘ Mirabilarii
et prodigiastri.”’

* Cf. Nov. Org. i. 120. This thought is to be met with in Chaucer,
Persone’s Tale : ‘‘ Certes, Holy Writ may not be defouled, no more
than the sonne that shineth on the myxene.”’

72 Bacon

rarities, and special subtilities; which humour of vain and
supercilious arrogancy is justly derided in Plato; where
he brings in Hippias, a vaunting sophist, disputing with
Socrates, a true and unfeigned inquisitor of truth; where
the subject being touching beauty, Socrates, after his
wandering manner of inductions, put first an example of a
fair virgin, and then of a fair horse, and then of a fair pot
well glazed, whereat Hippias was offended, and said, More
than for courtesy’s sake, he did think much to dispute with any
that did allege such base and sordid instances : whereunto
Socrates answered, You have reason, and it becomes you well,
being a man so trim in your vestments, etc., and so goeth on in
an irony.' But the truth is, they be not the highest in-
stances that give the securest information; as may be well
expressed in the tale so common of the philosopher,? that
while he gazed upwards to the stars fell into the water; for
if he had looked down he might have seen the stars in the
water, but looking aloft he could not see the water in the
stars. So it cometh often to pass, that mean and small
things discover great, better than great can discover the
small: and therefore Aristotle noteth well, That the nature
of everything is best seen tm tts smallest portions. And for
that cause he inquireth the nature of a commonwealth, first
in a family, and the simple conjugations of man and wife,
parent and child, master and servant, which are in every
cottage.2 Even so likewise the nature of this great city of
the world, and the policy thereof, must be first sought in
mean concordances and small portions. So we see how
that secret of nature, of the turning of iron touched with the
loadstone towards the north, was found out in needles of
iron, not in bars of iron.

But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of Aistory
mechanical is of all others the most radical and fundamental
towards natural philosophy; such natural philosophy as
shall not vanish in the fume of subtile, sublime, or delectable
speculation, but such as shall be operative to the endow-
ment and benefit of man’s life: for it will not only minister
and suggest for the present many ingenious practices in all
trades, by a connection and transferring of the observations

1 Plato, Hipp. Maz. iii. 288 and 291.

2 Thales. See Plat. Theat. i. 174.
* Aristot. Poltt. I. iii. 1, and Phys. i.

Advancement of Learning 73

of one art to the use of another, when the experiences of
several mysteries: shall fall under the consideration of one
man’s mind; but further, it will give a more true and real
illumination concerning causes and axioms than is hitherto
attained. For like as a man’s disposition is never well
known till he be crossed, nor Proteus ever changed shapes
till he was straitened and held fast;1 so the passages and
variations of nature cannot appear so fully in the liberty of
nature, as in the trials and vexations of art.

For civil history, it is of three kinds; not unfitly to be
compared with the three kinds of pictures or images: for
of pictures or images, we see some are unfinished, some are
perfect, and some are defaced. So of histories we may find
three kinds, memortals, perfect histories, and antiquities; for
memorials are history unfinished, or the first or rough
draughts of history; and antiquities are history defaced,
or some remnants of history which have casually escaped
the shipwreck of time.

Memorials, or preparatory Iustory, are of two sorts;
whereof the one may be termed commentaries, and the other
registers. Commentaries are they which set down a continu-
ance of the naked events and actions, without the motives
or designs, the counsels, the speeches, the pretexts, the
occasions and other passages of action: for this is the true
nature of acommentary; though Cesar, in modesty mixed
with greatness, did for his pleasure apply the name of a
commentary to the best history of the world. Registers
are collections of public acts, as decrees of council, judicial
proceedings, declarations and letters of state, orations and
the like, without a perfect continuance or contexture of
the thread of the narration.

Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as was said,
Tanquam tabula naufragi ;* when industrious persons by
an exact and scrupulous diligence and observation, out of
monuments, names, words, proverbs, traditions, private
records and evidences, fragments of stories, passages of
books that concern not story,® and the like, do save and
recover somewhat from the deluge of time.

In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no defici-

1 Virg. Georg. iv. 387, sqq.

2“* As was said; ’”’ referred to the last page. Cf. Nov. Org. i. 77.

3 Story here=history: “‘ librorum neutiquam historicorum.”’

7 4. Bacon

ence, for they are Tanquam imperfecte mista ; and therefore
any deficience in them is but their nature. As for the cor-
ruptions and moths of history, which are efitomes, the use
of them deserveth to be banished, as all men of sound judg-
ment have confessed; as those that have fretted and cor-
roded the sound bodies of many excellent histories, and
wrought them into base and unprofitable dregs.!

History, which may be called just and perfect history, is
of three kinds, according to the object which it propoundeth
or pretendeth to represent: for it either representeth a time,
or a person, or an action. The first we call chronicles, the
second dives, and the third narrations or relations. Of these,
although. the first be the most complete and absolute kind
of history, and hath most estimation and glory, yet the
second excelleth it in profit and use, and the third in verity
and sincerity. For history of times representeth the magni-
tude of actions, and the public faces and deportments of
persons, and passeth over in silence the smaller passages
and motions of men and matters. But such being the
workmanship of God, as He doth hang the greatest weight
upon the smallest wires, Maxima & minimis suspendens,
it comes therefore to pass, that such histories do rather set
forth the pomp of business than the true and inward resorts
thereof. But lives, if they be well written, propounding
to themselves a person to represent in whom actions both
greater and smaller, public and private, have a commixture,
must of necessity contain a more true, native, and lively
representation. So again marrations and relations of
actions, as the war of Peloponnesus, the expedition of
Cyrus Minor, the conspiracy of Catiline, cannot but be
more purely and exactly true than histories of times,
because they may choose an argument comprehensible
within the notice and instructions of the writer: whereas
he that undertaketh the story of a time, especially of any
length, cannot but meet with many blanks and spaces
which he must be forced to fill up out of his own wit and
conjecture.

For the History of Times, I mean of Civil History, the
providence of God hath made the distribution: for it hath
pleased God to ordain and illustrate two exemplar states

1 As in the Epitomes written in the decline of Latin Literature.
* Job xxvi. 7. “ Qui appendit terram super nihilum.”’

—— i

Advancement of Learning 75

of the world for arms, learning, moral virtue, policy, and
laws; the state of Grecia, and the state of Rome; the
histories whereof occupying the middle part of time, have
more ancient to them, histories which may by one common
name be termed the antiquities of the world: and after them
histories which may be likewise called by the name of
modern history.

Now to speak of the deficiencies. As to the Agathen
antiquities of the world, it is in vain to note them for defici-
ent: deficient they are no doubt, consisting most of fables
and fragments; but the deficience cannot be holpen; for
antiquity is like fame, Caput inter nubila condit,’ her head
is muffled from our sight. For the history of the exemplar
states, it is extant in good perfection. Not but I could wish
there were a perfect course of history for Grecia from
Theseus to Philopcemen (what time the affairs of Grecia
were drowned and extinguished in the affairs of Rome);
and for Rome from Romulus to Justinianus, who may be
truly said to be Ulttmus Romanorum.? In which sequences of
story the text of Thucydides and Xenophon in the one, and
the texts of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius, Cesar, Appianus,
Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire with-
out any diminution at all, and only to be supplied and
continued. But this is a matter of magnificence, rather to
be commended than required: and we speak now of parts
of learning supplemental and not of supererogation.

But for modern histories, whereof there are some few very
worthy, but the greater part beneath mediocrity, (leaving the
care of foreign stories to foreign states, because I will not be
curiosus in aliena republica,?) I cannot fail to represent to
your majesty the unworthiness of the history of England in
the main continuance thereof, and the partiality and obli-
quity of that of Scotland in the latest and largest author that
I have seen: 4 supposing that it would be honour for your
Majesty, and a work very memorable, if this island of Great
Britain, as it is now joined in monarchy for the ages to come,

1 Virg. Zn. iv. 177.

*Said of Cassius, Tac. Ann. iv. 34: ‘“‘ Cremutius Cordus postu-
latur, . . . quod C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum dixisset.” Cf.
Plut. Brutus, 43. Suet. Tib. 61, who attributes it to both Brutus
and Cassius.

2c, Off: 2, 34.

‘ Buchanan, for whom King James had no love.

76 Bacon

so were joined in one history for the times passed; after the
manner of the Sacred History, which draweth down the
story of the ten tribes, and of the two tribes, as twins,
together. And if it shall seem that the greatness of this
work may make it less exactly performed, there is an excel-
lent period of a much smaller compass of time, as to the
story of England; that is to say, from the uniting of the
Roses to the uniting of the kingdoms; a portion of time,
wherein, to my understanding, there hath been the rarest
varieties that in like number of successions of any heredi-
tary monarchy hath been known. For it beginneth with
the mixed adoption of a crown by arms and title: an entry
by battle, an establishment by marriage, and therefore
times answerable, like waters after a tempest, full of work-
ing and swelling, though without extremity of storm; but
well passed through by the wisdom of the pilot, being one
of the most sufficient kings of allthe number. Then follow-
eth the reign of a king, whose actions, howsoever conducted,
had much intermixture with the affairs of Europe, balancing
and inclining them variably; in whose time also began that
great alteration in the state ecclesiastical, an action which
seldom cometh upon the stage. Then the reign of a minor:
then an offer of a usurpation, though it was but as febris
ephemera. Then the reign of a queen matched with a
foreigner: then of a queen that lived solitary and un-
married, and yet her government so masculine, that it had
greater impression and operation upon the states abroad
than it any ways received from thence. And now last,
this most happy and glorious event, that this island of
Britain, divided from all the world,! should be united in
itself: and that oracle of rest, given to Aineas, antiquam
exquirite matrem,? should now be performed and fulfilled
upon the nations of England and Scotland, being now
reunited in the ancient mother name of Britain, as a full
period of all instability and peregrinations. So that as it
cometh to pass in massive bodies, that they have certain
trepidations and waverings before they fix and settle; so it
seemeth that by the providence of God this monarchy,
before it was to settle in your majesty and your generations,
(in which I hope it is now established for ever,) had these
prelusive changes and varieties.
tVirg. Ect. 1, 97. ? Virg. En. iil. 96.

Advancement of Learning 77

For lives, I do find it strange that these times have so
little esteemed the virtues of the times, as that the writing
of lives should be no more frequent. For although there
be not many sovereign princes or absolute commanders,
and that states are most collected into monarchies, yet are
there many worthy personages that deserve better than
dispersed report or barren elogies. For herein the inven-
tion of one of the late poets! is proper, and doth well enrich
the ancient fiction: for he feigneth that at the end of the
thread or web of every man’s life there was a little medal
containing the person’s name, and that Time waited upon
the shears; and as soon as the thread was cut, caught the
medals, and carried them to the river of Lethe; and about
the bank there were many birds flying up and down, that
would get the medals and carry them in their beak a little
while, and then let them fall into the river: only there were
a few swans, which if they got a name, would carry it toa
temple where it was consecrate. And although many men,
more mortal in their affections than in their bodies, do
esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity and
ventosity,

Animi nil magne laudis egentes; ?

which opinion cometh from that root, Non prius laudes
contempsimus, quam laudanda facere desivimus :* yet that
will not alter Salomon’s judgment, Memoria justi cum
laudibus, at impiorum nomen putrescet : * the one flourisheth,
the other either consumeth to present oblivion, or turneth
to an ill odour. And therefore in that style or addition,
which is and hath been long well received and brought in
use, Felicis memoria, pie memoria, bone memoria, we do
acknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from
Demosthenes, that Bona fama propria possessio defunc-
torum ,;® which possession I cannot but note that in our times
it lieth much waste, and that therein there is a deficience.

1 Ariosto, Orlando Furioso, end of bk. 34, and opening of bk. 35.
(See Ellis’ and Spedding’s edition of the De Augm. Sc.)

* Vitg. Zin. V¥.. 751.

3 Plin. Ep. iil. 21: ‘‘ Postquam desiimus facere laudanda, laudari
quoque ineptum putamus.’”’ Were Bacon’s quotations usually from
memory ? *PIOVv. X: 7:

5 Cic. Philip. ix.: ‘‘ Vita enim mortuorum in memoria vivorum
est posita.”” From Dem. adv. Lept. 488, tv’ jv favres éxrijoavro
evdoklav avtn kal TeNeuTnKOoLV avToIs awodobeln.

78 Bacon

For narrations and relations of particular actions, there
were also to be wished a greater diligence therein; for there
is no great action but hath some good pen which attends it.
And because it is an ability not common to write a good
history, as may well appear by the small number of them;
yet if particularity of actions memorable were but tolerably
reported as they pass, the compiling of a complete history
of times mought be the better expected, when awriter should
arise that were fit for it: for the collection of such relations
mought be as a nursery garden, whereby to plant a fair and
stately garden, when time should serve.

There is yet another portion of history which Cornelius
Tacitus maketh, which is not to be forgotten, especially with
that application which he accoupleth it withal, annals and
journals; appropriating to the former matters of estate,
and to the latter acts and accidents of a meaner nature.
For giving but a touch of certain magnificent buildings, he
addeth Cum ex dignitate popult Romani repertum sit, res
illustres annalibus talia diurnis urbis actis mandarve.1 So as
there is a kind of contemplative heraldry, as well as civil.
And as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a state
more than confusion of degrees; so it doth not a little
embase the authority of a history, to intermingle matters
of triumph, or matters of ceremony, or matters of novelty,
with matters of state. But the use of a journal hath not
only been in the history of time, but likewise in the history
of persons, and chiefly of actions; for princes in ancient
time had, upon point of honour and policy both, journals
kept of what passed day by day: for we see the chronicle
which was read before Ahasuerus,? when he could not take
rest, contained matter of affairs indeed, but such as had
passed in his own time, and very lately before: but the
journal of Alexander’s house expressed every small particu-
larity, even concerning his person and court ;* and it is yet
a use well received in enterprises memorable, as expeditions
of war, navigations, and the like, to keep diaries of that
which passeth continually.

I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which
some wise and grave men have used, containing a scattered
history of those actions which they have thought worthy of

1 Tac. Ann. xiii, 31. S Pisth, Vix 1;
3 See Plutarch, Sympos. 1. Qu. 6.

: Advancement of Learning 79

memory, with politic discourse and observation thereupon:
not incorporate into the history, but separately, and as the
more principal in their intention; + which kind of ruminated
history I think more fit to place amongst books of policy,
whereof we shall hereafter speak, than amongst books of
history: for it is the true office of history to represent the
events themselves together with the counsels, and to leave
the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty
and faculty of every man’s judgment. But mixtures are
things irregular, whereof no man can define.

So also is there another kind of history manifoldly mixed,
and that is history of cosmography : being compounded of
natural history, in respect of the regions themselves; of
history civil, in respect of the habitations, regiments, and
manners of the people; and the mathematics, in respect of
the climates and configurations towards the heavens: which
part of learning of all others in this latter time hath obtained
most proficience. For it may be truly affirmed to the
honour of these times, and in a virtuous emulation with
antiquity, that this great building of the world had never
through-lights made in it, till the age of us and our fathers:
for although they had knowledge of the Antipodes,

Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis,
' Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper: ?

yet that mought be by demonstration, and not in fact; and
if by travel, it requireth the voyage but of half the globe.
But to circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, was not
done or enterprised till these latter times: and therefore
these times may justly bear in their word, not only plus
ultra,® in precedence of the ancient non ultra, and imitabile
fulmen, in precedence of the ancient non imitabile fulmen,

Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen; etc.‘

but likewise tmitabile celum; in respect of the many
memorable voyages after the manner of heaven about the
globe of the earth.

And this proficience in navigation and discoveries may

1 Such books as Machiavelli’s Discorst sopra Livia are here meant.
* Virg. Georg. i. 250, 251.

3 Plus ultra was the motto of Charles V. (Ellis).

*Virg. Zn. vi. 590.

80 Bacon

plant also an expectation of the further proficience and
augmentation of all sciences; because it may seem they are
ordained by God to be coevals, that is, to meet in one age.
For so the prophet Daniel, speaking of the latter times,
foretelleth Plurimt pertransibunt, et multiplex erit screntia:}
as if the openness and thorough passage of the world and
the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the same
ages; as we see it is already performed in great part; the
learning of these latter times not much giving place to the
former two periods or returns of learning, the one of the
Grecians, the other of the Romans.

History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions with
history civil: but further, in the propriety thereof, may be
divided into the history of the church, by a general name;
history of prophecy ; and history of providence. The first
describeth the times of the militant church, whether it be
fluctuant, as the ark of Noah; or moveable, as the ark in
the wilderness; or at rest, as the ark in the temple: that is,
the state of the church in persecution, in remove, and in
peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as deficient;
only I would that the virtue and sincerity of it were accord-
ing to the mass and quantity. But I am not now in hand
with censures, but with omissions.

The second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth of
two relatives, the prophecy, and the accomplishment; and
therefore the nature of such a work ought to be, that every
prophecy of the Scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling
the same, throughout the ages of the world; both for better
confirmation of faith, and for the better illumination of the
Church touching those parts of prophecies which are yet
unfulfilled: allowing nevertheless that latitude which is
agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies; being of the
nature of their Author, with whom a thousand years are but
as one day;? and therefore are not fulfilled punctually at
once, but have springing and germinant accomplishment
throughout many ages; though the height or fulness of
them may refer to some one age. This is a work which I
find deficient; but is to be done with wisdom, sobriety, and
reverence, or not at all.

The third, which is /istory of providence, containeth that
excellent correspondence which is between God’s revealed

1 Dan. xu. 4, 2 2 Peter iii. 8.

Advancement of Learning 81

will and His secret will: which though it be so obscure, as
for the most part it is not legible to the natural man; no,
nor many times to those that behold it from the Tabernacle ;
yet at some times it pleaseth God, for our better establish-
ment and the confuting of those which are as without God
in the world, to write it in such text and capital letters, that
as the prophet saith, He that runneth by may read 1t ,;* that
is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God’s judgments,
and never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are
nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern it.
Such are the notable events and examples of God’s Judg-
ments, chastisements, deliverances, and blessings: and this
is a work which hath passed through the labour of many,
and therefore I cannot present as omitted.

There are also other parts of learning which are appen-
dices to Wistory: for all the exterior proceedings of man
consist of words and deeds: whereof history doth properly
receive and retain in memory the deeds: and if words, yet
but as inducements and passages to deeds: so are there
other books and writings, which are appropriate to the
custody and receipt of words only; which likewise are of
three sorts: ovations, letters, and brief speeches or sayings.
Orations are pleadings, speeches of counsel, laudatives,
invectives, apologies, reprehensions, orations of formality
or ceremony, and the like. Letters.are according to all
the variety of occasions, advertisements, advices, directions,
propositions, petitions, commendatory, expostulatory,
satisfactory, of compliment, of pleasure, of discourse, and
all other passages of action. And such as are written from
wise men, are of all the words of man, in my judgment, the
best; for they are more natural than orations and public
speeches, and more advised than conferences or present
speeches. So again letters of affairs from such as manage

_ them, or are privy to them, are of all others the best instruc-

tions for history, and to a diligent reader the best histories
in themselves. For Apophthegms, it is a great loss of that
book of Czsar’s;? for as his history, and those few letters of
his which we have, and those apophthegms which were of
his own, excel all men’s else, so I suppose would his collec-

1 Hab. ii. 2, but misquoted. ‘‘ That he may run that readeth,”
—1.e. may hasten to carry on the tidings.
*'Vid. Cic. ad Fam. ix. 16.

q
.
82 Bacon |
tion of Apophthegms have done; for as for those which are ©
collected. by others, either I have no taste in such matters, ©
or else their choice hath not been happy. But upon these —
three kinds of writings I do not insist, because I have no —
deficiencies to propound concerning them. |
Thus much therefore concerning history; which is that —
; part of learning which answereth to one of the cells, domi- |
,ciles, or offices of the mind of man: which is that of |
‘memory.

Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words for the
most part restrained, but in all other points extremely
licensed, and doth truly refer to the imagination; which, |
‘being not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join ©
that which nature hath severed, and sever that which nature ©
hath joined; and so make unlawful matches and divorces —
of things; Pictoribus atque poetis, etc.1 It is taken in two —
senses in respect of words or matter; in the first sense it is
but a character of style, and belongeth to arts of speech, and —
is not pertinent for the present: in the latter it is, as hath |
been said, one of the principal portions of learning, and is
nothing else but fezgned history, which may be styled as well |
in prose as in verse.

The use of this feigned history hath been to give some
shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points
wherein the nature of things doth deny it, the world being in
proportion inferior to the soul; by reason whereof there is, ©
agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a
more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety, than can |
be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because the ©
acts or events of true history have not that magnitude which
satisfieth the mind of man, Poesy feigneth acts and events
greater and more heroical: because true history propound-
eth the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to
the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them
more just in retribution, and more according to revealed
providence: because true history representeth actions and
events more ordinary, and less interchanged, therefore
poesy endueth them with more rareness, and more unex- —
pected and alternative variations: so as it appeareth that —
poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, |
and to delectation. And therefore it was ever thought to —

1 Hor. Ep. ad Pis. 9. j

Advancement of Learning 8 3

have some participation of divineness, because it doth raise
and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of things to
the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and
bow the mind into the nature of things. And we see, that
by these insinuations and congruities with man’s nature
and pleasure, joined also with the agreement and comfort
it hath with music, it hath had access and estimation in
rude times and barbarous regions, where other learning
stood excluded.

The division of Poesy which is aptest in the propriety
thereof (besides those divisions which are common unto it
with history, as feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the
appendices of history, as feigned epistles, feigned orations,
and the rest) is into poesy narrative, representative, and
allusive. The Narrative is a mere imitation of history, with
the excesses before remembered; choosing for subject
commonly wars and love, rarely state, and sometimes
pleasure or mirth. Representative is as a visible history;
and is an image of actions as if they were present, as history
is of actions in nature as they are (that is) past. Allusive
or Parabolical is a Narrative applied only to express some
special purpose or conceit. Which latter kind of paraboli-
cal wisdom was much more in use in the ancient times, as
by the fables of AZsop, and the brief sentences of the Seven,
and the use of hieroglyphics may appear. And the cause
was, for that it was then of necessity to express any point
of reason which was more sharp or subtile than the vulgar
in that manner, because men in those times wanted both
variety of examples and subtility of conceit: and as hiero-
glyphics were before letters, so parables were before argu-
ments: and nevertheless now, and at all times, they do
retain much life and vigour; because reason cannot be so
sensible, nor examples so fit.

But there remaineth yet another use of Poesy Parabolical,
opposite to that which we last mentioned: for that tendeth
to demonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or de-
- livered, and this other to retire and obscure it: that is, when
the secrets and mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy,
_are involved in fables or parables. Of this in divine poesy
_we see the use is authorized. In heathen poesy we see the
exposition of fables doth fall out sometimes with great
felicity; as in the fable that the giants being overthrown in

84 Bacon

their war against the gods, the Earth their mother in
revenge thereof brought forth Fame:

Illam terra parens, ira irritata Deorum,
Extremam, ut perhibent, Coeo Enceladoque sororem
Progenuit: 3

expounded, that when princes and monarchs have sup-
pressed actual and open rebels, then the malignity of the
people, which is the mother of rebellion, doth bring forth ©
libels and slanders, and taxations of the states, which is of —
the same kind with rebellion, but more feminine. So in the ©
fable, that the rest of the gods having conspired to bind —
Jupiter, Pallas ? called Briareus with his hundred hands to |
his aid: expounded, that monarchies need not fear any
curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects, as long
as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the people, who will
be sure to come in on their side. So in the fable, that
Achilles was brought up under Chiron the Centaur, who was —
part a man and part a beast, expounded ingeniously but —
corruptly by Machiavel,? that it belongeth to the education —
and discipline of princes to know as well how to play the —
part of the lion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the —
man in virtue and justice. Nevertheless, in many the like —
encounters, I do rather think that the fable was first, and
the exposition devised, than that the moral was first, and —
thereupon the fable framed. For I find it was an ancient ©
vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself with great ©
contention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the ©
fictions of the ancient poets; but yet that all the fables and
fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not figure, I
interpose no opinion. Surely of those poets which are now ~
extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding he was made ©
a kind of Scripture by the latter schools of the Grecians), |
yet I should without any difficulty pronounce that his fables —
had no such inwardness in his own meaning; but what they
might have upon a more original tradition, is not easy to |
affirm; for he was not the inventor of many of them.? |

1 Virg. Zn. iv. 178-180.

2 Not Pallas, but Thetis, Hom. J/. A. 401, sqq.

3 Hom. JI. A. 8 31, and Machiav. Prince, c. 18.

‘In the Latin, in room of these examples, the fables of Pan, ©
Perseus, and Dionysus, are expounded to show respectively how i
physical, political, and moral doctrines might be thence deduced. |

|

Advancement of Learning — 85

In this third}! part of learning, which is poesy, I can
report no deficience, For being as a plant that cometh of
the lust of the earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung
up and spread abroad more than any other kind. But to
ascribe unto it that which is due, for the expressing of affec-
tions, passions, corruptions, and customs, we are beholding
to poets more than to the philosophers’ works; and for wit
and eloquence, not much less than to orators’ harangue.
But it is not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let us
now pass on to the judicial place or palace of the mind,
which we are to approach and view with more reverence
and attention.

The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending
from above, and some springing from beneath; the one
informed by the light of nature, the other inspired by divine
revelation. The light of nature consisteth in the notions of
the mind and the reports of the senses: for as for knowledge
which man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and not
original; as in a water that besides his own spring-head is
fed with other springs and streams. So then, according to
these two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is
first of all divided into divinity and philosophy.

In Philosophy, the contemplations of man do either
penetrate unto God,—or are circumferred to nature,—or
are reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which
several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, divine
philosophy, natural philosophy, and human philosophy or
humanity. For all things are marked and stamped with
this triple character of the power of God, the difference of
nature and the use of man. But because the distributions
and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that

_ meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point; but are like

branches of a tree, that meet in a stem, which hath a dimen-
sion and quantity of entireness and continuance, before it
come to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs:

_ therefore it is good, before we enter into the former distribu-

tion, to erect and constitute one universal science, by the
name of philosophia prima, primitive or summary philosophy,
as the main and common way, before we come where the
ways part and divide themselves; which science whether I
1 Rather the second than the thivd part of learning—History,
Poesy, Philosophy.
G 719

86 Bacon

should report as deficient or no, I stand doubtful. For I
find a certain rhapsody of natural theology, and of divers
parts of logic; and of that part of natural philosophy which
concerneth the principles, and of that other part of natural
philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit; all these
strangely commixed and confused; but being examined,
it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other sciences,
advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, than
anything solid or substantive of itself. Nevertheless I
cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current, that
the same things are handled but in several respects. As
for example, that logic considereth of many things as they
are in notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature;
the one in appearance, the other in existence; but I find
this difference better made than pursued. For if they had
considered quantity, similitude, diversity, and the rest of
those extern characters of things, as philosophers, and in
nature, their inquiries must of force have been of a far other
kind than they are. For doth any of them, in handling
quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how far it
multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason, why some
things in nature are so common, and in so great mass, and
others so rare, and in so small quantity? Doth any, in
handling similitude and diversity, assign the cause why iron
should not move to iron, which is more like, but move to
the lode-stone, which is less like? Why in all diversities
of things there should be certain participles in nature, which
are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be referred ?
But there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature
and operation of those common adjuncts of things, as in
nature: and only a resuming and repeating of the force and
use of them in speech or argument. Therefore, because in
a writing of this nature, I avoid all subtility, my meaning
touching this original or universal philosophy is thus, in a
plain and gross description by negative: That 1t be a recep-
tacle for all such profitable observations and axioms as fall —
not within the compass of any of the special paris of |
philosophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher
stage.

Now that there are many of that kind need not to be
doubted. For example: is not the rule, Sz in@qualibus
equalia addas, omnia erunt inegualia, an axiom as well of —

Advancement of Learning 87

justice as of the mathematics? and is there not a true
coincidence between commutative and distributive justice,
and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Is not that
other rule, Que in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se conve-
niunt, a rule taken from the mathematics, but so potent in
logic as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is not the observa-
tion, Omnia mutantur, nil interit,? a contemplation in philo-
sophy thus, that the quantum of nature is eternal? in
natural theology thus, that it requireth the same Omnipo-
tence to make somewhat nothing, which at the first made
nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, Didict quod
omnia opera, que fecit Deus, perserverent in perpetuum ; non
possumus eis quicquam addere nec auferre.® Is not the
ground, which Machiavel wisely and largely discourseth
concerning governments, that the way to establish and
preserve them, is to reduce them ad principia, a rule in
religion and nature, as well as in civil administration? 4
Was not the Persian magic a reduction or correspondence
of the principles and architectures of nature to the rules and
policy of governments? Is not the precept of a musician,
to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or
sweet accord, alike true in affection. Is not the trope of
music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence, common
with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation? ® Is not
the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same
with the playing of light upon the water?

Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus.®

Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs
of reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or
strait determined and bounded? Neither are these only
similitudes, as men of narrow observation may conceive
them to be, but the same footsteps of nature, treading or
printing upon several subjects or matters. This science,
therefore, as I understand it, I may justly report as deficient:

1In Ellis and Spedding’s edition there is a note saying that this
clause and its successor are transposed in the original edition. This
is not the case in the copy I have collated. And in one or two
other notices of variation my copy did not bear out their remarks.

* Plat. The@t. i. 152. Ovid, Met. xv. 165.

*Ecclus. xiii. 21. * Discourse on Livy, iii. 1.

5 See Nov. Org. 11. 27. ‘“‘ Instantize conformes,”’

* Virg. En. vil. 9.

88 Bacon

for I see sometimes the profounder sort of wits in handling
some particular argument will now and then draw a bucket
of water out of this well for their present use; but the
spring-head thereof seemeth to me not to have been visited;
being of so excellent use, both for the disclosing of nature,
and the abridgment of art.

This science being therefore first placed as a common
parent, like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly
issue,

Omnes Ccelicolas, omnes supera alta tenentes,!

we may return to the former distribution of the three
philosophies, divine, natural, and human.

And as concerning divine philosophy or natural theology,
it is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning
God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of His
creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed divine in
respect of the object, and natural in respect of the lhght.
The bounds of this knowledge are, that it sufficeth to con-
vince atheism, but not to inform religion: and therefore
there was never miracle wrought by God to convert an
atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to
confess a God: but miracles have been wrought to convert
idolators and the superstitious, because no light of nature
extendeth to declare the will and true worship of God.
For as all works do show forth the power and skill of the
workman, and not his image; so it is of the works of God,
which do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker,
but not His image: and therefore therein the heathen
opinion differeth from the sacred truth; for they supposed
the world to be the image of God, and man to be an exact
or compendious image of the world,? but the Scriptures
never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour, as to
be the image of God, but only the work of His hands :?
neither do they speak of any other image of God, but man:
wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and

BV ite. ASn. V1. 787.

® Mixpdxoouos—a favourite dogma with Paracelsus, who divided
the body of man according to the cardinal points of the world. But
Bacon is perhaps referring to the Platonists in the first part of the
sentence.

SS). Vite 3:

Advancement of Learning 89

enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate
His power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent
argument, and hath been excellently handled by divers.
But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature,
or ground of human knowledge, to induce any verity or
persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment
not safe: Da fidet que fider sunt. For the heathens them-
selves conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable
of the golden chain: That men and gods were not able to draw
Jupiter down to the earth ; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able
to draw them up to heaven.2, So as we ought not to attempt
to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason;
but contrariwise toraise andadvance ourreason to the divine
truth. So as in this part of knowledge, touching divine
philosophy, I am so far from noting any deficience, as I
rather note an excess: whereunto I have digressed because
of the extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy
have received and may receive, by being commixed
together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical
religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy.
Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which
is an appendix of theology both divine and natural, and
is neither inscrutable nor interdicted; for although the
Scripture saith, Let no man deceive you in sublime discourse
touching the worship of angels, pressing into that he knoweth
not, etc.,2 yet notwithstanding, 1f you observe well that
precept, it may appear thereby that there be two things
only forbidden, adoration of them, and opinion fantastical
of them, either to extol them farther than appertaineth to
the degree of a creature, or to extol a man’s knowledge of
them farther than he hath ground. But the sober and
grounded inquiry, which may arise out of the passages of
holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations of nature, is not
restrained. So of degenerate and revolted spirits, the
conversing with them or the employment of them is pro-
hibited, much more any veneration towards them; but the
contemplation or science of their nature, their power, their
illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual
wisdom. For so the apostle saith, We are not ignorant of
his stratagems. And it is no more unlawful to inquire the

‘uke Ex, 25. ? Hom. JI. viii. 19-22.
* Coloss. ii. 18. *2 Cor, 1. 77.

go Bacon

nature of evil spirits, than to inquire the force of poisons
in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in morality. But
this part touching angels and spirits I cannot note as defi-
cient, for many have occupied themselves in it;} I may
rather challenge it, in many of the writers thereof, as
fabulous and fantastical.

Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology
(not Divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for the
last of all, as the haven and sabbath of all man’s contempla-
tions), we will now proceed to natural philosophy.

_ If then it be true that Democritus said, That the truth of
nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves,” and if it be
true likewise that the alchemists do so much inculcate, that
Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth that dexterously
and compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages and
length of time, it were good to divide natural philosophy
into the mine and the furnace: and to make two professions
or occupations of natural philosophers, some to be pioneers
and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and
hammer: and surely I do best allow of a division of that
kind, though in more familiar and scholastical terms;
namely, that these be the two parts of natural philosophy, —
the inquisition of causes, and the production of effects ;
speculative, and operative; natural science and natural
prudence. For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of
discourse and a wisdom of direction; so is it in natural.
And here I will make a request, that for the latter, or at
least for a part thereof, I may revive and reintegrate the
misapplied and abused name of natural magic ;* which, in
the true sense, is but natural wisdom, or natural prudence ;
taken according to the ancient acception, purged from
vanity and superstition. Now although it be true, and I
know it well, that there is an intercourse between causes and
effects, so as both these knowledges, speculative and opera-
tive, have a great connection between themselves; yet
because all true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a

1 The nature of Angels was a favourite subject of speculation and
discussion among the Schoolmen, whose writings on it deserve
Bacon’s censure.

2 vy Bv0@ yap 7 addHOea. Diog. Laert. ix. 72.—Whence our “ Truth
lies at the bottom of a Well.’

3 Cf. Nov. Org. ii. g and 51, and De Augm. iii. 5, where he asserts
for the term Magic its proper honours.

Advancement of Learning Ql

double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent; ascend-
ing from experiments to the invention of causes, and de-
scending from causes to the invention of new experiments;
therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts
be severally considered and handled.

Natural science or theory is divided into physique and
_metaphysique : wherein I desire it may be conceived that I
use the word metaphysique in a differing sense from that
that is received: and in like manner, I doubt not but it will
easily appear to men of judgment, that in this and other
particulars, wheresoever my conception and notion may
differ from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep the
ancient terms. For hoping well to deliver myself from
mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of that
I do propound, I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to
recede as little from antiquity, either in terms or opinions,
as may stand with truth and the proficience of knowledge.
And herein I cannot a little marvel at the philosopher
Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of difference and
contradiction towards all antiquity: undertaking not only
to frame new words of science at pleasure, but to confound
and extinguish all ancient wisdom: insomuch as he never
nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but
to confute and reprove;! wherein for glory, and drawing
followers and disciples, he took the right course. For cer-
tainly there cometh to pass and hath place in human truth,
that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth:
Vent in nomine Patris, nec recipitis me ; si quis venerit in
nomine suo eum rectpietis.2 But in this divine aphorism,
(considering to whom it was applied, namely to Antichrist,
the highest deceiver,) we may discern well that the coming
in a man’s own name, without regard of antiquity or pater-
nity, is no good sign of truth, although it be joined with the
fortune and success of an Eum recipietis. But for this
excellent person Aristotle, I will think of him that he
learned that humour of his scholar, with whom, it seemeth,
he did emulate, the one to conquer all opinions, as the other

1Cf. Nov. Org. i. 63, 67, where he likens him to the Turks, whose
Sultans on ascending the throne murder all the seed royal. Cf.
Ar. Eth. Nic. I. 6, i., where Aristotle declares that it is sometimes
needful for truth’s sake kai 7a oixeta dvaioety.

2 John v. 43.

g2 Bacon

to conquer all nations; wherein nevertheless, it may be, he
may at some men’s hands that are of a bitter disposition get
a like title as his scholar did:

Felix terrarum predo, non utile mundo
Editus exemplum, etc.

So

Felix doctrine predo.!

But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth
in my pen to ground a sociable intercourse between anti-
quity and proficience, it seemeth best to keep way with
antiquity usque ad aras ; and therefore to retain the ancient
terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions,
according to the moderate proceeding in civil government ;
where although there be some alteration, yet that holdeth
which Tacitus wisely noteth, Eadem Magistratuum vocabula.2
To return therefore to the use and acceptation of the
term Metaphysique, as I do now understand the word; it
appeareth, by that which hath been already said, that I
intend philosophia prima, Summary Philosophy, and Meta-
physique, which heretofore have been confounded as one,
to be two distinct things. For the one I have made as a
parent or common ancestor to all knowledge; and the other
I have now brought in as a branch or descendent of natural
science. It appeareth likewise that I have assigned to
Summary Philosophy the common principles and axioms
which are promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences: I
have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the
operation of the relative and adventive characters of
essences, as quantity, stmilitude, diversity, possibility, and
the rest: with this distinction and provision; that they be
handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically.
It appeareth likewise that Natural Theology, which hereto-
fore hath been handled confusedly with Metaphysique, I
have inclosed and bounded by itself. It is therefore now
a question which is left remaining for Metaphysique;
Illic Pellaei proles vesana Philippi

Felix prado jacet, terrarum vindice fato

Rapras.: 200

Nam sibi libertas unquam si redderet orbem,

Ludibrio servatus erat, non utile mundo
Editus exemplum. Lucan. Phars. x. 20.

Pr aG. 74h, 4:3,

®

Advancement of Learning 93

_ wherein I may without prejudice preserve thus much of the

conceit of antiquity, that Physique should contemplate
that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory ;
and Metaphysique that which is abstracted and fixed.
And again, that Physique should handle that which sup-
poseth in nature only a being and moving; and Meta-
physique should handle that which supposeth further in
nature a reason, understanding, and platform. But the

difference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and

sensible. For as we divided natural philosophy in general
into the inquiry of causes, and productions of effects : so that
part which concerneth the inquiry of causes we do sub-
divide according to the received and found division of
causes; the one part, whichis Physique, inquireth and
handleth the material and efficient causes ; and the other,
which is Metaphysique, handleth the formal and final
causes.+

Physique, taking it according to the derivation, and not
according to our idiom for medicine, is situate in a middle
term or distance between Natural History and Meta-
physique. For natural history describeth the variety
of things; physique, the causes, but variable or respective
causes; and metaphysique, the fixed and constant causes.

Limus ut hit durescit, et hac ut cera liquescit,
Uno eodemque igni: ?

Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay;
fire is the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax; but
fire is no constant cause either of induration or colliquation:
so then the physical causes are but the efficient and the
matter. Physique hath three parts; whereof two respect
nature united or collected, the third contemplateth nature
diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either into one
entire total, or else into the same principles or seeds. So as
the first doctrine is touching the contexture or configura-
tion of things, as de mundo, de untversitate rerum. The
second is the doctrine concerning the principles or originals
of times. The third is the doctrine concerning all variety
and particularity of things; whether it be of the differing

J

1 For these ‘‘ four causes’
Mill’s Logic, bk. iii, ch. 5.
eVitg. Ecl. viii. 80.

see Arist. Post. Anal. ii. 10, 1. Cf.

94 Bacon

substances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof

— ee

j

there needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss, —

or paraphrase, that attendeth upon the text of natural

j
;
‘

history. Of these three I cannot report any as deficient. |
In what truth or perfection they are handled, I make not —
now any judgment; but they are parts of knowledge not —

deserted by the labour of man.
For Metaphysique, we have assigned unto it the inquiry

of formal and final causes; which assignation, as to the |
former of them, may seem to be nugatory and void; because |
of the received and inveterate opinion that the inquisition —

of man is not competent to find out essential Forms or true
differences: of which opinion we will take this hold, that
the invention of Forms is of all other parts of knowledge the
worthiest to be sought, if it be possible to be found. As
for the possibility, they are ill discoverers that think there
is no land, when they can see nothing but sea. But it is
manifest that Plato, in his opinion of Ideas, as one that had
a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry, that
Forms were the true object of knowledge ;* but lost the real
fruit of his opinion, by considering of Forms as absolutely
abstracted from matter, and not confined and determined
by matter; and so turning his opinion upon theology,
wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected.* But if
any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon
action, operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise
and take notice what are the Forms, the disclosures whereof

are fruitful and important to the state of man. For as to-

the forms of substances, man only except, of whom it Is said,
Formavit hominem de limo terre, et spiravit in faciem ejus
spiraculum vite, and not as of all other creatures, Producant
aque, producat terra; * the Forms of substances, I say, as
they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied,
are so perplexed, as they are not to be inquired; no more
than it were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the
Forms of those sounds which make words, which by com-
position and transposition of letters are infinite. But, on

1 See Nov. Org. ii. 1. Date nature formam . . . invenire, opus et
intentio est humane scientiz. The first twenty chapters of bk. ii.
of the Nov. Org. are an attempt at expansion of this saying.

* Plato, Rep. x. init. * Nov. Org. i. 96.

Gen. i, 7; 1. 20, 2A,

> Advancement of Learning 95

the other side, to inquire the Form of those sounds or voices
which make simple letters is easily comprehensible; and
being known, induceth and manifesteth the Forms of all
words, which consist and are compounded of them. In
the same manner to inquire the Form of a lion, of an oak,
of gold; nay, of water, of air, is a vain pursuit: but to
inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegeta-
tion, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity,
of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities, which,
like an alphabet, are not many, and of which the essences,
upheld by matter, of all creatures do consist; to inquire,
_Isay, the true Forms of these, is that part of metaphysique
which we now define of. Not but that Physic doth make
inquiry, and take consideration of the same natures: but
how? Only as to the material and efficient causes of them,
and not as to the Forms. For example; if the cause of
whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and it be rendered
thus, that the subtile intermixture of air and water is the
cause, it is well rendered; but, nevertheless, is this the form
of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which is ever but
vehiculum forme.’ This part of Metaphysique I do not find
laboured and performed: whereat I marvel not; because I
hold it not possible to be invented by that course of inven-
tion which hath been used; in regard that men, which is the
root of all error, have made too untimely a departure and
too remote a recess from particulars.

But the use of this part of Metaphysique, which I report
as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects:
the one, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge
to abridge the infinity of individual experience, as much as
the conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the
complaint of vita brevis, ars longa ;* which is performed by
uniting the notions and conceptions of sciences: for know-
ledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis. So of
natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage
next the basis is physique; the stage next the vertical point
is metaphysique. As for the vertical point, opus quod
operatur Deus a principio usque ad finem,® the summary law

1 Nov. Org. ii. 3, efficiens et materialis causa (que cause fluxe
sunt, et nihil aliud quam vehicula et cause formam deferentes in
aliquibus).

* Hippoc. A ph. i. . * Eccles. iii. 11.

96 Bacon

of nature, we know not whether man’s inquiry can attain .
unto it. But these three be the true stages of knowledge, |
and are to them that are depraved no better than the giant’s —

hills:

Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam,
Scilicet atque Osse frondosum involvere Olympum.!

But to those who refer all things to the glory of God, they

are as the three acclamations, Sancte, sancte, sancte! holy

in the description or dilatation of His works; holy in the —
connection or concatenation of them: and holy in the union ~

of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And therefore
the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato,

although but a speculation in them, that all things by scale
did ascend to unity.2. So then always that knowledge is —
worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity; which —
appeareth to be metaphysique; as that which considereth —

the simple Forms or differences of things, which are few in
number, and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof make
all this variety.

The second respect, which valueth and commendeth this

part of metaphysique, is that it doth enfranchise the power —

of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of works
and effects. For physique carrieth men in narrow and re-
strained ways, subject to many accidents of impediments,
imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of nature; but late
undique sunt sapientibus vie:* to sapience, which was
anciently defined to be rerum divinarum et humanarum
scientia,* there is ever choice of means. For physical causes
give light to new invention in s¢mili materia ; but whoso-
ever knoweth any Form, knoweth the utmost possibility

cea aiced

of super-inducing that nature upon any variety of matter; —
and so is less restrained in operation, either to the basis of |
the matter, or the condition of the efficient; which kind of ©

knowledge Salomon likewise, though in a more divine sort,
elegantly describeth: non arctabuntur gressus tui, et currens
non habebis offendiculum.® The ways of sapience are not
much liable either to particularity or chance.

x |

The second part of metaphysique is the inquiry of final —

‘Georg, 1. 251, 282: 2 Plato, Parm. 165, 166.
* Perhaps Prov. xv. 19, via justorum absque offendiculo.
* Cic. dé Off. 1. 43 (154). ® Prov. iv, 12.

‘ Advancement of Learning 97

causes, which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as
misplaced; and yet if it were but a fault in order, I would
not speak of it: for order is matter of illustration, but
pertaineth not to the substance of sciences. But this mis-
placing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great impro-
ficience in the sciences themselves. For the handling of
final causes mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath
intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and
physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon
these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest
and prejudice of further discovery. For this I find done not
only by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by
Aristotle, Galen, and others which do usually likewise fall
upon these flats of discoursing causes.’ For to say that the
hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence about the sight;
or that the firmness of the skins and hides of living creatures
ts to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold ; or that
the bones are for the columns or beams, whereupon the frames
of the bodies of living creatures are built: or that the leaves
of trees are for protecting of the fruit ; or that the clouds are
for watering of the earth; or that the solidness of the earth
is for the station and mansion of living creatures and the
like, is well inquired and collected in metaphysique, but
in physique they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed
but remore, and hindrances to stay and slug the ship
from further sailing; and have brought this to pass, that
the search of the physical causes hath been neglected,
and passed in silence. And therefore the natural philo-
sophy of Democritus and some others (who did not suppose
a mind or reason in the frame of things, but attributed the
form thereof able to maintain itself to infinite essays or
proofs of nature, which they term fortune) seemeth to me,
as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which
remain unto us, in particularities of physical causes, more
real and better inquired than that of Aristotle and Plato;
whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of
theology, and the other as a part of logic, which were the
favourite studies respectively of both those persons. Not
because those final causes are not true, and worthy to be
inquired, being kept within their own province; but

1 Aristot. Phys. ii. 8, 2, where he illustrates by the teeth. Also
Plat. Tim. iii. 70, and Galen, De Usu Partium.

98 Bacon

because their excursions into the limits of physical causes _
hath bred a vastness and solitude in that track. For ~
otherwise, keeping their precincts and borders, men are
extremely deceived if they think there is an enmity or
repugnancy at all between them. For the cause rendered,
that the hairs about the eye-lids are for the safeguard of ©
the sight, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that pilosity —
ts tmcident to orifices of moisture; muscost fontes,) etc. —
Nor the cause rendered, that the firmness of Mides is for —
the armour of the body against extrenuties of heat or cold, —
doth not impugn the cause rendered, that contraction —
of pores is incident to the outwardest parts, in regard of their ©
adjacence to foreign or unlike bodies : and so of the rest: both —
causes being true and compatible, the one declaring an —

intention, the other a consequence only. Neither doth this

call in question, or derogate from Divine Providence, but —
highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil actions he is the
greater and deeper politique, that can make other men the —
instruments of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint —
them with his purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not ©

know what they do, than he that imparteth his meaning to

those he employeth; so is the wisdom of God more admir- —

able, when nature intendeth one thing, and Providence
draweth forth another, than if He communicated to particu-
lar creatures and motions the characters and impressions
of His Providence. And thus much for metaphysique:

the latter part whereof I allow as extant, but with it con- |

fined to his proper place.

Nevertheless there remaineth yet another part of Natural ©

Philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part and

holdeth rank with Physique special and Metaphysique, —

which is Mathematique; but I think it more agreeable to
the nature of things and to the light of order to place it asa
branch of Metaphysique: for the subject of it being quantity

(not guantity indefinite, which is but a relative, and belongeth |
to philosophia prima, as hath been said, but quantity deter- —
mined or proportionable) it appeareth to be one of the essen- —
tial Forms of things; as that that is causative in nature of ©
a number of effects; insomuch as we see, in the schools both —

of Democritus and of Pythagoras,” that the one did ascribe
1 Virg. Ecl. vil. 45.

2 For these opinions of Democritus and the Pythagoreans, see —

Aristot. De Anima, i. 2; Met. i. 4, 5.

tsi ia .

ist

ee ee as

ee

Advancement of Learning 99

figure to the first seeds of things, and the other did suppose
numbers to be the principles and originals of things: and it
is true also that of all other Forms, as we understand Forms,
it is the most abstracted and separable from matter, and
therefore most proper to Metaphysique; which hath like-
wise been the cause why it hath been better laboured and
inquired than any of the other Forms, which are more
immersed in matter.

For it being the nature of the mind of man, to the extreme
prejudice of knowledge, to delight in the spacious liberty
of generalities, as in a champain region, and not in the
inclosures of particularity; the Mathematics of all other
knowledge were the goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite.
But for the placing of this science, it is not much material:
only we have endeavoured in these our partitions to observe
a kind of perspective, that one part may cast light upon
another.

The Mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the Pure
Mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle
quantity determinate, merely severed from any axioms of
natural philosophy; and these are two, Geometry and
Arithmetic; the one handling quantity continued, and the

other dissevered.

Mixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural
philosophy, and considereth quantity determined, as it is
auxiliary and incident unto them. For many parts of
nature can neither be invented with sufficient subtilty, nor
demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommo-
dated unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and
intervening of the mathematics; of which sort are perspec-
tive, music, astronomy, cosmography, architecture, enginery,
and divers others.

In the Mathematics I can report no deficience, except it
be that men do not sufficiently understand the excellent use
of the Pure Mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure
many defects in the wit and faculties intellectual. For if
the wit be too dull, they sharpen it; if too wandering, they
fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So that
as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great use in
respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put itself
into all postures; so in the Mathematics, that use which is.

collateral and intervenient is no less worthy than that which

100 Bacon

is principal and intended. And as for the Mixed Mathe- —
matics, I may only make this prediction, that there cannot —

fail to be more kinds of them, as nature grows further dis-
closed. Thus much of Natural Science, or the part of
nature speculative.

For Natural Prudence, or the part operative of Natural —

Philosophy, we will divide it into three parts, experimental,
philosophical, and magical; which three parts active have
a correspondence and analogy with the three parts specula-
tive, natural history, physique, and metaphysique: for
many operations have been invented, sometimes by a casual

incidence and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experi- —
ment: and of those which have been found by an intentional —

experiment, some have been found out by varying or extend-
ing the same experiments, some by transferring and com-
pounding divers experiments the one into the other, which
kind of invention an empiric may manage.

Again, by the knowledge of physical causes there cannot
fail to follow many indications and designations of new
particulars, if men in their speculation will keep one eye
upon use and practice. But these are but coastings along
the shore, Premendo littus in1qguum : + for it seemeth to me
there can hardly be discovered any radical or fundamental
alterations and innovations in nature, either by the fortune
and essays of experiments, or by the light and direction of
physical causes. If therefore we have reported Meta-
physique deficient, it must follow that we do the like of
natural Magic, which hath relation thereunto. For as for
the Natural Magic whereof now there is mention in books,
containing certain credulous and superstitious conceits and
observations of sympathies and antipathies, and hidden
properties, and some frivolous experiments, strange rather
by disguisement than in themselves; it is as far differing in
truth of nature from such a knowledge as we require, as the
story of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of Bordeaux, differs
from Czsar’s Commentaries in truth of story. For it is
manifest that Cesar did greater things de vero than those
imaginary heroes were feigned to do; but he did them not
in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of learning the fable
of Ixion ? was a figure, who designed to enjoy Juno, the
goddess of power; and instead of her had copulation with

+ H10t. Od. T%.73- 2 Pind. Pyth. ii. 21.

ee ee ee

Advancement of Learning IO!

a cloud, of which mixture were begotten centaurs and
chimeras. So whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous
imaginations, instead of a laborious and sober inquiry of
truth, shall beget hopes and beliefs of strange and impossible
shapes.

And therefore we may note in these sciences which
hold so much of imagination and belief, as this degenerate
Natural Magic, Alchemy, Astrology, and the like, that in
their propositions the description of the mean is ever more
monstrous than the pretence or end. For it is a thing more
probable, that he that knoweth well the natures of weight,
of colour, of pltant and fragile, in respect of the hammer, of
volatile and fixed in respect of the fire and the rest, may
superinduce upon some metal the nature and Form of gold
by such mechanique as belongeth to the production of the
natures afore rehearsed, than that some grains of the mede-
cine projected should in a few moments of time turn a sea of
quicksilver or other material into gold: so it is more pro-
bable that he that knoweth the nature of arefaction, the
nature of assimilation of nourishment to the thing nourished,
the manner of increase and clearing of spirits, the manner
of the depredations which spirits make upon the humours
and solid parts, shall by ambages of diets, bathings, anoint-
ings, medicines, motions, and the like, prolong life, or restore
some degree of youth or vivacity, than that it can be done
with the use of a few drops or scruples of a liquor or receipt.
To conclude, therefore, the true Natural Magic, which is
that great liberty and latitude of operation which dependeth
upon the knowledge of Forms, I may report deficient, as the
relative thereof is.

To which part, 1f we be serious, and incline not to vanities
and plausible discourse, besides the deriving and deducing
the operations themselves from Metaphysique, there are
pertinent two points of much purpose, the one by way of
preparation, the other by way of caution: the first is, that
there be made a kalendar, resembling an inventory of the
estate of man, containing all the inventions, being the works
or fruits of nature or art, which are now extant, and whereof
man is already possessed; out of which doth naturally
result a note, what things are yet held impossible, or not
invented: which kalendar will be the more artificial and
serviceable, if to every reputed impossibility you add what

H 7°9

102 Bacon

thing is extant which cometh the nearest in degree to that
impossibility; to the end that by these optatives and
potentials man’s inquiry may be more awake in deducing
direction of works from the speculation of causes: and
secondly, that those experiments be not only esteemed
which have an immediate and present use, but those princi-
pally which are of most universal consequence for inven-
tion of other experiments, and those which give most light
to the invention of causes; for the invention of the mariner’s
needle, which giveth the direction, is of no less benefit for
navigation than the invention of the sails which give the
motion.

Thus have I passed through Natural Philosophy, and the
deficiencies thereof; wherein if I have differed from the
ancient and received doctrines, and thereby shall move
contradiction; for my part, as I affect not to dissent, so I
purpose not to contend. If it be truth,

Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvz.!

The voice of nature will consent, whether the voice of man
do orno. And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the
expedition of the French for Naples, that they came with
chalk in their hands to mark up their lodgings, and not with
weapons to fight; so I like better that entry of truth which
cometh peaceably, with chalk to mark up those minds
which are capable to lodge and harbour it, than that which
cometh with pugnacity and contention.?

But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy
according to the report of the inquiry, and nothing concern-
ing the matter or subject; and that is positive and considera-
tive; when the inquiry reporteth either an assertion or a
doubt. These doubts or non liquets are of two sorts, parti-
cular and total. For the first, we see a good example there-
of in Aristotle’s Problems, which deserved to have had a
better continuance; but so nevertheless as there is one
point whereof warning is to be given and taken. The
registering of doubts hath two excellent uses: the one, that
it saveth philosophy from errors and falsehoods; when

eVirg. Pcl x. 8.

* Nov. Org. i. 35. This saying of Alexander VI. was called forth
by the expedition of Charles VIII. which overran Italy in about
five months, A.D. 1494.

Advancement of Learning 103

that which is not fully appearing is not collected into asser-
tion, whereby error might draw error, but reserved in doubt:
the other, that the entry of doubts are as so many suckers
or sponges to draw use of knowledge; insomuch as that
which, if doubts had not preceded, a man should never have
advised, but passed it over without note, by the suggestion
and solicitation of doubts, is made to be attended and
applied. But both these commodities do scarcely counter-
vail an inconvenience which will intrude itself, if it be not
debarred; which is, that when a doubt is once received,
men labour rather how to keep it a doubt still, than how to
solve it; and accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see
the familiar example in lawyers and scholars, both which,
if they have once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after
authorised fora doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge
is to be allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful things
certain, and not those which labour to make certain things
doubtful. Therefore these kalendars of doubts I commend
as excellent things; so that there be this caution used, that
when they be thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution,
they be from thenceforth omitted, decarded, and not con-
tinued to cherish and encourage men in doubting. To
which kalendar of doubts or problems, I advise be annexed
another kalendar, as much or more material, which is a
Kalendar of popular errors: I mean chiefly in natural
history, such as pass in speech and conceit, and are never-
theless apparently detected and convicted of untruth:
that man’s knowledge be not weakened nor embased by
such dross and vanity.

As for the doubts or non liquets general, or in total, I
understand those differences of opinions touching the prin-
ciples of nature, and the fundamental points of the same,
which have caused the diversity of sects, schools, and
philosophies, as that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Demo-
critus, Parmenides, and the rest. For although Aristotle,
as though he had been of the race of the Ottomans, thought
he could not reign except the first thing he did he killed all
his brethren; yet to those that seek Truth and not magis-

1 See Ellis’ note on De Augm. iii. 4, where he suggests, most prob-
ably, that Bacon is alluding to the acts of Mahomet III. who, on
becoming Sultan in A.D. 1595, put to death nineteen brothers, and
ten or twelve women, supposed to be with child by his father. He

104 Bacon

trality, it cannot but seem a matter of great profit, to see
before them the several opinions touching the foundations
of nature: not for any exact truth that can be expected in
those theories; for as the same phenomena in astronomy
are satisfied by the received astronomy of the diurnal
motion, and the proper motions of the planets, with their
eccentrics and epicycles, and likewise by the theory of
Copernicus,! who supposed the earth to move (and the
calculations are indifferently agreeable to both), so the
ordinary face and view of experience is many times satisfied
by several theories and philosophies; whereas to find the
real truth requireth another manner of severity and atten-
tion. For as Aristotle saith,? that children at the first will
call every woman mother, but afterward they come to
distinguish according to truth, so experience, if it be in
childhood, will call every philosophy mother, but when it
cometh to ripeness, it will discern the true mother. So as
in the meantime it is good to see the several glosses and
opinions upon nature, whereof, it may be, every one in some
one point hath seen clearer than his fellows: therefore I
with some collection to be made, painfully and under-
standingly, de antiquis philosophis, out of all the possible
light which remaineth to us of them: which kind of work
I find deficient. But here I must give warning, that it be
done distinctly and severally ; the philosophies of every one
throughout by themselves; and not by titles packed and
fagotted up together, as hath been done by Plutarch. For
it is the harmony of a philosophy in itself which giveth it
light and credence; whereas if it be singled and broken, it
will seem more foreign and dissonant. For as when I read
in Tacitus the actions of Nero, or Claudius, with circum-
stances of times, inducements, and occasions, I find them
not so strange; but when I read them in Suetonius Tran-
quillus, gathered into titles and bundles, and not in order of

adds that the practice was established as a fundamental State Law
by Mahomet II.

1 Nov. Org. i. 45, where he calls these “‘ eccentrics and epicycles,”’
linee@ spirales et dvacones. Bacon was ignorant of, and incurious
about Mathematics and Astronomy at this time; and shows no
good will towards Galileo and the “ Copernican theory.”

2 Aristot. Phys. i. I.

3 Editions 1605, 1633, read severely ; but the Latin has distincte
which seems to require severally.

Advancement of Learning 105

time, they seem more monstrous and incredible: so is it
of any philosophy reported entire, and dismembered by
articles. Neither do I exclude opinions of latter times to
be likewise represented in this kalendar of sects of philo-
sophy, as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus,’ eloquently
reduced into a harmony by the pen of Severinus the Dane: ?
and that of Telesius* and his scholar Donius, being as a
pastoral philosophy, full of sense, but of no great depth;
and that of Fracastorius,* who, though he pretended not to
make any new philosophy, yet did use the absoluteness of
his own sense upon the old; and that of Gilbertus our
countryman,® who revived, with some alterations and
demonstrations, the opinions of Xenophanes: and any other
worthy to be admitted.

Thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams
of man’s knowledge; that is, vadius directus, which is
referred to nature; vadius refractus, which is referred to
God, and cannot report truly because of the inequality of
the medium. There resteth radius reflexus, whereby man
beholdeth and contemplateth himself.

We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the
ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of our-
selves ;® which deserveth the more accurate handling, by
how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as
it is the end and term of natural philosophv in the intention
of man, so nothwithstanding it is but a portion of natural
philosophy in the continent of nature: and generally let
this be a rule, that all partitions of knowledges be accepted ;
rather for lines and veins than for sections and separations;
and that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be

1 Paracelsus (von Hohenheim), enthusiast and alchemist, born
A.D. 1493, died A.D. 1541. He, though in a purposely obscure way,
did much service to experimental philosophy.

2 Severinus, a Danish physician, died in 1602.

3 Telesius, born in 1509 at Cosenza; who, as Bacon adds in the
Latin, revived the philosophy of Parmenides.

4 Fracastorius, born in 1483 at Verona; a man of greatest worth,
disinterestedness, and capacity; whether as Poet, Philosopher,
Physician, Astronomer, or Mathematician. But of course Bacon
has no good word for him.

’ Gilbertus, Court Physician to Elizabeth and James I., a great
experimentalist and discoverer in Magnetism. Bacon seems to
have regarded him with especial ill-will.

* Plat. Aicth. Pr. ti. 124.

106 Bacon

preserved. For the contrary hereof hath made particular
sciences to become barren, shallow, and erroneous, while
they have not been nourished and maintained from the
common fountain. So we see Cicero the orator complained
of Socrates and his school that he was the first that separated
philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon rhetoric became an
empty and verbal art. So we may see that the opinion of
Copernicus touching the rotation of the earh, which astro-
nomy itself cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to
any of the phenomena, yet natural philosophy may correct.
So we see also that the science of medicine, if it be destituted
and forsaken by natural philosophy, it is not much better
than an empirical practice. With this reservation there-
fore we proceed to human philosophy or humanity, which
hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate or distri-
butively ; the other congregate or in society. So as human
philosophy is either simple and particular, or conjugate
and civil.

Humanity particular consisteth of the same parts whereof
man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the
body, and of knowledges which respect the mind. But
before we distribute so far, it is good to constitute. For I
do take the consideration in general and at large of human
nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by
itself: not so much in regard of those delightful and elegant
discourses which have been made of the dignity of man, of
his miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his
common and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of
the knowledge concerning the sympathies and concordances
between the mind and body, which being mixed cannot
be properly assigned to the sciences of either.

This knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues and
amities consist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices, so
this league of mind and body hath these two parts; how the
one discloseth the other, and how the one worketh upon the
other; discovery andimpression. The former of these hath
begotten two arts, both of prediction or prenotion ; whereof
the one is honoured with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the
other of Hippocrates.2, And although they have of later
time been used to be coupled with superstitious and fantasti-
cal arts, yet being purged and restored to their true state,

1Cic. de Orat. ili. 16, 17. 2In his Prenotiones.

Advancement of Learning 107

they have both of them a solid ground in nature, and a
profitable use in life. The first is Ahystognomy, which dis-
covereth the disposition of the mind by the lineaments of
the body: the second is the exposition of natural dreams,
which discovereth the state of the body by the imaginations
of the mind. In the former of these I note a deficience.
For Aristotle hath very ingeniously and diligently handled
the factures of the body, but not the gestures of the body,
which are no less comprehensible by art, and of greater use
and advantage.!_ For the lineaments of the body do disclose
the disposition and inclination of the mind in general; but
the motions of the countenance and parts do not only so, but
do further disclose the present humour and state of the mind
and will. For as your majesty saith most aptly and ele-
gantly, As the tongue speaketh to the ear so the gesture speaketh
to the eye.” And therefore a number of subtle persons,
whose eyes do dwell upon the faces and fashions of men, do
well know the advantage of this observation, as being most
part of their ability; neither can it be denied, but that it is
a great discovery of dissimulations, and a great direction in
business.

The latter branch, touching tmpression, hath not been
collected into art, but hath been handled dispersedly; and
it hath the same relation or antistrophe that the former hath.
For the consideration is double: either how, and how far the
humours and affects of the body do alter or work upon the mind;
or again, how and how far the passions or apprehensions of the
mind do alter or work upon the body. The former of these
hath been inquired and considered as a part and appendix
of medicine, but much more as a part of religion or super-
stition. For the physician prescribeth cures of the mind
in phrensies and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also
to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind, to confirm the
courage, to clarify the wits, to corroborate the memory,
and the like: but the scruples and superstitions of diet and
other regimen of the body in the sect of the Pythagoreans,
in the heresy of the Manicheans, and in the law of Mohomet,

1In the treatises on the History and Parts of Animals. The
subject of Gesture may be said to come under the short treatises on
the External Phenomena of the Animal Kingdom: and in that on
the Motion of Animals.

* Spedding gives Basilikon Doron, bk. iii., as the place whence this
quotation comes. Cf. Horace, A. P., 180, 181.

108 Bacon

do exceed. So likewise the ordinances in the ceremonial
law, interdicting the eating of the blood and the fat, dis-
tinguishing between beasts clean and unclean for meat, are
many and strict. Nay the faith itself being clear and
serene from all clouds of ceremony, yet retaineth the use of
fastings, abstinences, and other macerations and humilia-
tions of the body, as things real, and not figurative. The
root and life of all of which prescripts is, besides the cere-
mony, the consideration of that dependency which the affec-
tions of the mind are submitted unto upon the state and
disposition of the body. Andif any man of weak judgment
do conceive that this suffering of the mind from the body
doth either question the immortality, or derogate from the
sovereignty of the soul, he may be taught in easy instances
that the infant in the mother’s womb is compatible with
the mother and yet separable;! and the most absolute
monarch is sometimes led by his servants and yet without
subjection. As for the reciprocal knowledge, which is the
operation of the conceits and passions of the mind upon the
body, we see all wise physicians, in the prescriptions of their
regiments to their patients, do ever consider accidentia
anim: as of great force to further or hinder remedies or
recoveries: and more especially it is an inquiry of great
depth and worth concerning imagination, how and how far
it altereth the body proper of the imaginant. For although
it hath a manifest power to hurt, it followeth not it hath the
same degree of power to help; no more than a man can
conclude, that because there be pestilent airs able suddenly
to kill a man in health, therefore there should be sovereign
airs able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the
inquisition of this part is of great use, though it needeth, as
Socrates said, a Delian diver,” being difficult and profound.
But unto all this knowledge de commumi vinculo, of the con-
cordances between the mind and the body, that part of
inquiry is most necessary, which considereth of the seats
and domiciles which the several faculties of the mind do
take and occupate in the organs of the body; which know-
ledge hath been attempted, and is controverted, and

1 Qui simul cum matris affectibus compatitur, et tamen e corpore
matris suo tempore excluditur. De Augm.

2 Diog. Laert. ii. 22. Socrates speaks of a work of Heraclitus
which Euripides had lent him: “ Delio quopiam natatore indiget.”’

Advancement of Learning 109

deserveth to be much better inquired. For the opinion of
Plato,! who placed the understanding 1n the brain, animosity
(which he did unfitly call anger, having a greater mixture
with pride) in the heart, and concupiscence or sensuality in
the liver, deserveth not to de despised; but much less to be
allowed. So then we have constituted, as in our own wish
and advice, the inquiry touching human nature entire, as a
just portion of knowledge to be handled apart.

The knowledge that concerneth man’s body is divided as
the good of man’s body is divided, unto which it referreth.
The good of man’s body is of four kinds, Health, Beauty,
Strength, and Pleasure: so the knowledges are Medicine, or
art of Cure; art of Decoration, which is called Cosmetic;
art of Activity, which is called Athletic; and art Voluptuary,
which Tacitus truly calleth evuditus luxus.2 This subject
of man’s body is of all other things in nature most suscep-
tible of remedy; but then that remedy is most susceptible
of error. For the same subtility of the subject doth
cause large possibility and easy failing; and therefore the
inquiry ought to be the more exact.

To speak therefore of Medicine, and to resume that we
have said, ascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that
man was microcosmus, an abstract or model of the world,
hath been fantastically strained by Paracelsus? and the
alchemists, as if there were to be found in man’s body
certain correspondences and parallels, which should have
respect to all varieties of things, as stars, planets, minerals,
which are extant in the great world. But thus much is
evidently true, that of all substances which nature hath
produced, man’s body is the most extremely compounded.
For we see herbs and plants are nourished by earth and
water; beasts for the most part by herbs and fruits; man
by the flesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits,
water, and the manifold alterations, dressings, and prepara-

1 Plat. Tim. 69, 70 (Steph.}. In the head, 7d Oetov: then below
the isthmus of the neck, the mortal part of man; first 7d wérexov
THs YuxAs avdpeias kal Oywod; (so that Bacon is scarcely right in his
censure; for neither dvdpeia nor Ouuds is anger); then the diaphragm
to divide the parts; then in the heart he placed @dgpos cai pd8os;
and below it 7d ériduunrixdv, Gorep ev hatvyn. . . KaTadedeuévov—in
the liver.

2 Tac. Ann. xvi. 18.

* See Ellis and Spedding’s note to Nov. Org. ii. 48 (p. 339).

110 Bacon

tions of the several bodies, before they come to be his food
andaliment. Add hereunto, that beasts have a more simple
order of life, and less change of affections to work upon
their bodies: whereas man in his mansion, sleep, exercise,
passions, hath infinite variations: and it cannot be denied
but that the Body of man of all other things is of the
most compounded mass. The Soul on the other side is the
simplest of substances, as is well expressed:

Purumque reliquit
/Ethereum sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem.?

So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no
rest, if that principle be true, that Motus rerum est rapidus
extra locum, placidus tm loco. But to the purpose: this
variable composition of man’s body hath made it as an
instrument easy to distemper; and therefore the poets did
well to conjoin Music and Medicine in Apollo,? because the
office of Medicine is but to tune this curious harp of man’s
body and to reduce it to harmony. So then the subject
being so variable, hath made the art by consequence more
conjectural; and the art being conjectural hath made so
much the more place to be left for imposture. For almost
all other arts and sciences are judged by acts, or master-
pieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and
events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading,
and not by the issue of the cause; the master of the ship is
judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the
fortune of the voyage; but the physician, and perhaps the
politique, hath no particular acts demonstrative of his
ability, but is judged most by the event; which is ever but
as it is taken: for who can tell if a patient die or recover, or
if a state be preserved or ruined, whether it be art or acci-
dent? And therefore many times the impostor is prized,
and the man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see the weakness
and credulity of men is such, as they will often prefer a
mountebank * or witch before a learned physician. And
therefore the poets were clear-sighted in discerning this
extreme folly, when they made A¢sculapius and Circe

1Virg. Ain. vi. 747. 2 Ovid, Metam. i. 521.

3 Montabank—in the old editions—from montambanco, a quack-
doctor. Holland, in his Plutarch, renders the word mount-bank.
The word was confined in meaning to a quack in Bacon’s day.

Advancement of Learning I11

brother and sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses,

Ipse repertorem medicine talis et artis
Fulmine Phebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas:

And again,
Dives inaccessos ubi Solts filia lucos, etc.?

For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and
old women and impostors have had a competition with
physicians. And what followeth? Even this, that physi-
cians say to themselves as Salomon expresseth it upon a
higher occasion; If it befall to me as befalleth to the fools,
why should I labour to be more wise ?* And therefore I can-
not much blame physicians, that they use commonly to
intend some other art or practice, which they fancy more
than their profession. For you shall have of them anti-
quaries, poets, humanists, statesmen, merchants, divines,
and in every of these better seen than in their profession ;
and no doubt upon this ground, that they find that medio-
crity and excellency in their art maketh no difference in
profit or reputation towards their fortune; for the weakness
of patients, and sweetness of life, and nature of hope,
maketh men depend upon physicians with all their defects.
But nevertheless, these things which we have spoken of,
are courses begotten between a little occasion, and a great
deal of sloth and default; for if we will excite and awake our
observation, we shall see in familiar instances what a pre-
dominant faculty the subtilty of spirit hath over the variety
of matter or form: nothing more variable than faces and
countenances: yet men can bear in memory the infinite
distinctions of them; nay, a painter with a few shells of
colours, and the benefit of his eye and habit of his imagina-
tion, can imitate them all that ever have been, are, or may
be, if they were brought before him: nothing more variable
than voices; yet men can likewise discern them personally:
nay, you shall have a buffoon or pantomimus,* who will
express aS many as he pleaseth. Nothing more variable
than the differing sounds of words; yet men have found

1 Virg. ZEn. vii. 772. * Ibed,. vit. 1%, * Eccles. ii. 15.

4 Buffon, or pantomimus, in the original; showing that the words
were newly imported into the English tongue. The pantomime
was then a person, not a play.

112 Bacon

the way to reduce them to a few simple letters. So that it
is not the insufficiency or incapacity of man’s mind, but it is
the remote standing or placing thereof, that breedeth these
mazes and incomprehensions: for as the sense afar off is
full of mistaking, but is exact at hand, so is it of the
understanding; the remedy whereof is, not to quicken or
strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the object; and
therefore there is no doubt but if the physicians will learn
and use the true approaches and avenues of nature, they
may assume as much as the poet saith:

Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes;
Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt.?

Which that they should do, the nobleness of their art doth
deserve; well shadowed by the poets, in that they made
Esculapius to be the son of the sun, the one being the
fountain of life, the other as the second stream: but
infinitely more honoured by the example of our Saviour,
who made the body of man the object of His miracles, as
the soul was the object of His doctrine. For we read not
that ever He vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour or
money, except that one for giving tribute to Cesar;? but
only about the preserving, sustaining, and healing the body
of man.

Medicine is a science which hath been, as we said, more
professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than
advanced; the labour having been, in my judgment, rather
in circle than in progression. For I find much iteration,
but small addition. It considereth causes of diseases, with
the occasions or impulsions ; the diseases themselves, with
the accidents ; and the cures, with the preservations. The
deficiencies which I think good to note, being a few of many,
and those such as are of a more open and manifest nature,
I will enumerate, and not place.

The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious
diligence of Hippocrates,? which used to set down a narra-
tive of the special cases of his patients, and how they pro-
ceeded, and how they were judged by recovery or death.
Therefore having an example proper in the father of the art,
I shall not need to allege an example foreign, of the wisdom

P Ovid, A, 525. 2 Matt. xvii. 27.
* Hippocr. De Epidemiis.

Advancement of Learning 113

of the lawyers, who are careful to report new cases and
decisions for the direction of future judgments. This con-
tinuance of medicinal history I find deficient ; which I under-
stand neither to be so infinite as to extend to every common
case, nor so reserved as to admit none but wonders: for
many things are new in the manner, which are not new in
the kind; and if men will intend to observe, they shall find
much worthy to observe.

In the inquiry which is made by Anatomy, I find much
deficience: for they inquire of the parts, and their sub-
stances, figures, and collocations ; but they inquire not of
the diversities of the parts, the secrecies of the passages, and
the seats or nestlings of the humours, nor much of the foot-
steps and impressions of diseases: the reason of which
omission I suppose to be, because the first inquiry may
be satisfied in the view of one or a few anatomies: but the
latter, being comparative and casual, must arise from the
view of many. And as to the diversity of parts, there is no
doubt but the facture or framing of the inward parts is as
full of difference as the outward, and in that is the cause
continent of many diseases; which not being observed, they
quarrel many times with humours, which are not in fault;
the fault being in the very frame and mechanic of the part,
which cannot be removed by medicine alterative, but must
be accommodate and palliate by diets and medicines
familiar. As for the passages and pores, it is true which
was anciently noted, that the more subtle of them appear
not in anatomies, because they are shut and latent in dead
bodies, though they be open and manifest in live: which
being supposed, though the inhumanity of anatomia vivorum
was by Celsus justly reproved;! yet in regard of the great
use of this observation, the inquiry needed not by him so
slightly to have been relinquished altogether, or referred to
the casual practices of surgery; but mought have been well
diverted upon the dissection of beasts alive, which notwith-
standing the dissimilitude of their parts, may sufficiently
satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours, they are com-
monly passed over in anatomies as purgaments; whereas
it is most necessary to observe, what cavities, nests, and
recptacles the humours do find in the parts, with the differ-
ing kind of the humour so lodged and received. And as for

1 De Re Medica, i. 1.

114 Bacon

the footsteps of diseases and their devastations of the inward
parts, imposthumations, exulcerations, discontinuations,
putrefactions, consumptions, contractions, extensions, con-
vulsions, dislocations, obstructions, repletions, together
with all preternatural substances, as stones, carnosities,
excrescences, worms, and the like; they ought to have been
exactly observed by multitude of anatomies, and the contri-
bution of men’s several experiences, and carefully set down,
both historically, according to the appearances, and artifi-
cially, with a reference to the diseases and symptoms which
resulted from them, in case where the anatomyis of a defunct
patient; whereas now, upon opening of bodies, they are
passed over slightly and in silence,

In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of
many, some as in their nature incurable, and others as past
the period of cure; so that Sylla and the Triumvirs never
proscribed so many men to die, as they do by their ignorant
edicts: whereof numbers do escape with less difficulty than
they did in the Roman proscriptions. Therefore I will not
doubt to note as a deficience, that they inquire not the
perfect cures of many diseases, or extremities of diseases;
but pronouncing them incurable, do enact a law of neglect,
and exempt ignorance from discredit.

Nay, further, I esteem it the office of a physician not only
to restore health, but to mitigate pain and dours; and not
only when such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but
when it may serve to make a fair and easy passage: for it is
no small felicity which Augustus Cesar was wont to wish
to himself, that same Euthanasia;+ and which was especi-
ally noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose death was
after the fashion and semblance of a kindly and pleasant
sleep. So it is written of Epicurus, that after his disease
was judged desperate, he drowned his stomach and senses
with a large draught and ingurgitation of wine; where-
upon the epigram was made, Hinc Stygias ebrius hausit
aquas,* he was not sober enough to taste any bitterness of

1Suet. Vit. Aug. c. 99.

— Tov dxparov
“Eoracev, elr’ ’Aténv Yuxpoy érecrdcaro.
Diog. Laert. x. 15 (Vit. Eptc.).
No ebrius here; pvotenus and l@etius are suggested; but either
emendation would rob the story of its point.

Advancement of Learning PES

the Stygian water. But the physicians contrariwise do
make a kind of scruple and religion to stay with the patient
after the disease is deplored; whereas, in my judgment,
they ought both to inquire the skill and to give the atten-
dances for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and
agonies of death.

In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find a
deficience in the receipts of propriety,! respecting the
particular cures and diseases: for the physicians have
frustrated the fruit of tradition and experience by their
magistralities, in adding, and taking out, and changing guid
pro quo, in their receipts at their pleasures; commanding so
over the medicine, as the medicine cannot command over
the diseases: for except it be treacle and mithridatum,?
and of late dzascordium, and a few more, they tie themselves
to no receipts severely and religiously: for as to the confec-
tions of sale which are in the shops, they are for readiness
and not for propriety; for they are upon general intention
of purging, opening, comforting, altering, and not much
appropriate to particular diseases: and this is the cause why
empirics and old women are more happy many times
in their cures than learned physicians, because they are
more religious in holding their medicines. Therefore here
is the deficience which I find, that physicians have not,
partly out of their own practice, partly out of the constant
probations reported in books, and partly out of the tradi-
tions of empirics, set down and delivered over certain
experimental medicines for the cure of particular diseases,
besides their own conjectural and magistral descriptions.
For as they were the men of the best composition in the
state of Rome, which either being consuls inclined to the
people, or being tribunes inclined to the senate; so in the
matter we now handle, they be the best physicians, which

1 Receipts of propriety, t.e. proper or fit for each particular disease.

* Treacle and mithridatum. In the frontispiece to the edition of
Hippocrates, which I consulted, Onpiaxdy and MiOpidarixdy were
placed side by side as the chief remedies. By treacle (thertas) is
meant, not the syrup of sugar, etc., but a composition of the parts
of vipers; good for the cure of serpents’ bites, and for other medicinal
purposes. Muthridate (from king Mithridates’ antidote) was a
medicine of general use. ‘‘ Was it not strange, a physician should
decline exhibiting of Mithridate, because it was a known medicine,
and famous for its cures many ages since?’’ Boyle’s Works, ii.
p. 218. Diascordium is said to have been invented by Fracastorius.

116 Bacon

being learned incline to the traditions of experience, or
being empirics incline to the methods of learning.

In preparation of medicines, I do find strange, especially
considering how mineral medicines have been extolled,! and
that they are safer for the outward than inward parts, that
no man hath sought to make an imitation by art of natural
baths and medicinable fountains: which nevertheless are
confessed to receive their virtues from minerals: and not
so only, but discerned and distinguished from what particu-
lar mineral they receive tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel,
or the like; which nature, if it may be reduced to composi-
tions of art, both the variety of them will be increased, and
the temper of them will be more commanded.

But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable
either to my intention or to proportion, I will conclude this
part with the note of one deficience more, which seemeth to
me of greatest consequence; which is, that the prescripts
in use are too compendious to attain their end: for, to my
understanding, it is a vain and flattering opinion to think
any medicine can be so sovereign or so happy, as that the
receipt or use of it can work any great effect upon the body
ofman. It were a strange speech, which spoken, or spoken
oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to which he were by
nature subject: it is order, pursuit, sequence, and inter-
change of application, which is mighty in nature; which
although it require more exact knowledge in prescribing,
and more precise obedience in observing, yet is recompensed
with the magnitude of effects. And although a man would
think, by the daily visitations of the physicians, that there
were a pursuance in the cure: yet let a man look into their
prescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them but
inconstancies and every day’s devices, without any settled
providence or project. Not that every scrupulous or super-
stitious prescript is effectual, no more than every straight
way is the way to heaven; but the truth of the direction
must precede severity of observance.

For Cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate:

1 By Paracelsus and his school, who were chiefly distinguished by
their use of mineral medicines.

* The passage in the Latin on the prolongation of Life, which is
inserted at this point, is most curious. It was a subject to which
Bacon had evidently turned his attention; for he often refers to it,
and had great hopes respecting it.

»

Advancement of Learning 117

for cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a
due reverence to God, to society, and to ourselves. As for
artificial decoration, it is well worthy of the deficiencies
which it hath; being neither fine enough to deceive, nor
to use, nor wholesome to please.

For Athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that is to say,
for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be
brought, whether it be of activity, or of patience ; whereof .
activity hath two parts, strength and swiftness; and patience
likewise hath two parts, hardness against wants and extrem1-
ties, and endurance of pain or torment ; whereof we see the
practices in tumblers, in savages, and in those that suffer
punishment: nay, if there be any other faculty which falls
not within any of the former divisions, as in those that dive,
that obtain a strange power of containing respiration, and
the like, I refer to it this part. Of these things the practices
are known, but the philosophy that concerneth them is not
much inquired; the rather, I think, because they are sup-
posed to be obtained, either by an aptness of nature, which
cannot be taught, or only by continual custom, which is
soon prescribed: which though it be not true, yet I forbear
to note any deficiencies: for the Olympian games are down
long since, and the mediocrity of these things is for use; as
for the excellency of them it serveth for the most part but
for mercenary ostentation.

For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in them
is of laws to repress them.! For as it hath been well
observed, that the arts which flourish in times while virtue
is in growth, are military ; and while virtue is in state, are
liberal ; and while virtue is in declination, are voluptuary ;
so I doubt that this age of the world is somewhat upon
the decent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple
practices joculary; for the deceiving of the senses is one of
the pleasures of the senses. As for games of recreation,
I hold them to belong to civil life and education. And thus
much of that particular human philosophy which concerns
the body, which is but the tabernacle of the mind.

For Human Knowledge which concerns the Mind, it hath

_ two parts; the one that inquireth of the substance or nature

1 This subject is very differently treated in the Latin. He there
introduces music and painting, not as things to be repressed, but
honoured,

x79

118 Bacon

of the soul or mind, the other that inquireth of the faculties
or functions thereof. Unto the first of these, the considera-
tions of the original of the soul, whether it be native or
adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws of matter,
and of the immortality thereof, and many other points, do
appertain: which have been not more laboriously inquired
than variously reported; so as the travail therein taken
seemeth to have been rather ina maze thaninaway. But
although I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more
really and soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath
been; yet I hold that in the end it must be bounded by
religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion: for
as the substance of the soul in the creation was not ex-
tracted out of the mass of heaven and earth by the benedic-
tion of a producat but was immediately inspired from God:
so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by
accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are
the subject of philosophy; and therefore the true know-
ledge of the nature and state of the soul must come by the
same inspiration that gave the substance. Unto this part
of knowledge touching the soul there be two appendices;
which, as they have been handled, have rather vapoured
forth fables than kindled truth, Divination and Fascina-
tion.

Dwination hath been anciently and fitly divided into
artificial and natural; whereof artificial is, when the mind
maketh a prediction by argument, concluding upon signs
and tokens; natural is when the mind hath a presention by
an internal power, without the inducement of a sign.
Artificial is of two sorts; either when the argument is
coupled with a derivation of causes, which is rational; or
when it is only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect,
which is experimental: whereof the latter for the most part
is superstitious; such as were the heathen observations
upon the inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the
swarming of bees; and such as was the Chaldean astrology,
and the like. For artificial divination, the several kinds
thereof are distributed amongst particular knowledges.
The astronomer hath his predictions, as of conjunctions,
aspects, eclipses, and the like. The physician hath his
predictions of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues
of diseases. The Politique hath his predictions; O urbem

?

Advancement of Learning 119

venalem, et cito perituram, si emptorem invenertt!* which
stayed not long to be performed, in Sylla first, and after in
Cesar. So as these predictions are now impertinent, and
to be referred over. But the divination which springeth
from the internal nature of the soul, is that which we now
speak of; which hath been made to be of two sorts, primi-
tive and by influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the
supposition, that the mind, when it is withdrawn and
collected into itself, and not diffused into the organs of the
body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion; which
therefore appeareth most in sleep, in ecstasies, and near
death, and more rarely in waking apprehensions; and is
induced and furthered by those abstinences and observ-
ances which make the mind most to consist in itself. By
influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as
a mirror or glass, should take illumination from the fore-
knowledge of God and spirits: ? unto which the same regi-
ment doth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind
within itself, is the state which is most susceptible of divine
influxions; save that it is accompanied in this case with a
fervency and elevation, which the ancients noted by fury,
and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other.
Fascination is the power and act of imagination intentive
upon other bodies than the body of the imaginant, for of
that we spake in the proper place: wherein the school of
Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended Natural Magic
have been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power of
the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-
working faith; others, that draw nearer to probability,
calling to their view the secret passages of things, and
specially of the contagion that passeth from body to body,
do conceive it should likewise be agreeable to nature, that
there should be some transmissions and operations from
spirit to spirit without the mediation of the senses; whence
the conceits have grown, now almost made civil, of the
mastering spirit, and the force of confidence, and the like.
Incident unto this is the inquiry how to raise and fortify
the imagination: for if the imagination fortified have
power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt

1Sall. Jug. c. xxxv.
* Plat. Tim. 71 (Steph.), olov év xarémrpy Sexouévy rious, and note
the observation on paytixy, at the same place.

120 Bacon

it. And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a
palliation of a great part of Ceremonial Magic. For it may
be pretended that Ceremonies, Characters, and Charms, do
work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil
spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him
that useth it: as images are said by the Roman church to
fix the cogitations, and raise the devotions of them that
pray before them. But for mine own judgment, if it be
admitted that imagination hath power, and that Ceremonies
fortify imagination, and that they be used sincerely and
intentionally for that purpose;? yet I should hold them
unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which God gave
unto man, Jn sudore vultus comedes panem tuum.” For they
propound those noble effects, which God hath set forth unto
man to be bought at the price of labour, to be attained by a
few easy and slothful observances. Deficiencies in these
knowledges I will report none, other than the general defici-
ence, that it is not known how much of them is verity, and
how much vanity.*

The Knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the
mind of man is of two kinds; the one respecting his Under-
standing and Reason, and the other his Will, Appetite, and
Affection; whereof the former produceth Position or
Decree, the latter Action or Execution. It is true that the
Imagination is an agent or munczius, in both provinces, both
the judicial and the ministerial. For Sense sendeth over
to Imagination before Reason have judged: and Reason
sendeth over to Imagination before the decree can be acted:
for Imagination ever precedeth Voluntary Motion. Saving
that this Janus of Imagination hath differing faces: for the
face towards Reason hath the print of Truth, but the face
towards Action hath the print of Good; which nevertheless
are faces,

Quales decet esse sororum.*

Neither is the Imagination simply and only a messenger;

1 Ceremonies. The word does not now convey quite the same
sense; for in these passages Bacon refers to invocation of spirits:
saying (as we gather also from the Latin) that they are illicit, though,
used only as physical remedies without any incantation.

2 Gen. iii. 19.

3In the Latin, two desiderata are noticed; Voluntary Motion,
and Sense and the Sensible: together with a curious discourse on
the Form of Light. 4 Ovid. Metam. ii. 14.

i

Advancement of Learning 121

but is invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth no small
authority in itself, besides the duty of the message. For
it was well said by Aristotle, That the mind hath over the
body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman ;
but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment
which a magistrate hath over a free citizen,’ who may come
also to rule in histurn. For we see that, in matters of Faith
and Religion, we raise our Imagination above our Reason ;
which is the cause why Religion sought ever access to the
mind by similitude, types, parables, visions, dreams. And
again, in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and
other impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise
the true appearance of things, the chief recommenda-
tion unto Reason is from the Imagination. Nevertheless,
because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly
pertain to the Imagination, I see no cause to alter the
former division. For as for poesy, it 1s rather a pleasure or
play of Imagination, than a work or duty thereof. And if
it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as
the Imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle
and consider of the Imagination; no more than we shall
speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth, for that
extendeth to all philosophy, but of such knowledges as do
handle and inquire the faculty of reason: so as poesy had
its true place. As for the power of the Imagination in
nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we have
mentioned it in the doctrine De Anima, whereunto it most
fitly belongeth. And lastly, for Imaginative or Insinuative
Reason, which is the subject of Rhetoric, we think it best to
refer it to the Arts of Reason. So therefore we content
ourselves with the former division, that human philosophy,
which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath
two parts, rational and moral.

The part of human philosophy which is rational, is of all
knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful; and
seemeth but a net of subtilty and spinosity. For as it was
truly said, that knowledge is Pabulum animi,> so in the

1 Aristot. Polit. i. 5, 6; where épetis, appetite, is the term here
rendered by imagination.

* J.e. Rhetoric aims at the feelings rather than at the cool judg-
ment, and inflames Imagination till she overpowers Reason.

8 Cic. Acad. iv. ad Lucullum, 32 a. (Steph. 225). Est enim ani-
morum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quasi pabulum conside-

122 Bacon

nature of men’s appetite to this food, most men are of the
taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would
fain have returned ad ollas carnium, and were weary of
manna; which, though it were celestial, yet seemed less
nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well
knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, civil
history, morality, policy, about the which men’s affections,
praises, fortunes do turn and are conversant; but this same
lumen siccum doth parch and offend most men’s watery and
soft natures. But to speak truly of things as they are in
worth, Rational Knowledges are the keys of all other arts,
for as Aristotle saith, aptly and elegantly, That the hand is
the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of
forms: so these be truly said to be the art of arts: neither
do they only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen:
even as the habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot
a nearer shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow.

The Arts intellectual are four in number; divided accord-
ing to the ends whereunto they are referred: for man’s
labour is to invent that which is sought or propounded; or
to judge that which is invented; or to retain that which is
judged; or to deliver over that which is retained. So as the
arts must be four: Avt of Inquiry or Invention: Art of
Examination or Judgment : Art of Custody or Memory : and
Art of Elocution or Tradition.

Invention is of two kinds, much differing: the one of Avis
and Sciences; and the other of Speech and Arguments.
The former of these I do report deficient; which seemeth
to me to be such a deficience as if in the making of an
inventory touching the estate of a defunct it should be set
down that there 1s no ready money. For as money will fetch
all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which
should purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies
had never been discovered if the use of the mariner’s needle
had not been first discovered, though the one be vast
regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be
found strange if sciences be no farther discovered, if the
art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over.

ratio contemplatioque nature. Or perhaps, De Senect.14. Sihabet
aliquid tanquam pabulum studis atque doctrine, nihil est otiosa

senectute jucundius. =
1 Numb. xi. 4-6. 2 Aristot. De Anima, iii. 8.

——_

Advancement of Learning 123

That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment
standeth plainly confessed; for first, Logic doth not pretend
to invent sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it
over with a Cuigue in sua arte credendum.\ And Celsus
acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the Empirical and
dogmatical sects of physicians, That medicines and cures
were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were
discoursed ; and not the causes first found out, and by light
from them the medicines and cures discovered.” And Plato,
in his Theaetetus, noteth well, That particulars are infinite,
and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction: and
that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ
from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every
particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience.®
And therefore we see, that they which discourse of the
inventions and originals of things, refer them rather to
chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds fishes,
serpents, than to men.

Dictamnum genitrix Cretea carpit ab Ida,

Puberibus caulem foliis et flore comantem

Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris

Gramina, cum tergo volucres hesere sagitte.*
So that it was no marvel, the manner of antiquity being to
consecrate inventors, that the Egyptians had so few human
idols in their temples, but almost all brute.

Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis,

Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, etc.®
And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and
ascribe the first inventions to men; yet you will rather
believe that Prometheus first struck the flints, and mar-
velled at the spark, than that when he first struck the flints
he expected the spark: and therefore we see the West Indian
Prometheus ® had no intelligence with the European,

1 Ellis and Spedding refer to Arist. Anal. Pr. i. 30; Mr. Markby
to Eth. Mag. 1.1.17. Aristotle declares (thet. 1. i. 1) that neither
Rhetoric nor Logic has any proper subject-matter, both being
purely instrumental; accordingly neither can “‘ invent sciences.”

® De Re Med. i. 1.

3 Not in the Theetetus certainly. As Bacon in the Latin intro-
duces the quotation withs Plato non semel innuit, he probably is
not quoting any exact passage.

‘ Virg. ZEn. xii. 412. 5 Ibid. viii. 698.

° Refers, doubtless, to the rubbing of two sticks together to
produce fire. Cf. Nov. Org. 11. i. 16.

124 Bacon

because of the rareness with them of flint, that gave the
first occasion. So as it should seem, that hitherto men are
rather beholding to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightin-
gale for music, or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the
pot-lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance,!
or anything else, than to logic, for the invention of arts and
sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil
describeth much other:

Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes
Paulatim.?

For if you observe the words well, it is no other method
than that which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in
ure; which is a perpetual intending or practising some one
thing, urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of con-
servation of being; for so Cicero saith very truly, Usus uni
ver deditus et naturam et artem sepe vincit.2 And therefore

if it be said of men,
Labor omnia vincit
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas! #

it is likewise said of beasts,

Quis psittaco docuit suum xaipe? ®

Who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a
hollow tree, where she espied water, that the water might
rise so as she might come to it; Who taught the bee to sail
through such a vast sea of air, and to find the way from a
field in flower a great way off to her hive? Who taught the
ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill,
lest it should take root and grow? Add then the word
extundere, which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the
word paulatim, which importeth the extreme slowness, and
we are where we were, even amongst the Egyptians’ gods;
there being little left to the faculty of reason, and nothing
to the duty of art, for matter of invention.

Secondly, the Induction which the Logicians speak of,
and which seemeth familiar with Plato, (whereby the
Principles of Sciences may be pretended to be invented, and

1Téxvn rixny éorepte, kal rixn Téxvnv. Arist. Eth. Nic. vi. 4.

2 Georg. i. 133.

3 Cic. p. Corn. Balb. xx. 45. 4 Virg. Georg. i. 145.
5 Pers. Prol. 8, where it is expedivit.

Advancement of Learning 125

_ so the middle propositions by derivation from the Principles;
their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious and incom-
petent: wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the
duty of Art to perfect and exalt Nature; but they contrari-
wise have wronged, abused, and traduced Nature. For he
that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this
excellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet
speaketh of,

Aérei mellis coelestia dona,!

distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and
artificial, as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find
that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act
an induction much better than they describe it. For to
conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without
instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture;
for who can assure, in many subjects, upon those particulars
which appear of a side, that there are not other on the con-
trary side which appear not? As if Samuel should have
rested upon those sons of Jesse ? which were brought before
him, and failed of David, which was in the field.2 And this
form, to say truth, is so gross, as it had not been possible for
wits so subtile as have managed these things to have offered
it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and
dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful towards
particulars; which their manner was to use but as Jictores
and viatores, for sergeants and whifflers, ad suwmmovendam
turbam, to make way and make room for their opinions,
rather than in their true use and service. Certainly it isa
thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how
the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and
human truth: for as in divine truth man cannot endure to
become as a child; so in human, they reputed the attending
the inductions whereof we speak, as if it were a second
infancy or childhood.

Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly
induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that middle proposi-
tions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature #

1 Virg. Georg. iv. I.

* All the old editions spell the word Issay, and the De Augm.
(as a genitive) Isai. 31 Sam. xvi.

‘In the Latin, 7m rebus naturalibus.

126 Bacon

by syllogism, that is, by touch and reduction of them to
principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences
popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity,
(because it pleaseth God to apply himself to the capacity of
the simplest,) that form may have use; and in natural
philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory
reason, Que assensum parit, operis effeta est: but the
subtlety of nature and operations will not be enchained in
those bonds: for arguments consist of propositions, and
propositions of words; and words are but the current tokens
or marks? of popular notions of things; which notions, if
they be grossly and variably collected out particulars, it is
not the laborious examination either of consequence of argu-
ments, or of the truth of propositions, that can ever correct
that error, being, as the physicians speak, in the first diges-
tion: and therefore it was not without cause, that so many
excellent philosophers became Sceptics and Academics, and
denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension; and
held opinion that the knowledge of man extended only to
appearances and probabilities. It is true that in Socrates
it was supposed to be but a form of irony, Scientiam dis-
simulando simulavit for he used to disable his knowledge,
to the end to enhance his knowledge: like the humour of
Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, but would not
acknowledge so much: 4 and in the later Academy, which
Cicero embraced, this opinion also of acatalepsia,> I doubt,
was not held sincerely: for that all those which excelled in
copie of speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which
was fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable
discourses; being rather like progresses of pleasure, than
journeys to anend. But assuredly many scattered in both
Academies did hold it in subtilty and integrity: but here
was their chief error; they charged the deceit upon the
senses; which in my judgment, notwithstanding all their

1 This quotation is omitted in the Latin, nor can I find whence it
comes; could it be a saying of Bacon’s own?

* Tessere. Arist. Interp. 1. i. 2—ra rdv ev tH puxH Tadnudtwv
ovpBora.

*Cic. Acad. .°5, 15. Cf. Cic. ad AW. xi 19, 3. - Ehese very
words do not occur.

Prac, ANN. 1.7,

5 Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18. where «ardAnyis only is mentioned. Cf.
Nov. Org. i. 37.

Advancement of Learning 139

cavilations, are very sufficient to certify and report truth
though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help
of instrument, and by producing and urging such things
as are too subtile for the sense to some effect comprehensible
by the sense, and other like assistance. But they ought to
have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellec-
tual powers, and upon the manner of collecting and con-
cluding upon the reports of the senses. This I speak, not to
disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek help: for
no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a
straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which
may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass.

This part of invention, concerning the invention of
sciences, I purpose, if God give me leave, hereafter to
propound, having digested it into two parts; whereof the
one I term experientia literata, and the other tnterpretatio
nature : the former being but a degree and rudiment of the
latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great
upon a promise.!

The invention of speech or argument is not properly an
invention, for to invent is to discover that we know not, and
not to recover or resummon that which we already know:
and the use of this invention is no other but out of the
knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed to draw
forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the
purpose which we take into our consideration. So as to speak
truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion,
with an application; which is the cause why the schools do
place it after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent.
Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase as well of
deer in an inclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it
hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention:
so as it be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end
of this invention is readiness and present use of our know-
ledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.

To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two
courses, Preparation and Suggestion. The former of these
seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of

1 In the Latin, Bacon explains his experientia literata, which treats
of methods of experiment; Venatio Panis he also styles it. Cf.
Nov. Org. i. 101. The Interpretatio Nature is the subject-matter
of the Nov. Org.

128 Bacon

diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein
Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the Sophists
near his time, saying, They did as tf one that professed the art
of shoe-making should not teach how to make a shoe, but only
exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and
sizes.1 But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker
should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is
bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour
speaking of divine knowledge, saith, that the kingdom of
heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new
and old store:* and we see the ancient writers of Rhetoric
do give it in precept, “ that pleaders should have the Places,
whereof they have most continual use, ready handled in
all the variety that may be;”’ as that, ‘‘ to speak for the
literal interpretation of the law against equity, and con-
trary; and to speak for presumptions and inferences
against testimony, and contrary.”’? And Cicero himself,
being broken unto it by great experience, delivereth it
plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have occasion to
speak of, if he will take the pains, he may have it in effect
premeditate, and handled, im thest;4 so that when he
cometh to a particular he shall have nothing to do, but to
put to names and times and places, and such other circum-
stances of individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence
of Demosthenes; who, in regard of the great force that the
entrance and access into causes hath to make a good impres-
sion, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations
and speeches. All which authorities and precedents may
overweigh Aristotle’s opinion, that would have us change a
rich wardrobe for a pair of shears.

But the nature of the collection of this provision or
preparatory store, though it be common both to Logic and
Rhetoric, yet having made an entry to it here, where it
came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the
further handling of it to Rhetoric.

The other part of invention, which I term suggestion,
doth assign and direct us to certain marks, or places, which
may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge

1 Aristot. Soph. El. 34. * Matt. xiii. 52.
? In the edition 1605 these passages are printed in black letter, as
quotations.

*Cic. Ovat. 14 (46).

Advancement of Learning 129

as it hath formerly collected, to the end we may make use
thereof. Neither is this use, truly taken, only to furnish
argument to dispute probably with others, but likewise to
minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within our-
selves. Neither may these Places serve only to apprompt
our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. Fora faculty
of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato
saith, Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in
a general notion: else how shall he know tt when he hath
found it ?+ and therefore the larger your anticipation is,
the more direct and compendious is your search. But the
same Places which will help us what to produce of that which
we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience
were before us, what questions to ask; or, if we have books
and authors to instruct us, what points to search and
revolve; so as I cannot report that this part of invention,
which is that which the schools call Topics, is deficient.”

Nevertheless, Topics are of two sorts, general and special.®
The general we have spoken to; but the particular hath
been touched by some, but rejected generally as inartificial
and variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned
too much in the schools, which is, to be vainly subtle in a
few things which are within their command, and to reject
the rest; I do receive particular Topics, (that is, places or
directions of invention and inquiry in every particular
knowledge,) as things of great use, being mixtures of Logic
with the matter of sciences; for in these it holdeth, ars in-
veniendt adolescit cum inventis ;* for as in going of a way,
we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed,
but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which
remaineth: so every degree of proceeding in a science
giveth a light to that which followeth; which light if we
strengthen by drawing it forth into questions or places of
inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit.®

Now we pass unto the arts of Judgment, which handle
the natures of Proofs and Demonstrations; which as to
Induction hath a coincidence with Invention.. For in all

1 Plato, Menon. 80.

* This passage is better arranged in the Latin. The paragraphs
on Topics look as if they had been inserted as an afterthought.

3 Cf. Aristot. Rhet. 11. xxii. 16, 17.

4 Cf. Nov. Org. i. 130.

°In the Latin an inquiry de gravi et levi is here added as a Topic.

130 Bacon

inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the same
action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth; all one as in
the sense. But otherwise it is in proof by syllogism; for
the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention
of the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the conse-
quence is another; the one exciting only, the other examin-
ing. Therefore for the real and exact form of judgment,
we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of inter-
pretation of nature.

For the other judgment by Syllogism, as it is a thing
most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehe-
mently and excellently laboured; for the nature of man
doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his understand-
ing fixed and immovable, and as a rest and support of the
mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove,
that in all motion there is some point quiescent; ? and as
he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas, that
stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling, to be
meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the
conversion is accomplished; so assuredly men have a desire
to have an Aflas or axle-tree within to keep them from
fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of falling;
therefore men did hasten to set down some principles about
which the variety of their disputations might turn.

So then this art of Judgment is but the reduction of pro-
positions to principles in a middle term: the principles to
be agreed by all and exempted from argument; the middle
term to be elected at the liberty of every man’s invention;
the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted; the
one when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which
they term a probation ostensive ; the other, when the con-
tradictory of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory
of the principle, which is that which they call per ancommo-
dum, or pressing an absurdity ; the number of middle terms
to be as the proposition standeth degrees more or less re-
moved from the principle.®

But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the
one by way of direction, the other by way of caution: the
former frameth and setteth down a true form of conse-

1In the Latin, legitimam (Inductionis formam) ad Novum
Organum remittimus.
* Aristot. De Motu Anim. 3. 3 Cf. Sanderson, Logic, iii. 5.

?

Advancement of Learning 131

quence, by the variations and deflections from which errors
and inconsequences may be exactly judged. Toward the
composition and structure of which form, it is incident to
handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the

parts of propositions, which are simple words: and this is

that part of Logic which is comprehended in the Analytics.

The second method of doctrine was introduced for ex-
pedite use and assurance sake; discovering the more subtle
forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions,
which is that which is termed elenches. For although in
the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth, as Seneca
maketh the comparison well, as in juggling feats, which,
though we know not how they are done, yet we know well
it is not as it seemeth to be;? yet the more subtle sort of
them doth not only put a man beside his answer, but doth
many times abuse his judgment.

This part concerning elenches is excellently handled by
Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in
example, not only in the persons of the Sophists, but even
in Socrates himself; who, professing to affirm nothing, but
to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly
expressed all the forms of objection, fallacy, and regardu-
tion.” And although we have said that the use of this
doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate
and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, which
passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great
advantage: though the difference be good which was made
between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the grey-
hound which hath his advantage in the race, and the other
as the hare which hath her advantage in the turn, so as it
is the advantage of the weaker creature.

But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more
ample latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto
divers parts of knowledge; whereof some are laboured and
others omitted. For first, I conceive, though it may seem
at first somewhat strange, that that part which is variably
referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysics,
touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an elench ,;
for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation,

*Sen. Epist. Mor. 45. Sine noxa decipiunt, quomodo preastigia-

torum acetabula et calculi, in quibus fallacia ipsa delectat.
* Cf. Plato’s account of Socrates in the opening of the Theetetus.

132 Bacon

or ambiguity of words and phrase, (especially of such words
as are most general, and intervene in every inquiry,) it
seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use, leaving vain
subtilties and speculations, of the inquiry of majority,
minority, priority, postertority, identity, diversity, possibility,
act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and the like, are but
wise cautions against the ambiguities of speech. So again
the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call
categories or predicaments, are but cautions against the con-
fusion of definitions and divisions.

Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the
strength of the impression, and not by the subtilty of the
illaqueation; not so much perplexing the reason, as over-
ruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I
think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric.

But lastly, there is yet a much more important and pro-
found kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not
observed or inquired at all,? and think good to place here,
as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify
judgment: the force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle
or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth
more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state
thereof. For the mind of man is far from the nature of a
clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should
reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather
like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture,
if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let
us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon
us by the general nature of the mind,® beholding them in
an example or two; as first, in that instance which is the
root of a superstition, namely, That to the nature of the
mind of all men tt ts consonant for the affirmative or active
to affect more than the negative or privative: so that a few
times hitting or presence, countervails oft-times failing or
absence; as was well answered by Diagoras to him that
showed him in Neptune’s temple the great number of
pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck, and had paid
their vows to Neptune, saying, Advise now, you that think

1 Arist. Categ.

2 This is the doctrine of ‘‘ Idols,”” expanded in the Latin, and still
more in the Nov. Org. i. 39-68.

3 Idols ’’ of the Tribe, Nov. Org. i. 24-31.

Pz

Advancement of Learning 1 33

it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest: Yea, but, saith
Diagoras, where are they painted that are drowned ?1 Let us
behold it in another instance, namely, That the spirit of man,
being of an equal and untform substance, doth usually suppose
and feign in nature a greater equality and uniformity than 1s
in truth. Hence it cometh, that the mathematicians
cannot satisfy themselves except they reduce the motions
of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral
lines, and labouring to be discharged of eccentrics.2, Hence
it cometh, that whereas there are many things in nature as
it were monodica, sui quris ;* yet the cogitations of man
do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates,
whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an element
of fire, to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the
like: nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a
number of fictions and fancies the similitude of human
actions and arts, together with the making of man com-
munis mensura, have brought into natural philosophy; not
much better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites,*
bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks, and the
opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism,
who supposed the Gods to be of human shape. And there-
fore Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked why
God should have adorned the heavens with stars, as if he
had been an @dtlis, one that should have set forth some
magnificent shows or plays.® For if that great Work-
master had been of a human disposition, he would have
cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and
orders, like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one
can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight
line, amongst such an infinite number; so differing a
harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit
of nature.

1 Cic. De Nat. Deor. ili. 37.

* Bacon’s warning here is good, though his illustration was soon
signally confuted by the promulgation of Kepler’s laws. See Nov.
org. i. 45.

3 He seems to think the derivation of this term is yudvos and dixn.

* Anthropomorphites, a sect which flourished in the fourth and
tenth centuries; their distinctive doctrine was that as God is said
to have made man in his own Image, therefore the Deity is clothed
in human shape. See Mosheim, Eccl. Hist. Cent. x. pt. ii. ch. 5.

5 Cic. De Nat. Deor. i. 9.

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134 Bacon

Let us consider again the false appearances imposed —
upon us by every man’s own individual nature and custom,
in that feigned supposition that Plato? maketh of the |
cave: for certainly if a child were continued in a grot or |
cave under the earth until maturity of age, and came —
suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd |
imaginations. So in like manner, although our persons live ©
in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in the |
caves of our own complexions and customs, which minister |
unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if they be not —
recalled to examination. But hereof we have given many |

,
|
§

examples in one of the errors, or peccant humours, which
we ran briefly over in our first book. .
And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are |
imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied —
according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort: —
and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe
it well, loguendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes ; yet
certain it is that words, as a Tartar’s bow, do shoot back |
upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily en- |
tangle and pervert the judgment. So as it is almost neces- —
sary in all controversies and disputations to imitate the ©
wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very |
beginning the definitions of our words and terms that —
others may know how we accept and understand them, —
and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh to —
pass for want of this that we are sure to end there where
we ought to have begun, which is, in questions and differ- —
ences about words. To conclude therefore, it must be —
confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from ~
these fallacies and false appearances, because they are in-
separable from our nature and condition of life; so yet
nevertheless the caution of them, (for all elenches, as was
said, are but cautions,) doth extremely import the true ©
conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches or
cautions against these three false appearances, I find
altogether deficient. 4
There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency, |
which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I —
may report that also deficient; which is the application of ©

1** Tdols ” of the Cave, Nov. Org. i. 31-35. }
2 Plato, De Rep. lib. vii. tnzt.

Advancement of Learning 135

the differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of sub-
jects; for there being but four kinds of demonstrations,
that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense, by in-
duction, by syllogism, and by congruity (which is that
which Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circles and
not a notioribus ;) every of these hath certain subjects in
the matter of sciences, in which respectively they have
chiefest use; and certain others, from which respectively
they ought to be excluded; and the rigour and curiosity
in requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and
chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more
remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest
causes of detriment and hinderance to knowledge. The
distributions and assignations of demonstrations, accord-
ing to the analogy of sciences, I note as deficient.

The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing
or memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of
the character, and the order of the entry; for the art of
characters, or other visible notes of words or things, it
hath nearest conjugation with grammar; and therefore I
refer it to the due place: for the disposition and collocation
of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it con-
sisteth in a good digest of common-places; wherein I am not
ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of common-
place books, as causing a retardation of reading, and some
sloth or relaxation of memory. But because it is but a
counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant,
except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of common-
places to be a matter of great use and essence in studying, as
that which assureth copie of invention, and contracteth
judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the
methods of common-places that I have seen, there is none
of any sufficient worth; all of them carrying merely the face
of a school, and not of a world; and referring to vulgar
matters and pedantical divisions, without all life or respect
to action.

For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge,
which is Memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly
inquired of. An art? there is extant of it; but it seemeth

1 Aristot. Analyt. Pr. li. 5, I.
* Cf. Aristot. De Mem. See the article in the Encycl. Britannica,
“On Mnemonics.” Cf. Cicero, De Rhet. iii. and De Orat. ii.

136 Bacon

to me that there are better precepts than that art, and
better practices of that art than those received. It is
certain the art, as it is, may be raised to points of ostenta-
tion prodigious: but in use, as it is now managed, it is
barren, (not burdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory,
as is imagined, but barren,) that is, not dexterous to be
applied to the serious use of business and occasions. And
therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great
number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pour-
ing forth of a number of verses or rhymes, ex tempore, or the
making of a satirical simile of everything, or the turning of
everything to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of
everything by cavil, or the like, (whereof in the faculties of
the mind there is great copie, and such as by device and
practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder,)
than I do of the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, baladines : +
the one being the same in the mind that the other is in the
body, matters of strangeness without worthiness.

This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the
one prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth
the indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and —
directeth us to seek in a narrow compass, that is, somewhat
that hath congruity with our place of memory. Emblem
reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, which
strike the memory more; out of which axioms may be
drawn much better practice than that in use; and besides
which axioms, there are divers moe touching help of
memory, not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning
distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are
but only ill managed.

There remaineth the fourth kind of rational knowledge,
which is transitive, concerning the expressing or transferring
our knowledge to others; which I will term by the general
name of tradition or delivery. Tradition hath three parts;
the first concerning the organ of tradition: the second
concerning the method of tradition; and the third con-
cerning the illustration of tradition.

For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing:
for Aristotle saith well, Words are the images of cogitations,
and letters are the images of words ;* but yet it is not of

1 Ballerino is Italian for a dancer.
2 Aristot. De Interpret. i. 2.

Advancement of Learning 137

necessity that cogitations be expressed by the medium of
words. For whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences,
and those perceptible by the sense, 1s in nature competent to
express cogitations. And therefore we see in the commerce
of barbarous people, that understand not one another’s
language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and
deaf, that men’s minds are expressed in gestures, though
not exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we understand
further, that it is the use of China, and the kingdoms of the
high Levant,! to write in characters real, which express
neither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions;
insomuch as countries and provinces, which understand
not one another’s language, can nevertheless read one
another’s writings, because the characters are accepted
more generally than the languages do extend; and there-
fore they have a vast multitude of characters, as many, I
suppose, as radical words.

These notes of cogitations are of two sorts; the one when
the note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion:
the other ad placitum, having force only by contract or
acceptation. Of the former sort are hieroglyphics and
gestures. For as to hieroglyphics, things of ancient use,
and embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the most
ancient nations, they are but as continued impresses and
emblems. And as for gestures, they are as transitory
hieroglyphics, and are to hieroglyphics as words spoken are
written, in that they abide not; but they have evermore,
as well as the other, an affinity with the things signified:
as Periander, being consulted with how to preserve a
tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and
report what he saw him do; and went into his garden and
topped all the highest flowers: signifying, that it consisted
in the cutting off and keeping low of the nobility and
grandees.2, Ad placitum, are the characters real before

1“ In China et provinciis ultimi Orientis’’ (De Augm.). See a

_ very interesting note on these paragraphs in Ellis and Spedding’s
_ edition of the De Augm. vi. 1.

* Aristot. Polit. iti. 13, and Herod. v. 92. Cf. also Livy, i. 54,

_ where the story is transferred to Tarquinius Superbus. Grandees,

in edition 1605, grandes ; the word being not yet naturalised in the
English language. According to Richardson, Burton (the Anatomy

was published in 1624) spells it grandy. In my copy of the first

edition I have not met with the word.

138 Bacon

mentioned, and words: although some have been willing ©
by curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning to have derived
imposition of names from reason and intendment; a
speculation elegant, and, by reason it searcheth into
antiquity, reverent; but sparingly mixed with truth, and
of small fruit. This portion of knowledge, touching the
notes of things and cogitations in general, I find not in-
quired but deficient. And although it may seem of no

4

great use, considering that words and writings by letter —

do far excel all the other ways; yet because this part
concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge, (for words
are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys

are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that —
moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver,) I —

thought good to propound it to better inquiry.

Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them ©

hath produced the science of grammar: for man still

striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from —
which by his fault he hath been deprived; and as he hath ©
striven against the first general curse by the invention of all —
other arts, so hath he sought to come forth of the second —
general curse, which was the confusion of tongues, by the ©

art of grammar; whereof the use in a mother tongue ? is

small, in a foreign tongue more; but most in such foreign ©
tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are —
turned only to learned tongues. The duty of it is of two ©

natures; the one popular, which is for the speedy and
perfect attaining languages as well for intercourse of

speech as for understanding of authors; the other philo- —
sophical, examining the power and nature of words, as ©
they are the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of ©

analogy between words and reason is handled sparsim,

brokenly, though not entirely; and therefore I cannot —

report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to be
reduced into a science by itself.

Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the con- —

sideration of the accidents of words; which are measure,

sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness and —
harshness of them; whence hath issued some curious ©

1 The Latin is “ linguis quibusque vernaculis.”” Edition 1605 has

in another tongue, which is clearly a misprint—the antithesis lying —
between a ‘‘ vernacular ’’ or mother tongue, and a foreign language. ~

Advancement of Learning 139

observations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider
it in respect of the verse and not of the argument; wherein
though men in learned tongues do tie themselves to the
ancient measures, yet in modern languages it seemeth to
me as free to make new measures of verses as of dances:
for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a measured
speech. In these things the sense is better judge than the
art;
Coene fercula nostre
Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis.}

And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an
unfit subject, it is well said, Quod tempore antiquum videtur,
ad incongruitate est maxime novum.”

For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets
but may be in words. The kinds of ciphers, besides the
simple ciphers, with changes, and intermixtures of nulls
and non-significants, are many, according to the nature or
rule of the infolding. wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles,
etc.2 But the virtues of them, whereby they are to be
preferred, are three; that they be not laborious to write
and read; that they be impossible to decipher; and, in
some cases, that they be without suspicion. The highest
degree whereof is to write omnia per omnia; which is

undoubtedly possible, with a proportion quintuple at most
of the writing infolding to the writing infolded, and no
other restraint whatsoever. This art of ciphering hath
for relative an art of deciphering, by supposition unprofit-
able, but, as things are, of great use. For suppose that
ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them
which exclude the decipherer. But in regard of the rawness
and unskilfulness of the hands through which they pass,
the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest
ciphers.

1 Martial. Epig. ix. 82.

* This quotation, which is omitted in the Latin, is only another
form and application of Bacon’s favourite ‘‘ Antiquitas feculi,
juventus mundi.”

’ In the Latin a specimen of a cipher (invented by himself when
a young man at Paris) is introduced, to show how the art of writing
omnia per omnia can be attained to. See also Encycl. Brit. verb.
Cipher. Trithemius, Bapt. Porta, and others, wrote treatises on this
art; and it is worth remembering that the Stuarts made considerable
_ political use of it.

140 Bacon

In the enumeration of these private and retired arts, it
may be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of
sciences, naming them for show and ostentation, and to
little other purpose. But let those which are skilful in
them judge whether I bring them in only for appearance,
or whether in that which I speak of them, though in few
marks, there be not some seed of proficience. And this
must be remembered, that as there be many of great
account in their countries and provinces, which, when they
come up to the seat of the estate, are but of mean rank
and scarcely regarded; so these arts, being here placed with
the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things; yet
to such as have chosen them to spend their labours and
studies in them, they seem great matters.

For the Method of Tradition, I see it hath moved a

controversy in our time.1 But as in civil business, if there ©

be a meeting, and men fall at words, there is commonly an
end of the matter for that time, and no proceeding at all;
so in learning, where there is much controversy, there is
many times little inquiry. For this part of knowledge
of Method seemeth to me so weakly inquired as I shall
report it deficient.

Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in Logic,
as a part of Judgment; ? for as the doctrine of Syllogisms
comprehendeth the rules of Judgment upon that which
is invented, so the doctrine of Method containeth the rules
of Judgment upon that which is to be delivered; for
Judgment precedeth Delivery, as it followeth Invention.
Neither is the Method or the nature of the tradition material
only to the use of knowledge, but likewise to the progression
of knowledge: for since the labour and life of one man
cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom of the
tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of continuance
and proceeding. And therefore the most real diversity
of method, is of Method referred to use, and Method
referred to progression: whereof the one may be termed
Magistral, and the other of Probation.

1 Between Ramus, whose method was one of perpetual dicho-
tomies, and others.

2 Not so in the usual text-books—Sanderson, lii. 30, 31, and
Aldrich, ch. vi., place it under Discourse; and it is defined as
‘‘ Ratio ita disponendi partes alicujus discipline vel tractationis, ut
facillime a nobis integra discatur.”’

eS

Advancement of Learning 141

The latter whereof seemeth to be via deserta et interclusa.
For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of
contract of error between the deliverer and the receiver:
for he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to deliver it
in such form as may be best believed, and not as may be
best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge, desireth
rather present satisfaction, than expectant inquiry; and so
rather not to doubt, than not to err: glory making the
author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making
the disciple not to know his strength.

But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun
on, ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible,
in the same method wherein it was invented: and so is it
possible of knowledge induced. But in this same antici-
pated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how
he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But
yet nevertheless, secundum majus et minus, a man may
revisit and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge
and consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew
in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in plants:
if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots;
but it you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured
to rest upon roots than slips: so the delivery of know-
ledges, as it is now used, is as of fair bodies of trees without
the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter.
But if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for the
shaft or body of the tree, so you look well to the taking up
of the roots: of which kind of delivery the method of the
mathematics, in that subject, hath some shadow: but
generally I see it neither put in use } nor put in inquisition:
and therefore note it for deficient.

Another diversity of Method there is, which hath some
affinity with the former, used in some cases by the discretion
of the ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of
many vain persons, who have made it as a false light for
their counterfeit merchandises; and that is, enigmatical
and disclosed. The pretence whereof is, to remove the

1T have read use for ure. For the Latin is usus, and the word ure
is a rare one. Richardson’s examples are all from Chaucer. The
meaning of both words is the same.

*Corresponds to the scholastic ‘‘ Methodus dxpoauarich et
éfwrepixy,’’ Aldrich, Logic, vi. Bacon uses these terms in the Latin.

142 Bacon

vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of
knowledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, or
wits of such sharpness as can pierce the veil.

Another diversity of Method, whereof the consequence is
great, is the delivery of knowledge in Aphorisms, or in
Methods; wherein we may observe that it hath been too
much taken into custom, out of a few axioms or observa-
tions upon any subject, to make a solemn and formal art,
filling it with some discourses, and illustrating it with
examples, and digesting it into a sensible Method.

But the writing in aphorisms hath many excellent
virtues, whereto the writing in Method doth not approach.
For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or
solid: for Aphorisms, except they should be rediculous,
cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for
discourse of illustration is cut off: recitals of examples
are cut off; discourse of connection and order is cut off;
descriptions of practice are cut off. So there remaineth
nothing to fill the Aphorisms but some good quantity of
observation: and therefore no man can suffice, nor in
reason will attempt to write Aphorisms, but he that is
sound and grounded. But in Methods,

Tantum series juncturaque pollet,
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris; }

as a man shall make a great shew of an art, which, if it
were disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods
are more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to
action; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or
circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore satisfy ;
but particulars, being dispersed, do best agree with dis-
persed directions. And lastly, Aphorisms, representing a
knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire farther; whereas
Methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if
they were at farthest.

Another diversity of Method, which is likewise of great
weight, is the handling of knowledge by assertions and
their proofs, or by questions and their determinations;
the latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, ts
as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning, as it is to the
proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little

1 Hor. Ep. ad Pis. 242.

Advancement of Learning 143

fort or hold. For if the field be kept, and the sum of the
enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in of
themselves: indeed a man would not leave some important
piece enemy at his back.t In like manner, the use of con-
futation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing;
and to serve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudg-
ments, and not to minister and excite disputations and
doubts.

Another diversity of Method is, according to the subject
or matter which is handled; for there is a great difference
in delivery of the mathematics, which are most abstracted
of knowledges, and policy, which is the most immersed:
and howsoever contention hath been moved touching a
uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, yet we
see how that opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been
of ill desert towards learning, as that which taketh the way
to reduce learning to certain empty and barren generali-
ties; being but the very husks and shells of sciences, all the
kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and
press of the Method. And therefore as I did allow well of
particular topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of
particular Methods of tradition.

Another diversity of judgment? in the delivery and
teaching of knowledge is according unto the light and
presuppositions of that which is delivered; for that know-
ledge which is new, and foreign from opinions received,
is to be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable?
and familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to
tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he
saith, If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after simili-
tudes, etc. For those whose conceits are seated in popluar
opinions, need only but to prove or dispute; but those
whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double
labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the
other to prove and demonstrate: so that it is of necessity

1 This passage is equivalent to “ although indeed a man would
not leave some fortified place hostile to him in his rear.”’

* Bacon meant here to say “‘ diversity of Method to be used with
judgment,”’ etc.; for the Latin is ‘“‘ Sequitur aliud Methodi discrimen
in tradendis scientiis cum judicio adhibendum.”’

* Agreeable. ‘‘ Opinionibus jampridem imbibitis et receptis
affinis.”’

* Arist. Eth. Nic. vi. 3, see note in Ellis and Spedding’s edition.

144 Bacon

with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations
to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of
learning, and in rude times, when those conceits which are
now trivial were then new, the world was full of parables
and similitudes; for else would men either have passed over
without mark, or else rejected for paradoxes, that which
was offered, before they had understood or judged. So
in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes
are: for it isa rule, that whatsoever science is not consonant
to presuppositions, must pray in aid of similitudes.

There be also other diversities of Methods vulgar and
received: as that of Resolution or Analysis, of Constitution
or Systasis, of Concealment of Cryptic, etc., which I do allow
well of, though I have stood upon those which are least
handled and observed. All which I have remembered to
this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one
general inquiry, which seems to me deficient, touching the
Wisdom of Tradition.

But unto this part of knowledge concerning Methods
doth farther belong not only the architecture of the whole
frame of a work, but also the several beams and columns
thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and
figure. And therefore Method considereth not only the
disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the
propositions: not as to their truth or matter, but as to
their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus merited
better a great deal in reviving the good rules of propositions,
Ka6éAr0v mp@rov Kata mavtos, etc., than he did in intro-
ducing the canker of epitomes;? and yet (as it is the con-
dition of human things that, according to the ancient
fables, the most precious things have the most pernicious
keepers ;) it was so, that the attempt of the one made him
fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted
that should design to make axioms convertible, if he make
them not withal circular, and non-promovent, or incurring
into themselves; but yet the intention was excellent.

The other considerations of method, concerning pro-
positions, are chiefly touching the utmost propositions,
which limit the dimensions of sciences; for every know-
ledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity, (which is

1 Should this not rather have been Dichotomies ? ‘“‘ quam in unica
sua Methodo et Dichotomiis obtrudendis.”’

—— wes xe Vig Poul aet
ee ae ee Re ON

Advancement of Learning 145

the truth and substance of it, that makes it solid,) to have
a longitude and a latitude; accounting the latitude towards
other sciences, and the longitude towards action; that is,
from the greatest generality to the most particular precept.
The one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to inter-
meddle within the province of another, which is the rule they
call Kadavrs;1 the other giveth rule unto what degree of
particularity a knowledge should descend: which latter
I find passed over in silence, being in my judgment the
more material; for certainly there must be somewhat left
to practice; but how much is worthy the inquiry. We see
remote and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge
to scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding to prac-
tice than an Ortelius’ 2 universal map is to direct the way
between London and York. The better sort of rules have
been not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished,
where you may see the images of things, but first they
must be filed: so the rules will help, if they be laboured and
polished by practice. But how crystalline they may be
made at the first, and how far forth they may be polished
aforehand, is the question; the inquiry whereof seemeth
to me deficient.

There hath been also laboured and put in practice a
method, which is not a lawful method, but a method of
imposture; which is to deliver knowledges in such manner,
as men may speedily come to make a show of learning
who have it not: such was the travail of Raymundus
Lullius, in making that art which bears his name: ? not
unlike to some books of typocosmy, which have been
made since; being nothing but a mass of words of all arts,
to give men countenance, that those which use the terms
might be thought to understand the art; which collections
are much like a fripper’s or broker’s shop, that hath ends
of everything, but nothing of worth.

Now we descend to that part which concerneth the

1 Viz. that Propositions should be true essentially.

2 Ortelius was an Antwerper, died 1598, styled the ‘‘ Ptolemzus
sui seculi.”’

3 Raymundus Lully, ‘“‘the Enlightened Doctor,” was born in
Majorca in 1225, studied Arabian philosophy, chemistry, physic,
and divinity. He was stoned to death at the age of eighty in Maure-
tania, for preaching the gospel. For a brief account of his Method,
see note to Ellis and Spedding’s De Augm. vi. 2 (p. 669).

146 Bacon

illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science
which we call rhetoric, or art of eloquence ; a science éxcellent,
and excellently well laboured. For though in true value
it is inferior to wisdom, (as it is said by God to Moses,
when he disabled himself for want of this faculty, Aaron
shall be thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God :)1 yet
with people it is the more mighty: so Salomon saith,
Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloguio
majora veperiet ;* signifying, that profoundness of wisdom
will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is
eloquence that prevaileth in an active life. And as to the
labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetori-
cians of his time, and the experience of Cicero hath made
them in their works of rhetorics exceed themselves. Again,
the excellency of examples of. eloquence in the orations
of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the
precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this
art; and therefore the deficiencies which I shall note will
rather be in some collections, which may as hand-maids
attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself.

Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots
of this science, as we have done of the rest; the duty and
office of rhetoric is, to apply reason to imagination for the
better moving of the will. For we see reason is disturbed
in the administration thereof by three means; by zllaquea-
tion or sophism, which pertains to logic; by imagination
or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion —
or affection, which pertains to morality. And as in negotia-
tion with others, men are wrought by cunning, by impor-
tunity, and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within
ourselves, men are undermined by inconsequences, solicited
and importuned by impressions or observations, and
transported by passions. Neither is the nature of man so
unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should
have force to: disturb reason, and not to establish and
advance it. For the end of logic is, to teach a form of
argument.to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end
of morality is to procure the affections to obey reason,
and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is, to fill the
imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it: for
these abuses of art come in but ex obliquo, for caution.

1 Exod. iv. 16. * Prov, XVi, 2%,

Advancement of Learning 147

And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though
springing out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his
time, to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resem-
bling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, and help
unwholesome by variety ofsaucesto the pleasure of the taste.t
For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning
that which is good, than in colouring that which is evil;
for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than he
can do or think: and it was excellently noted by Thucy-
dides in Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad side
_ in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against
eloquence and good speech;? knowing that no man can
speak fair of courses sordid and base. And therefore as
Plato said elegantly, That virtue, 1f she could be seen, would
move great love and affection ;* so seeing that she cannot be
showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree is
to show her to the imagination in lively representation:
for to show her to reason only in subtilty of argument,
was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the
Stoics; who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp
disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy
with the will of man.

Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and
obedient to reason, it were true there should be no great
use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than
of naked proposition and proofs; but in regard of the
continual mutinies and seditions of the affections,

Video meliora, proboque;
Deteriora sequor: *

reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of
persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from
the affections’ part, and contract a confederacy between
the reason and imagination against the affections; for the
affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as
reason doth. The difference is, that the affection beholdeth
merely the present; reason beholdeth the future and sum
of time. And therefore the present filling the imagination
more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force
of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and

1 Plat. Gorg. 462, seq. * Thucyd. iii. 42.

3 Plat. Phedr. 250. * Ovid. Metam. vii. 20.

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remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the |
imagination reason prevaileth. |

We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more ~
charged with the colouring of the worse part, than logic
with sophistry,! or morality with vice. For we know the
doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be
opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from
rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close,
the other at large; but much more in this, that logic
handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth
it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And
therefore Aristotle ? doth wisely place rhetoric as between
logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the
other, as participating of both: for the proofs and demon-
strations of logic are towards all men indifferent and the
same; but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought
to differ according to the auditors:

Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion.*

Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend
so far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to
several persons, he should speak to them all respectively
and several ways: though this politic part of eloquence in
private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want:
whilst by the observing their well-graced forms of speech
they leese the volubility of application: and therefore it
shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry,
not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part
which concerneth policy.

Now therefore will I descend to the deficiencies, which,
as I said, are but attendances: 4 and first, I do not find
the wisdom and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who
began to make a collection of the popular signs and colours
of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which are
as the sophisms of rhetoric, as 1 touched before.® For
example:

1 Arist. Rhet. 1. 1. 14. 2 Arist. Rhet. i. 2, 7.
3 Virg. Ecl. viii. 56.
4 Attendances. ‘‘ Pertinent omnia ad promptuarium.”

5 These were published in 1597, at the end of the volume of
Essays. They are reproduced in the corresponding place of the
Latin. See Arist. Top. i. 12.

: Advancement of Learning 149

Sophisma.
Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.

Redargutto.
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.}

Malum est, malum est, inquit emptor : sed cum recesserit,
tum gloriabitur |?

The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three: one,
that there be but a few of many; another, that their
elenches are not annexed; and the third, that he conceived
but a part of the use of them: for their use is not only
in probation, but much more in impression. For many
forms are equal in signification which are differing in
impression; as the difference is great in the piercing of that
which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of
the percussion be the same: for there is no man but will
be a little more raised*by hearing it said, Your enemies
will be glad of this:

Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atride; *

than by hearing it said only, Thts ts evil for you.

Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before,
touching provision or preparatory store for the furniture
of speech and readiness of invention; which appeareth
to be of two sorts; the one in resemblance to a shop of
pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made
up; both to be applied to that which is frequent and most
in request: the former of these I will call antitheta, and the
latter formule. }

Antitheta are theses argued pro et contra ; wherein men
may be more large and laborious: but, in such as are able
to do it, to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the
several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute
sentences, not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms
of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be
used; supplying authorities and examples by reference.

Pro verbts legis.
Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, que recedit a litera:
Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.
Pro sententia legis.
Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula.

‘Hor. Ed, ii. 2, 11. * Prov, 2k. 44, ® Virg. En, li. 104.
L 719

150 Bacon

Formule are but decent and apt passages or convey-—
ances of speech, which may serve indifferently for differing
subjects; as of preface, conclusion, digression, transition, —
excusation, etc. For as in buildings, there is great pleasure
and use in the well casting of the staircases, entries, doors, ©
windows, and the like; so in speech, the conveyances and
passages are of special ornament and effect.

A conclusion tn a deliberative.

So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the incon-
veniences future.

There remain two appendices touching the tradition of |
knowledge, the one critical, the other pedantical. For all
knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by —
men’s proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal —
part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing —
of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading —
of books; whereunto appertain incidently these considera-
tions. The first is concerning the true correction and
edition of authors; wherein nevertheless rash diligence —
hath done great prejudice. For these critics have often
presumed, that that which they understand not is false set
down: as the priest that, where he found it written of
St. Paul, Demissus est per sportam+ mended his book, and
made it Demissus est per portam ; because sporta was a
hard word, and out of his reading: and surely their errors,
though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, are yet of —
the same kind. And therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, ~
the most corrected copies are commonly the least. correct.

The second is concerning the exposition and explication —
of authors, which resteth in annotations and commen-
taries: wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure places, ~
and discourse upon the plain.

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases
give great light to true interpretations.

The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judg-
ment of the authors; that men thereby may make some
election unto themselves what books to read. :

And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition ©
of studies; that men may know in what order or pursuit ©
to read.

1 Acts ix. 25.

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For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference
of tradition which is proper for youth; whereunto apper-
tain divers considerations of great fruit.

As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with
what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain
them.

Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the
easiest, and so proceed to the more difficult; and in what
courses to press the more difficult, and then to turn them
to the more easy: for it is one method to practise swimming
with bladders, and another to practise dancing with heavy
shoes.

A third is the application of learning according unto
the propriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the facul-
ties intellectual, but seemeth to have a proper cure con-
tained in some studies; as, for example, if a child be
bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention,
the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them,
if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is to begin
anew. And as sciences have a propriety towards faculties
for cure and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy
towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting: and
therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what kinds of
wits and natures are most apt and proper for what sciences.

Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great
consequence to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by
Cicero,! men in exercising their faculties, if they be not
well advised, do exercise their faults and get ill habits as
well as good; so there is a great judgment to be had in the
continuance and intermission of exercises. It were too
long to particularize a number of other considerations of
this nature, things but of mean appearance, but of singular
efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or
young plants is that that is most important to their thriv-
ing: (and as it was noted that the first six kings being in
truth as tutors of the state of Rome in the infancy thereof,
was the principal cause of the immense greatness of that
state which followed:) so the culture and manurance of
minds in youth, hath such a forcible, though unseen opera-
tion, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour
can countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to

Bic, De'Osr, 4.3%:

152 Bacon

observe also how small and mean faculties gotten by educa-
tion, yet when they fall into great men or great matters,
do work great and important effects; whereof we see a
notable example in Tacitus! of two stage players, Per-
cennius and Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put
the Pannonian armies into an extreme tumult and combus-
tion. For there arising a mutiny amongst them upon the

OILS Pn Se I gar

death of Augustus Cesar, Blesus the lieutenant had com- ~

mitted some of the mutineers, which were suddenly rescued ;

whereupon Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he did 3
in this manner:—These poor innocent wretches appointed to —
cruel death, you have restored to behold the light; but who —

shall restore my brother to me, or life unto my brother, that —

was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany, to
treat of the common cause? and he hath murdered him this
last night by some of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath
about him for his executioners upon soldiers. Answer,
Blesus, what is done with his body ? The mortalest enemies
do not deny burial. When I have performed my last duty
to the corpse with kisses, with tears, command me to be slain
beside him ; so that these my fellows, for our good meaning,
and our true hearts to the legions, may have leave to bury us.
With which speech he put the army into an infinite fury
and uproar: whereas truth was he had no brother, neither
was there any such matter; but he played it merely as if
he had been upon the stage.

But to return: we are now come to a period of rational

knowledges; wherein if I have made the divisions other |
than those that are received, yet would I not be thought ~
to disallow all those divisions which I do not use. For ©
there is a double necessity imposed upon me of altering the ©

divisions. The one, because it differeth in end and pur-
pose, to sort together those things which are next in nature,

and those things which are next in use. For if a secretary

of state should sort his papers, it is like in his study or

general cabinet he would sort together things of a nature, —
as treaties, instructions, etc., but in his boxes or particular |
cabinet he would sort together those that he were like to ©
use together, though of several natures; so in this general —
cabinet of knowledge it was necessary for me to follow the ©

divisions of the nature of things; whereas if myself had
1 Tacit. Ann. i. 22, 23.

Se ee a ~

—— =~

Advancement of Learning 153

been to handle any particular knowledge, I would have
respected the divisions fittest for use. The other, because
the bringing in of the deficiencies did by consequence alter
the partitions of the rest. For let the knowledge extant,
for demonstration sake, be fifteen; let the knowledge with
the deficiencies be twenty; the parts of fifteen are not the
parts of twenty; for the parts of fifteen are three and five;
the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. So as
these things are without contradiction, and could not
otherwise be.

WE proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of
the appetite and will of man: whereof Salomon saith,
Ante omnia, filt, custodi cor tuum, nam inde procedunt
actiones vite.1 In the handling of this science, those which
have written seem to me to have done as if a man, that
professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair copies of
alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts
or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the
letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and
copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of good,
virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well described
as the true objects and scopes of man’s will and desires.
But how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame
and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable
to these pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly
and unprofitably. For it is not the disputing that moral
virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature,’
or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won by
doctrines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward
and punishment, and the like scattered glances and touches,
that can excuse the absence of this part.

The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden
rock whereupon both this and many other barks of know-
ledge have been cast away; which is, that men have
despised to be conversant in ordinary and common matters,
the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is the wisest
doctrine, (for life consisteth not in novelties or subtilties,)
but contrariwise they have compounded sciences chiefly

1 Prov. iv. 23. * Arist, Eth. Nec. ii. 1. Lud. Eth. 4, 3, 1.

154 Bacon

of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen
to give glory either to the subtilty of disputations, or to the
eloquence of discourses. But Seneca giveth an excellent
check to eloquence; Nocet allis eloquentia, quibus non rerum
cupiditatem facit, sed sut.1 Doctrine should be such as should
make men in love with the lesson, and not with the teacher;
being directed to the auditor’s benefit, and not to the
author’s commendation. And therefore those are of the
right kind which may be concluded as Demosthenes con-
cludes his counsel, Que st feceritis, non oratorem duntaxat
in presentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam non ita multo
post statu rerum vestrarum meltiore.”

Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have de-
spaired of a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself,
and indeed obtained, who got as much glory of eloquence,
wit, and learning in the expressing of the observations of
husbandry, as of the heroical acts of AEneas:—

Nec sum animi debius, verbis ea vincere magnum
Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem.*

And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write
at leisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to
instruct and suborn action and active life, these Georgics
of the mind, concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof,
are no less worthy than the heroical descriptions of virtue,
duty, and felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive
division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the exemplar
or platform of good, and the regiment or culture of the mind:
the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing
rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of
man thereunto.

The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good con-
sidereth it either simple or compared; either the kinds of
good, or the degrees of good; in the latter whereof those
infinite disputations, which were touching the supreme
degree thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, or the
highest good, the doctrines concerning which were as the
heathen divinity, are by the Christian faith discharged.

1Sen. ad Lucilium, Ep. 52.

2 Demosth. Olynth. B. ad fin. 3 Georg. iii. 289.

4JI.e. Stood to the Heathen in the place of Divinity. “Que
ethnicis instar Theologie erant.”’

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2

_ And as Aristotle saith, That young men may be happy, but
not otherwise but by hope ;+ so we must all acknowledge our
minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the
future world.

Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the
philosopher’s heaven, whereby they feigned a higher eleva-
tion of man’s nature than was, (for we see in what a height
of style Seneca writeth, Vere magnum, habere fragilitatem
hominis, securitatem Det,") we may with more sobriety and
truth receive the rest of their inquiries and labours. Where-
in for the nature of good positive or simple, they have set
it down excellently, in describing the forms of virtue and
duty, with their situations and postures; in distributing
them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and
administrations, and the like: nay farther, they have
commended them to man’s nature and spirit, with great
quickness of argument and beauty of persuasions; yea,
and fortified and entrenched them, as much as discourse
can do, against corrupt and popular opinions. Again, for
the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have
also excellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the
comparison between a contemplative and an active life,®
in the distinction between virtue with reluctation and
virtue secured, in their encounters between honesty and
profit, in their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the like;
so as this part deserveth to be reported for excellently
laboured.

Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular
and received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain,
and the rest, they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry
concerning the roots of good and evil, and the strings of
those roots, they had given, in my opinion, a great light
to that which followed; and specially if they had consulted
with nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix and
more profound; which being by them in part omitted and
in part handled with much confusion, we will endeavour to
resume and open in a more clear manner.

There is formed in every thing a double nature of good:
the one, as every thing is a total or substantive in itself;
the other, as it is a part or member of a greater body;

1 Rhet. ii. 12, 8. *Sen. ad Lucilium, Ep. 53.
8 Arist. Eth. Nic. x. 6-8.

156 Bacon

whereof the latter is in degree the greater and the worthier,
because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general
form. Therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy
moveth to the lodestone; but yet if it exceed a certain
quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the lodestone, and
like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region
and country of massy bodies: so may we go forward, and
see that water and massy bodies move to the centre of the
earth; but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continu-
ance of nature, they will move upwards from the centre of
the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth in regard to
their duty to the world. This double nature of good, and
the comparative thereof, is much more engraven upon man,
if he degenerate not: unto whom the conservation of duty
to the public ought to be much more precious than the
conservation of life and being: according to that memorable
speech of Pompeius Magnus, when being in commission of
purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with
great vehemency and instance by his friends about him
that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of
weather, he said only to them, Necesse est ut eam, non ut
vivam.' But it may be truly affirmed that there. was never
any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so
plainly and highly exalt the good which is communicative,
and depress the good which is private and particular, as
the Holy Faith; well declaring that it was the same God
that gave the Christian law to men, who gave those laws
of nature to inanimate creatures that we spoke of before;
for we read that the elected saints of God have wished
themselves anathematized and razed out of the book of life,
in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion.?

This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge
and determine most of the controversies wherein moral
philosophy is conversant. For first, it decideth the
question touching the preferment of the contemplative
or active life, and decideth it against Aristotle. For
all the reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative
are private, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a
man’s self, (in which respects, no question, the contempla-
tive life hath the pre-eminence) not much unlike to that
comparison, which Pythagoras made for the gracing and

1Plut. Vit. Pomp. * Rom. 3X. 73;

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magnifying of philosophy and contemplation: who being
asked what he was, answered, That 1f Hiero were ever at the
Olympian games, he knew the manner, that some came to try
their fortune for the prizes, and some came as merchants to
utter their commodities, and some came to make good cheer
and meet their friends, and some came to look on, and that
he was one of them that came to look on.1. But men must
know, that in this theatre of man’s life it is reserved only
for God and angels to be lookers on: neither could the like
question ever have been received in the church (notwith-
standing their Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum
ejus,” by which place they would exalt their civil death and
regular professions, ) but upon this defence, that the monasti-
cal life is not simply * contemplative, but performeth the
duty either of incessant prayers and supplications, which
hath been truly esteemed as an office in the church, or else
of writing or taking instructions for writing concerning the
_ law of God, as Moses did when he abode so long in the
mount. And so we see Enoch the seventh from Adam,
who was the first contemplative, and walked with God,
yet did also endow the church with prophecy, which St.
Jude citeth.2 But for contemplation which should be
finished in itself, without casting beams upon society,
assuredly divinity knoweth it not.

It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and
Socrates, and their schools and successions, on the one side,
who placed felicity in virtue simply or attended, the actions
and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and concern
society; and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and Epicur-
eans, who placed it in pleasure, and made virtue, (as it is
used in some comedies of errors, wherein the mistress and
the maid change habits,) to be but as a servant, without
which pleasure cannot be served and attended, and the
reformed school of the Epicureans,which placed it in serenity
of mind and freedom from perturbation, (as if they would
have deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the
first age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor
autumn, but all after one air and season,) and Herillus, who

1 Cic. Tusc. Quest. v. 3, of Leo, tyrant of Phlius, not of Hiero.
abs. CRVI. 15,

3 Edition 1605, simple ; 1629, 1633, simply.

ye Mae o tae ® Jude 14.

158 Bacon

placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the
mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming
things according to the clearness of the desires, or the
reluctation; which opinion was revived in the heresy of the
Anabaptists,1 measuring things according to the motions
of the spirit, and the constancy or wavering of belief: all
which are manifest to tend to private repose and ccntent-
ment, and not to point of society.

It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which
presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things
which are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and
disturbance: as if it were not a thing much more happy to
fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to obtain
all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune;
as Gonsalvo said to his soldiers, showing them Naples, and
protesting, He had rather die one foot forwards, than to have
iis life secured for long by one foot of retreat.2, Whereunto
the wisdom of that heavenly leader hath signed, who hath
affirmed that a good conscience ts a continual feast ;® showing
plainly that the conscience of good intensions, howsoever
succeeding, is a more continual joy to nature, than all the
provision which can be made for security and repose.

It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy, which
grew general about the time of Epictetus, in converting it
into an occupation or profession; as if the purpose had
been, not to resist and extinguish perturbations, but to fly
and avoid the causes of them, and to shape a particular
kind and course of life to that end; introducing such a
health of mind, as was that health of body of which Aristotle
speaketh of Herodicus, who did nothing all his life long but
intend his health:4 whereas if men refer themselves to
duties of society, as that health of body is best, which is
ablest to endure all alterations and extremities; so likewise
that health of mind is most proper, which can go through
the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as Dio-
genes’ opinion is to be accepted, who commended not them
which abstained, but them which sustained, and could

1 Anabaptists. Bacon here refers to the doctrines held by the
German Anabaptists. They believed themselves to be under special
and divine influences, and therefore had no need of magistracies, of
distinct ranks of men, or of restrictions in marriage.

? Guicciardini, vi. 2. * Prov. xv. 15;

* Arist. Rhet. 1. 5, 10.

Advancement of Learning 159

refrain their mind im precipitio, and could give unto the
mind, as is used in horsemanship, the shortest stop or turn.

Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of applica-
tion in some of the most ancient and reverend philoso-
phers and philosophical men, that did retire too easily
from civil business, for avoiding of indignities and perturba-
tions: whereas the resolution of men truly moral ought to
be such as the same Gonsalvo said the honour of a soldier
should be, e telé crassiove, and not so fine as that every-
thing should catch in it and endanger it.

To resume private or particular good ; it falleth into the
division of good active and passive: for this difference of
good, not unlike to that which amongst the Romans was
expressed in the familiar or household terms of promus
and condus, is formed also in all things, and is best disclosed
in the two several appetites in creatures; the one to pre-
serve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or
multiply themselves; whereof the latter seemeth to be
the worthier: for in nature the heavens, which are the more
worthy, are the agent; and the earth, which is the less
worthy, is the patient. In the pleasures of living creatures,
that of generation is greater than that of food; in divine
doctrine, beatius est dare quam accipere,? and in life, there
is no man’s spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting of
somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire, more than
sensuality; which priority of the active good, is much
upheld by the consideration of our estate to be mortal
and exposed to fortune. For if we might have a perpetuity
and certainty in our pleasures, the state of them would
advance their price: but when we see it is but magni
estimamus mort tardius,? and ne glorierts de crastino, nescis
partum diez,* it maketh us to desire to have somewhat
secured and exempted from time; which are only our
deeds and works: as it is said opera eorum sequuntur eos.®
The pre-eminence likewise of this active good is upheld by
the affection which is natural in man towards variety and
proceeding; which in the pleasures of the sense, which is
the principal part of passive good, can have no great latitude:

1 Diog. Laert. Vita Diogenis, see Ellis and Spedding’s edition in
loco.

2 Acts xx. S5. : 3 Sen. Nat. Quest. li, 59.

* Prov; xxvii. tf. 5 Revel. xiv. 13.

160 Bacon

Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris; cibus, somnus, ludus ; per
hunc circulum curritur ; mori velle non tantum fortis, aut
miser, aut prudens, sed etiam fastidiosus potest But in
enterprises, pursuits, and purposes of life, there is much
variety; whereof men are sensible with pleasure in their
inceptions, progressions, recoils, reintegrations, approaches
and attainings to their ends: so as it was well said Vita
sine proposito languida et vaga est. Neither hath this
active good any identity with the good of society, though in
some case it hath an incidence into it; for although it do
many times bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is with
a respect private to a man’s own power, glory, amplifica-
tion, continuance; as appeareth plainly, when it findeth a
contrary subject. For that gigantine state of mind which
possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was Lucius
Sylla, and infinite other in smaller model, who would have
all men happy or unhappy as they were their friends or
enemies, and would give form to the world, according to
their own humours, (which is the true Theomachy,) pre-
tendeth and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth
farthest from good of society, which we have determined
to be the greater.

To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of
conservative and perfective. For let us take a brief review
of that which we have said: we have spoken first of the good
of society, the intention whereof embraceth the form of
human nature, whereof we are members and portions,
and not our own proper and individual form: we have
spoken of active good, and supposed it as a part of private
and particular good: and rightly, for there is impressed
upon all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from
love to themselves; one of preserving and continuing their
form; another of advancing and perfecting their form;
and a third of multiplying and extending their form upon
other things; whereof the multiplying, or signature of it
upon other things, is that which we handled by the name
of active good. So as there remaineth the conserving of
it, and perfecting or raising of it; which latter is the highest —
degree of passive good. For to preserve in state is the less, —

1Sen. ad Lucsl. Epist. 77.
*Sen. ad Lucil. Epist. 95, where the words “ languida et’”’ are
wanting.

Advancement of Learning 161

to preserve with advancement is the greater. So in
man,—
Igneus est ollis vigor, et czlestis origo.!

His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature
is the perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of
which good is that which is the tempest of human life; while
man, upon the instinct of an advancement formal and
essential is carried to seek an advancement local. For
as those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up
and down and change place, as if by a remove local they
could obtain a remove internal; so is it with men in am-
bition, when failing of the means to exalt their nature, they
are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their place. So then
passive good is, as was said, either conservative or perfective.

To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which
consisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our
natures; it seemeth to be the most pure and natural of
pleasures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And this
also receiveth a difference, which hath neither been well
judged of, nor well inquired: for the good of fruition or
contentment is placed either in the sincereness of the fruition,
or in the quickness and vigour of it; the one superinduced
by equality, the other by vicissitude; the one having less
mixture of evil, the other more impression of good. Which
of these is the greater good is a question controverted; but
whether man’s nature may not be capable of both, is a
question not inquired.

The former question being debated between Socrates and
a sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant
peace of mind, and the sophist in much desiring and much
enjoying, they fell from argument to ill words: the sophist
saying that Socrates’ felicity was the felicity of a block or
stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist’s felicity was
the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but
itch and scratch.2. And both these opinions do not want
their supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much up-
held by the general consent even of the Epicures themselves,
that virtue beareth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain
it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations
than in compassing desires. The sophist’s opinion is much

1 Virg. Zn. vi. 730. 2 Plat. Gorg. 492, 494.

162 Bacon

favoured by the assertion we last spoke of, that good of
advancement is greater than good of simple preserva-
tion; because every obtaining a desire hath a show of
advancement, as motion though in a circle has a show
of progression.

But the second question, decided the true way, maketh
the former superfluous. For can it be doubted but that
there are some who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures
than some other, and yet nevertheless are less troubled with
the loss or leaving of them? so as this same, Non uti ut non
appetas, non appetere ut non metuas, sunt anim pusilli et
difidentis. And it seemeth to me, that most of the doc-
trines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautionary
than the nature of things requireth. So have they in-
creased the fear of death in offering to cure it. For when
they would have a man’s whole life to be but a discipline
or preparation to die, they must needs make men think
that it is a terrible enemy, against whom there is no end of
preparing. Better saith the poet:—

Qui spatium vite extremum inter munera ponat
Nature.

So have they sought to make men’s minds too uniform and
harmonical, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary
motions: the reason whereof I suppose to be, because they
themselves were men dedicated to a private, free, and
unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon the lute or
like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have
show of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such
strange and hard stops and passages as a set song or volun-
tary; much after the same manner was the diversity
between a philosophical and a civil life. And therefore
men are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers; who, if there
be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice,? which may be ground
forth without taking too much of the stone, they help it;
but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they
will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity
as they destroy not magnanimity.

Having therefore deduced the good of man which is
private and particular, as far as seemeth fit; we will now

St Jav. Sat. x 358:
2“* Nubecula aliqua aut glaciecula,’’ De Augm.

Advancement of Learning 163

return to that good of man which respecteth and beholdeth
society, which we may term Duty; because the term of
Duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed
towards others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind
well formed and composed in itself: though neither can
a man understand virtue without some relation to society,
nor Duty without an inward disposition. This part may
seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic: but not
if it be well observed; for it concerneth the regiment and
government of every man over himself, and not over others.
And as in architecture the direction of framing the posts,
beams, and other parts of building, is not the same with
the manner of joining them and erecting the building;
and in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an instru-
ment or engine, is not the same with the manner of setting
it on work and employing it, (and yet nevertheless in
expressing of the one you incidentally express the apt-
ness towards the other;) so the doctrine of conjugation
of men in society differeth from that of their conformity
thereunto.

This part of Duty is subdivided into two parts: the
common Duty of every man, as a man or member of a
state; the other, the respective or special Duty of every
man, in his profession, vocation, and place. The first of
these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. The
second likewise I may report rather dispersed than deficient ;
which manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument
I acknowledge to be best. For who can take upon him
to write of the proper duty, virtue, challenge, and right
of every several vocation, profession, and place? For
although sometimes a looker on may see more than a game-
ster, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound,
that the vale best discovereth the lull ; yet there is small doubt
but that men can write best, and most really and materially,
in their own professions; and that the writing of speculative
men of active matter, for the most part, doth seem to men
of experience, as Phormio’s argument of the wars seemed
to Hannibal, to be but dreams and dotage.! Only there
is one vice which accompanieth them that write in their
own professions, that they magnify them in excess. But
generally it were to be wished, as that which would make

1 Cic. de Oval. ii. 18, 75.

164 Bacon

learning indeed solid and fruitful, that active men would
or could become writers.

In which kind I cannot but mention, honoris causa, your
Majesty’s excellent book touching the duty of a king;!
a work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and
policy, with great aspersion of all other arts; and being,
in mine opinion, one of the most sound and healthful writ-
ings that I have read; not distempered in the heat of inven-
tion, nor in the coldness of negligence; not sick of dizziness,?
as those are who leese themselves in their order; nor of
convulsions, as those which cramp in matters impertinent;
not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do who
seek to please the reader more than nature beareth; and
chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable
to truth and apt for action; and far removed from that
natural infirmity, whereunto I noted those that write in
their own professions to .be subject, which is, that they
exalt it above measure: for your majesty hath truly de-
scribed, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern glory,
but a Moses or a David, pastors of their people. Neither
can I ever leese out of my remembrance, what I heard
your majesty, in the same sacred spirit of Government,
deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, That
kings ruled by their laws as God did by the laws of nature ;
and ought as rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative,
as God doth his power of working miracles. And yet not-
withstanding, in your book of a free monarchy,? you do
well give men to understand that you know the plenitude
of the power and right of a king, as well as the circle of his
office and duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this
excellent writing of your majesty, as a prime or eminent
example of tractates concerning special and respective
duties: wherein I should have said as much, if it had been
written a thousand years since: neither am I moved with
certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise
in presence; no, it is flattery to praise in absence; that is,
when either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is absent;
and so the praise is not natural, but forced, either in truth

1Sc. the Basilicon Doron.

2 Dizziness—Latin Vertigines. The edition 1605 has dusinesse,
1629 and 1633, businesse.

3 Sc. ‘‘ The True Law of Free Monarchies.”

Advancement of Learning 165

or in time. But. let Cicero be read in his oration pro Mar-
cello, which is nothing but an excellent table of Casar’s
virtue, and made to his face; besides the example of many
other excellent persons, wiser a great deal than such ob-
servers; and we will never doubt, upon a full occasion, to
give just praises to present or absent.

But to return: there belongeth further to the handling
of this part, touching the duties of professions and voca-
tions, a relative or opposite, touching the frauds, cautels,
impostures, and vices of every profession, which hath been
likewise handled: but how? rather in a satire and cynically
than seriously and wisely: for men have rather sought by
wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in
professions, than with judgment to discover and sever that
which is corrupt. For, as Salomon saith, he that cometh
to seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure,
shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no matter
for his instruction: Querents derisort scientiam 1psa se
abscondit ; sed studioso fit obviam.1 But the managing of
this argument with integrity and truth, which I note as
deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications
for honesty and virtue that can be planted. For, as the
fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he see you first, you
die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth: so it is
with deceits and evil arts; which, if they be first espied
they leese their life; but if they prevent, they endanger.
So that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others,
that write what men do, and not what they ought to do.
For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with colum-
bine innocency,? except men know exactly all the conditions
of the serpent: his baseness and going upon his belly, his
volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest;
that is, all forms and natures of evil: for without this,
virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can
do no good upon those that are wicked to reclaim them,
without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men of
corrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of
simplicity of manners, and believing of preachers, school-
masters, and men’s exterior language: so as, except you
can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches
of their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality;

1 Prov. xiv. 6. * Matt. x. ‘16.
M 779

166 Bacon

Non recipit stultus verba prudentia, nist ea dixeris que
versantur in corde ejus.*

Unto this part, touching Respective Duty, doth also
appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent
and child, master and servant: so likewise the laws of
friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of companies,
colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other
proportionate duties; not as they are parts of government
and society, but as to the framing of the mind of particular
persons.

The knowledge concerning good respecting Society doth
handle it also, not simply alone, but comparatively; where-
unto belongeth the weighing of duties between person and
person, case and case, particular and public: as we see in
the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which
was so much extolled; yet what was said?

Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores.?

So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides.
Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a
supper certain whose opinions they meant to feel, whether
they were fit to be made their associates, and cast forth the
question touching the killing of a tyrant being a usurper,
they were divided in opinion ; * some holding that servitude
was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better
than a civil war: and a number of the like cases there are
of comparative duty; amongst which that of all others
is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deal
of good to ensue of a small injustice. Which Jason of
Thessalia determined against the truth: Aligqua sunt
injuste facienda, ut multa juste fiert possint.* But the reply
is good, Auctorem presentis justitie habes, sponsorem
future non habes. Men must pursue things which are just
in present, and leave the future to the divine Providence.
So then we pass on from this general part touching the
exemplar and description of good.

Now therefore that we have spoken of this fruit of life,
it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth

1 Prov. xviii. 2. From the Vulgate.

2 Virg. 4En. vi. 823. Bacon, or a misprint, has substituted fata
for facta.

3 See Plutarch, Life of Brutus. 4Plut. Prec. Ger. Reip. 24.

— ae.
le ne

Advancement of Learning 167

thereunto; without which part the former seemeth to be
no better than a fair image, or statua, which is beautiful
to contemplate, but is without life and motion; whereunto
Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words: Necesse est
sctlicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur.
Inutile enim fere fuentt virtutem quidem nosse, acquirend@
autem ejus modos et vias ignorare: non enim de virtute
tantum, qua specie sit, querendum est, sed et quomodo sur
copiam faciat : utrumque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse,
et ejus compotes fiert: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nist
sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo.1 In such full words and
with such iteration doth he inculcate this part. So saith
Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he
had applied himself to philosophy, Non tta disputands
causa, sed ita vivendi.2, And although the neglect of our
times, wherein few men do hold any consultations touching
the reformation of their life, (as Seneca excellently saith)
De partibus vite quisque deliberat, de summa némo,® may
make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with
that aphorism of Hippocrates, Qui gravi morbo correptt
dolores non sentiunt, 11s mens egrotat,* they need medicine,
not only to assuage the disease, but to awake the sense.
And if it be said, that the cure of men’s minds belongeth
to sacred divinity, it is most true: but yet moral philosophy
may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble
handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, that the eyes of the
handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress,° and yet no
doubt many things are left to the discretion of the hand-
maid, to discern of the mistress’s will; so ought moral
philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of
divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself, within due
limits, many sound and profitable directions.

This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof,
I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced
to written inquiry: the rather, because it consisteth of
much matter, wherein both speech and action is often
conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men,
(which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass,) is wiser

1 Eth. Mag. A. i. 3. 2 Cic. pro Mur. xxx. (62).
Sen. ad Lucil. Epist. 71, where it is “‘ de partibus vite omnes
deliberamus, de ‘ota nemo.”

* Hippoc. APA. ii. 6. * PS. (CEI, 2.

168 Bacon

than their books. It is reasonable therefore that we pro-
pound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness,
and because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it
deficient; which seemeth almost incredible, and is other-
wise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that
have written. We will therefore enumerate some heads or
points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and
whether it be extant.

First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical,
we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and
what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of altera-
tion, but the other by way of application only. The
husbandman cannot command neither the nature of the
earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the
physician the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of
accidents. So in the culture and cure of the mind of man,
two things are without our command; points of nature,
and points of fortune. For to the basis of the one, and the
conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. In
these things therefore it is left unto us to proceed by
application ;

Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo: !

and so likewise,

Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo.

But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a
dull and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious
suffering, which draweth and contriveth use and advantage
out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary; which
is that property which we call accommodating or applying.
Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the
exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or
disposition, unto which we do apply: for we cannot fit a
garment, except we first take measure of the body.

So then the first article of this knowledge is to set down
sound and true distributions and descriptions of the
several characters and tempers of men’s natures and dis-
positions; especially having regard to those differences
which are most radical in being the fountains and causes
of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture;

1Virg. En. v. 710. ‘‘ Superanda omnis fortuna ferendo est.”

- Advancement of Learaing 169

wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage,
the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can
satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be considered,
that there are minds which are proportioned to great
matters, and others to small,! (which Aristotle handleth,
or ought to have handled, by the name of magnanimity;)
doth it not deserve as well to be considered, that there are
minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others
to few? So that some can divide themselves: others can
perchance do exactly well, but it must be in few things
at once: and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind,
as well asa pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are
proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or
within a short return of time; others to that which begins
afar off, and is to be won with length of pursuit:

Jam tum tenditque fovetque.?

So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which
is commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So
further deserved it to be considered by Aristotle; that there
ts a disposition in conversation (supposing it in things which
do im no sort touch or concern a man’s self,) to soothe and
please ; and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross:
and deserveth it not much better to be considered, that there
1s a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of
more serious nature, (and supposing it still in things merely
indifferent,) to take pleasure in the good of another: and a
disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at the good of another? ®
which is that property 4 which we call good nature or ill
nature, benignity or malignity: and therefore I cannot
sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching
the several characters of natures and dispositions, should
be omitted both in morality and policy; considering it is
of so great ministry and suppeditation to them both. A
man shall find in the traditions of astrology some pretty
and apt divisions of men’s natures, according to the pre-
dominances of the planets; lovers of quiet, lovers of action,
lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers
of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in

1 Arist. Eth. Nec. iv. 7. * Virg. Zn. i. 22.
3 Eth. Nic. iv. 6.
‘In all three early editions this word is printed properly.

170 Bacon

the wisest sort of these relations which the Italians make
touching conclaves, the natures of the several cardinals
handsomely and lively painted forth: a man shall meet
with in every day’s conference, the denominations of
sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, huomo dt prima
impressione, huomo di ultima impressione, and the like: and
yet nevertheless this kind of observation wandereth in
words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions are
found, many of them, but we conclude no precepts upon
them: wherein our fault is the greater; because both
history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields
where these observations grow; whereof we make a few
posies to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to
the confectionary, that receipts might be made of them for
use of life.

Of much like kind are those impressions of nature, which
are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the
region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity,
and the like, which are inherent and not extern; and again,
those which are caused by extern fortune; as sovereignty,
nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, private-
ness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable
fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the like. And
therefore we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an
old man beneficent, benignitas hujus ut adolescentuli est.+
St. Paul concludeth that severity of discipline was to be
used to the Cretans, increpa eos dure, upon the disposition
of their country, Cretenses semper mendaces, male bestia,
ventres pigyi.2 Sallust noteth that it is usual with kings
to desire contradictories: Sed plerumque regia voluntates,
ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, sepeque tps@ sibt adversa.®
Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth
the disposition: solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius.4
Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and sudden
fortune for the most part defeateth men gus magnam
felicitatem concoquere non possunt.? So the psalm showeth
it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune,
than in the increase of fortune: divitie@ st affluant, nolite
cor apponere® These observations, and the like, I deny not

1Plaut. Mil. Glor. iii. 1, 39. a Lit: 4. 12:
3 Bell. Jug. 113. *Tac. Hest. t. 50.
5 karaméwar uéyav 8ABov ov eduvvdcbn. Olym. i. 55. * Ps. lx. 14

Advancement of Learning 171

®

| but are touched a little by Aristotle, as in passage in his

~ Rhetorics,! and are handled in some scattered discourses:
but they were never incorporated into moral philosophy,
to which they do essentially appertain; as the knowledge
of the diversity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture,
and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions and
constitutions doth to the physician; except we mean to
follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the
same medicines to all patients.

Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching
the affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in
order first to know the divers complexions and constitu-
tions; secondly, the diseases; and lastly, the cures: so in
medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the divers
characters of men’s natures, it followeth, in order, to know
the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other
than the perturbations and distempers of the affections.
For as the ancient politiques in popular states ? were wont
to compare the people to the sea, and the orators to the
winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet,
if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people
would be peaceable and tractable, if the seditious orators
did not set them in working and agitation: so it may be
fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be
temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did not
put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I
find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written
divers volumes of ethics, and never handled the affections,
which is the principal subject thereof; and yet in his
Rhetorics, where they are considered but collaterally, and
in a second degree, as they may be moved by speech, he
findeth place for them,? and handleth them well for the
quantity; but where their true place is, he pretermitteth
them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and
pain that can satisfy this inquiry, no more than he that
should generally handle the nature of light can be said to
handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to
the particular affections as light is to particular colours.

1 Arist. Rhet. il. 12-17.

2 Bacon here seems to refer to Solon’s lines on Pisistratus. Ellis’
edition quotes Cic. pro Cluent. 49.

3 Arist. Rhet. ti. I-11.

i Bacon

Better travails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this
argument, as far as I can gather by that which we have at
second hand. But yet, it is like, it was after their manner,
rather in subtilty of definitions, (which in a subject of this
nature are but curiosities,) than in active and ample
descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some
particular writings of an elegant nature, touching some
of the affections; as of anger, of comfort upon adverse
accidents, of tenderness of countenance, and other.!

But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors
of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth with
great life, how affections are kindled and incited; and how
pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act
and further degree; how they disclose themselves; how
they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify;
how they are inwrapped one within another; and how they
do fight and encounter one with another; and other the
like particularities: amongst the which this last is of special
use in moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection
against affection, and to master one by another; even as
we use to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird,
which otherwise percase we could not so easily recover:
upon which foundation is erected that excellent use of
premium and pena, whereby civil states consist: employ-
ing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the
suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the govern-
ment of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one
faction with another, so it is in the government within.

Now come we to those points which are within our own
command, and have force and operation upon the mind,
to affect the will and appetite, and to alter manners:
wherein they ought to have handled custom, exercise,
habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company,
friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books,
studies: these as they have determinate use in moralities,
from these the mind suffereth; and of these are such
receipts and regiments compounded and described, as may
seem to recover or preserve the health and good estate of
the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine: of
which number we will insist upon some one or two, as
an example of the rest, because it were too long to prose-

1 Such as Plutarch’s and Seneca’s.

Advancement of Learning 173

cute all; and therefore we do resume custom and habit to
speak of.

The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent
opinion, that of those things which consist by nature
nothing can be changed by custom; using for example, that
if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up, it will not learn
to ascend;! and that by often seeing or hearing, we do not
learn to see or hear the better. For though this principle
be true in things wherein nature is peremptory (the reason
whereof we cannot now stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise
in things wherein nature admitteth a latitude. For he
might see that a strait glove will come more easily on with
use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it
grew; and that by use of the voice we speak louder and
stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or cold, we
endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort have
a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he
handleth, than those instances which he allegeth. But
allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in
habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the
manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many
precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as
there is of ordering the exercises of the body; whereof we
will recite a few.

The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first
either too high a strain, or too weak: for if too high, in a
diffident nature you discourage, in a confident nature you
breed an opinion of facility, and so a sloth; and in all
natures you breed a farther expectation than can hold out,
and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak on the other
side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great
task.

Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly at two
several times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the
other when it is worst disposed; that by the one you may
gain a great step, by the other you may work out the knots
and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the
more easy ? and pleasant.

1 Eth. Nic. ti. 1, 2.

* Edition 1605 has eastly—Latin, “‘ facile et placide delabentur ”’
—from which Mr. Spedding suggests that Bacon may have originally
written “ run more easily.”

174 Bacon

Another precept is, that which Aristotle mentioneth
by the way, which is to bear ever towards the contrary
extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclined;
like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a
wand straight by bending? him contrary to his natural
crookedness.?

Another precept is, that the mind is brought to anything
better, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that
whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention, but
tanquam aliud agendo, because of the natural hatred of
the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other
axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and
custom; which being so conducted doth prove indeed
another nature; but being governed by chance doth
commonly prove but an ape of nature, and bringing forth
that which is lame and counterfeit.

So if we should handle books and studies, and what
influence and operation they have upon manners, are
there not divers precepts of great caution and direction
appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers * in
great indignation call poesy, vinum demonum, because it
increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions?
Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded,
wherein he saith, That young men are no fit auditors of moral
philosophy, because they are not settled from the boiling heat
of ther affections, nor attempered with time and experience ?*
And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books
and discourses of the ancient writers, (whereby they have
persuaded unto virtue most effectually, by representing
her in state and majesty, and popular opinions against
virtue in their parasites’ coats fit to be scorned and derided,)
are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they
are not read and revolved by men in their mature and
settled years, but confined almost to boys and beginners?
But is it not true also, that much less young men are fit
auditors of matters of policy, till they have been thoroughly
seasoned in religion and morality; lest their judgments be
corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no true

1 Editions 1605 and 1624 have binding.
* Eth. Nic. Uso, §:

3 Probably St. Augustine.

“Eth. Nec. 23; §.

Advancement of Learning P75

differences of things, but according to utility and fortune,
as the verse describes it,

Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur; !
and again,
Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hic diadema: ®

which the poets do speak satirically, and in indignation on
virtue’s behalf; but books of policy do speak it seriously
and positively; for so it pleaseth Machiavel to say, That 1f
Cesar had been overthrown, he would have been more odious
than ever was Catiline ;* as if there had been no difference
but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and
the most excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the
world? Again, is there not a caution likewise to be given
of the doctrines of moralities themselves, (some kinds of
them,) lest they make men too precise, arrogant, incom-
patible; as Cicero saith of Cato, In Marco Catone hec bona
que videmus divina et egregia, tpsius scitote esse propria ;
gue nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a natura,
sed a magistro?* Many other axioms and advices there
are touching those proprieties and effects which studies
do infuse and instil into manners. And so likewise is there
touching the use of all those other points, of company,
fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning
in the doctrine of morality.

But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth
yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built
upon this ground; that the minds of all men are at some
times in a state more perfect, and at other times in a state
more depraved. The purpose therefore of this practice
is to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and
to obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of the
good hath been practised by two means, vows or constant
resolutions, and observances or exercises; which are not
to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep
the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration of the
evil hath been practised by two means, some kind of
redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an
inception or account de novo, for the time to come. But

1Senec. Herc. Fur. 251. * Juv. Sat. xiii. 105.
3 Machiav. disc. sopra T. Livio, I. x. *Cic. pro Mur, xxix. 61.

176 Bacon

this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all
good moral philosophy, as was said, is but a handmaid to
religion.

Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is
of all other means the most compendious and summary,
and again, the most noble and effectual to the reducing of
the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is the electing
and propounding unto a man’s self good and virtuous ends
of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his
compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed,
that a man set before him honest and good ends, and again,
that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them; it
will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at
once. And this indeed is like the work of nature; whereas
the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when
a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part where-
upon he worketh, (as if he be upon the face, that part
which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such
time as he comes to it;) but, contrariwise, when nature
makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments
of all the parts at one time: so in obtaining virtue by habit,
while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit
much to fortitude, nor the like: but when he dedicateth
and applieth himself to good ends, look, what virtue
soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth
commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposi-
tion to conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind
Aristotle doth excellently express himself that it ought
not to be called virtuous, but divine: his words are these:
Immamitats autem consentaneum est opponere eam, que supra
humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtutem: and a
little after, Nam ut fere neque vitium neque virtus est, sic
neque Dei: sed hic quidem status altius quiddam virtute
est, tlle aliud quiddam a vitio.1 And therefore we may see
what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to
Trajan in his funeral oration; ? where he said, That men
needed to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would
continue as good Lords to them as Trajan had been ,* as if

1 Arist. Eth. Nic. vil. I, I.

2 Bacon seems to have thought that the Panegyric was delivered
after Trajan’s death. He became aware of his error before the
Latin was published; for he there omits the words “in his funeral
oration.”’ 3 Plin. Paneg. 74.

Advancement of Learning 177

he had not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a
pattern of it. But these be heathen and profane passages,
having but a shadow of that divine state of mind, which
religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by
imprinting upon their souls charity, which is excellently
called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth
and fasteneth all virtues together. And as it is
elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but
a false imitation of divine love, Amor melior Sophista
levo ad humanam vitam,? that love teacheth a man to carry
himself better than the sophist or preceptor; which he
calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules and precepts,
he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that facility
to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so
certainly, if a man’s mind be truly inflamed with charity,
it doth work him suddenly into a greater perfection than
all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a sophist
in comparison of the other. Nay further, as Xenophon
observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise
the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness
of ecstasies or excesses; but only love doth exalt the mind,
and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and com-
pose it;* so in all other excellencies, though they advance
nature, yet they are subject to excess; only charity ad-
mitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to be like God
in power, the angels transgressed and fell; Ascendam, et
evo simtlts alttssimo :* by aspiring to be like God in know-
ledge, man transgressed and fell; Evitis stcut Dit, scientes
bonum et malum :* but by aspiring to a similitude of God
in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed,
or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are called:
Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et
orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filit
Pairis vestri qui in ceelis est, qui solem suum orirt facit super
bonos et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos.6 So in the
first platform of the divine nature itself, the heathen
1 Coloss. iii. 14.
= “* Not Menander but Anaxandrides—

“Epws cogusrod yiverar diddoKados
ZKavod ord KpElrTwy mpds Tov dvOpwirov Blov.”’
(Spedding.)
* Xen. Symp. ad init. “Isai. xiv. 14.
* Gen. iii. 5. ® Luke vi. 27, 28.

178 Bacon

religion speaketh thus, Optimus Maximus : and the sacred
Scriptures thus, Mzsericordia ejus super omnia opera ejus.4

Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge,
concerning the culture and regimen of the mind; wherein
if any man, considering the parts thereof which I have
enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to collect into
an art of science that which hath been pretermitted by
others, as matter of common sense and experience, he
judgeth well. But as Philocrates sported with Demos-
thenes, You may not marvel, Athenians, that Demosthenes
and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink wine ;?
and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of
sleep,

Sunt gemine somni porte: quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,

Sed falsa ad ceelum mittunt insomnia manes: °

so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a
sure maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor of
wine is the more vaporous, and the braver gate of ivory
sendeth forth the falser dreams.

But we have now concluded that general part of human
philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he
consisteth of body and spirit. Wherein we may further
note, that there seemeth to be a relation or conformity
between the good of the mind and the good of the body.
For as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty,
strength, and pleasure; so the good of the mind, inquired
in rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to make
the mind sound, and without perturbation; beautiful, and
graced with decency; and strong and agile for all duties of
life. These three, as in the body, so in the mind, seldom
meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe,
that many have strength of wit and courage, but have
neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or
decency in their doings; some again have an elegancy
and fineness of carriage, which have neither soundness of
honesty, nor substance of sufficiency: and some again
have honest and reformed minds, that can neither become
themselves nor manage business: and sometimes two of

+ Ps, Cxlv. 0, 2 Demosth. de Fals. Leg. p. 355.
$ Virg. 4En. vi. 894.

,
;
:

Advancement of Learning 179

them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have
likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced
to stupid,! but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the
subject of it, than in the strength and vigour of it.

Civit knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all
others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced
to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, That the
Romans were like sheep, for that a man might better drive a
flock of them, than one of them; for in a flock, tf you could
but get some few to go right, the rest would follow: so in
that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than policy.
Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing
of internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only
an external goodness; for that as to society sufficeth.
And therefore it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times
in good governments: for so we find in the holy story,
when the kings were good, yet it is added, Sed adhuc populus
non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum.?
Again, states, as great engines, move slowly, and are not
so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt the seven good
years sustained the seven bad, so governments for a time
well grounded, do bear out errors following; but the
resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted.
These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty
of civil knowledge.

This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three
summary actions of society; which are conversation,
negotiation, and government. For man seeketh in society
comfort, use, and protection: and they be three wisdoms
of divers natures, which do often sever: wisdom of the
behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.

The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much
affected, but much less despised; for it hath not only an
honour in itself, but an influence also into business and
government. The poet saith,

Nec vultu destrue verbo tuo: 4

1 Should this be stupidity or stupor ? In the Latin it is ‘‘ reddat
animum—non stupidum, sed voluptatis—sensum vivide retinen-
tem.” *Plut. Vit. Cait:

*2 Chron. xx. 33. * Ovid, ii. 312, de Art. Am.

180 Bacon

a man may destroy the force of his words with his counten-
ance: so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending
to his brother affability and easy access; Nil interest habere
ostium apertum, vultum clausum,} it is nothing won to
admit men with an open door, and to receive them with a
shut and reserved countenance. So, we see, Atticus, before
the first interview between Cesar and Cicero, the war
depending, did seriously advise Cicero touching the compos-
ing and ordering of his countenance and gesture.? And if
the government of the countenance be of such effect, much
more is that of the speech, and other carriage appertaining
to conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well
expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose: Ne
aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius ; quorum alterum est aliene
libertatis oblitt, alterum sue@:* The sum of behaviour is to
retain a man’s own dignity, without intruding upon the
liberty of others. On the other side, if behaviour and
outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass
into affectation, and then Quid deformius quam scenam in
vitam transferre (to act a man’s life)? But although it
proceed not to that extreme, yet it consumeth time, and
employeth the mind too much. And therefore as we use to
advise young students from company keeping, by saying,
Amici fures temporis: so certainly the intending of the
discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation.
Again, such as are accomplished in that hour 4 of urbanity
please themselves in it,° and seldom aspire to higher virtue;
whereas those that have defect in it do seek comeliness by
reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything
becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by
puntos, and compliments. Again, there is no greater
impediment of action than an over-curious observance of
decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and season.

1Q. Cic. de Petit. Consul. xi. 44.

* Cie. ad. Au. 1x. 12: * Livy, Sxi, 12.

4 Howr, edition 1605; hour, 1633; forme, 1629. Mr. Spedding
suggests and prints honov—not improbably. The Latin is: “ Qui
primas in urbanitate obtinent, et ad hanc rem quasi nati videntur ”
—to which ‘ primas’”’ honor well agrees. It might possibly be
either show or flower. But honor seems better, save that the phrase
‘honor of urbanity ”’ is forced.

5 Init. Editions 1605 and 1633 havein name ; 1629,in2t. Latin,
“ut sibi ipsis in illa sola complaceant,’’ which agrees with our |
reading. |

Soe. —

Advancement of Learning 181

For as Salomon saith, Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat ; et
gui respicit ad nubes, non metet:} a man must make his
opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour -
seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the
conditions of a garment. For it ought to be made in
fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to be
shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind,
and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to
be too strait, or restrained for exercise or motion. But
this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled,
and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.

The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not
been hitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation
of learning, and the professors of learning. For from this
root springeth chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is
expressed in adage to this effect, that there is no great

concurrence between learning and wisdom. For of the

three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil
life, for wisdom of behaviour it is by learned men for the
most part despised, as an inferior to virtue, and an enemy
to meditation; for wisdom of government, they acquit
themselves well, when they are called to it, but that hap-
peneth to few; but for the wisdom of business, wherein
man’s life is most conversant, there be no books of it,
except some few scattered advertisements, that have no
proportion to the magnitude of this subject. For if books
were written of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned
men with mean experience, would far excel men of long
experience without learning, and outshoot them in their
own bow.

Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this know-
ledge should be so variable as it falleth not under precept;
for it is much less infinite than science of government,
which, we see, is laboured and in some part reduced. Of
this wisdom, it seemeth some of the ancient Romans in
the saddest and wisest times were professors; for Cicero
reporteth ? that it was then in use for senators that had
name and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius,
Curius, Lelius, and many others, to walk at certain hours
in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use
their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort

1 Eccles. xi. 4. * Cic. de Orat. ili. 133, 134 (cap. 33).
N7*9

182 Bacon

unto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a
daughter, or of the employing of a son, or of a purchase
or bargain, or of an accusation, and every other occasion
incident to man’s life. So as there is a wisdom of counsel
and advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal
insight into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed
upon particular causes propounded, but is gathered by
general observation of cases! of like nature. For so we
see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth to his brother,
De petitione consulatus, (being the only book of business
that I know written by the ancients,) although it concerned
a particular action set on foot, yet the substance thereof
consisteth of many wise and politic axioms, which contain
not a temporary, but a perpetual direction in the case of
popular elections. But chiefly we may see in those aphor-
isms which have place among divine writings, composed
by Salomon the king, (of whom the Scriptures testify that
his heart was as the sands of the sea,? encompassing the
world and all worldly matters,) we see, I say, not a few
profound and excellent cautions, precepts, positions, ex-
tending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will
stay awhile, offering to consideration some number of
examples.

Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem
tuam, ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi.2 Here
is concluded the provident stay of inquiry of that which
we would be loth to find: as it was judged great wisdom ©
in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’ papers ©
unperused.?

Vir sapiens, st cum stulto contenderntt, sive irascatur, sive
videat, non inventet requiem.® Here is described the great
disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a
lighter person than himself; which is such an engagement
as, whether a man turn the matter to jest, or turn it to heat,
or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways quit himself
well of it.

Qui delicaté a pueritia nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet
eum contumacem.® Here is signified, that if a man begin

1 Editions 1629 and 1633 have causes.

1 Kings iv. 29, * Eccles, vil. 216
*Plut. Vit. Pomp. c. 20. © Prov. Xxix,-9:
or OV. XXX. 21,

Advancement of Learning 18 3

too high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly end in
unkindness and unthankfulness.

Vidistt virum velocem in opere suo ? coram regibus stabit,

nec erit inter 1gnobiles.1 Here is observed, that of all virtues
for rising to honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for
superiors many times love not to have those they employ
too deep or too sufficient, but ready and diligent.
— Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, cum adolescente
secundo qui consurgit pro eo.2 Here is expressed that which
was noted by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius; Plures
adorant solem ortentem quam occidentem vel meridianum.?

Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum
tuum ne demiseris; quia curatio faciet cessare peccata
maxima. Here caution is given, that upon displeasure,
retiring is of all courses the unfittest; for a man leaveth
things at worst, and depriveth himself of means to make
them better.

Erat civitas parva, et pauct in ea virt: venit contra eam
vex magnus, et vadavit eam, instruxitque munitiones per
gyrum, et perfecta est obsidio; inventusque est in ea vir
pauper et sapiens, et liberavit eam per saprentiam suam ,; et
nullus deinceps recordatus est hominis tllius pauperts.6 Here
the corruption of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue
or merit longer than they have use of it.

Mollts responsio frangit ivam.® Here is noted that silence
or rough answer exasperateth; but an answer present and
temperate pacifieth.

Iter pigrorum quast sepes spinarum.’ Here is lively
represented how laborious sloth proveth in the end; for
when things are deferred till the last instant, and nothing
prepared beforehand, every step findeth a brier or an
impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.

Melior est finis ovations quam principium’® Here is
taxed the vanity of formal speakers, that study more about
prefaces and inducements, than upon the conclusions and
issues of speech.

Qut cognoscit in judticio faciem, non bene facit ; iste et pro

1 Prov. xxii. 29. * Eccles, iv. 15.

% Plut. Vit. Pomp. and Tacit. Ann. vi. 46. The words vel meri-
dianum are omitted in the Latin, as they should be here.

“ Eccles. x. 4. Pix. JA. 15:

* Prov. xv. I. VV. 10:

* Eccles. vii. 8,

184 Bacon

bucella pants deseret veritatem. Here is noted, that a judge
were better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a
corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly ? as a facile.

Vir pauper calumnians pauperes similis est imbri vehe-
menti, n quo paratur fames.? Here is expressed the extre-
mity of necessitous extortions, figured in the ancient fable
of the full and the hungry horseleech.

Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est justus cadens
coram tmpio.4 Here is noted, that one judicial and exem-
plar iniquity in the face of the world, doth trouble the
fountains of justice more than many particular injuries
passed over by connivance.

Qui subtralit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dicit hoc non
esse peccatum, particeps est homicidiu.® Here is noted, that
whereas men in wronging their best friends use to extenuate
their fault, as if they might presume or be bold upon them,
it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and
turneth it from injury to impiety.

Nolt esse amicus homint tracundo, nec ambulato cum
homine furioso.® Here caution is given, that in the election
of our friends we do principally avoid those which are
impatient, as those that will espouse us to many factions
and quarrels.

Qui conturbat domum suam, possidebit ventum.’ Here is
noted, that in domestical separations and breaches men
do promise to themselves quieting of their mind and con-
tentment; but still they are deceived of their expectation,
and it turneth to wind.

Filius sapiens letificat patrem : filius vero stultus mestitia
est matri su@.8 Here is distinguished, that fathers have
most comfort of the good proof of their sons; but mothers
have most discomfort of their ill proof, because women
have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune.

Qui celat delictum, querit amicitiam,; sed qu altero
sermone repetit, separat federatos.? Here caution is given,
that reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and
passing over that which is past, than by apologies and
excusations.

1 Prov. xxvii. 25,

* Editions 1629 and 1633 read highly, which is clearly inferior to
lightly, which is the reading of 1605.

* Prov. xxviii. 3. Pe EXV. 20, xxvii. 24.
©xxi sea. ‘XI. 29. x. * xvil. 9g.

Advancement of Learning 185

In omni opere bono erit abundantia ; ubi autem verba sunt
plurima, ibi frequenter egestas.1_ Here is noted, that words
and discourse abound most where there is idleness and want.

Primus in sua causa justus; sed venit altera pars, et
inguiret in eum.2 Here is observed, that in all causes the
first tale possesseth much; in sort that the prejudice
thereby wrought will be hardly removed, except some
abuse or falsity in the information be detected.

Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perveniunt ad inte-
viora ventris.® Here is distinguished, that flattery and
insinuation, which seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far;
but that entereth deep which hath show of nature, liberty,
and simplicity.

Qui erudit derisorem, tpse sibi injuriam facit; et qui
arguit impium, sibt maculam generat. Here caution is
given how we tender reprehension to arrogant and scornful
natures, whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, and
accordingly to return it.

Da saptienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapientia.’ Here
is distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that
which is but verbal, and swimming only in conceit; for the
one upon occasion presented is quickened and redoubled,
the other is amazed and confused.

Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic
corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus.6 Here the
mind of a wise man is compared to a glass, wherein the
images of all diversity of natures and customs are re-
presented; from which representation proceedeth that
application,

Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit.’

Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sen-
tences politic of Salomon than is agreeable to the proportion
of an example; led with a desire to give authority to this
part of knowledge, which I noted as deficient, by so excel-
lent a precedent; and have also attended them with brief
observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence
to the sense, though I know they may be applied to a more
divine use: but it is allowed, even in divinity, that some
interpretations, yea, and some writings, have more of the

+ Prov. xiv. 23. * xvii. 17,
* xviii. §. ix. 7. © 3%. 0:
§ xxvii. 19. 7 Ovid, de Art. Am. i. 760.

186 | Bacon

eagle than others;1! but taking them as instructions for life,
they might have received large discourse, if I would have
broken them and illustrated them by deducements and
examples.

Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is
generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient
times; that as men found out any observation that they
thought was good for life, they would gather it, and express
it in parable, or aphorism, or fable. But for fables, they
were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now
that the times abound with history, the aim is better when
the mark is alive. And therefore the form of writing which
of all others is fittest for this variable argument of negotia-
tion and occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely
and aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories
or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly, and in our
view, out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars
again; and it hath much greater life for practice when
the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when the
example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no
point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance: for
when the example is the ground, being set down in a his-
tory at large, it is set down with all circumstances, which
may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and
sometimes supply it as a very pattern for action; ? whereas
the examples alleged for the discourse’ sake are cited suc-
cinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile aspect
towards the discourse which they are brought in to make
good.

But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as
history of Times is the best ground for discourse of govern-
ment, such as Machiavel handleth, so history of Lives is
the most proper for discourse of business, as ? more con-
versant in private actions. Nay, there is a ground of
discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is
discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as
many are of Cicero ad Alticum, and others. For letters

1 [.e. soar higher than others.

* Edition 1605 has gatme—Mr. Spedding suggests aim—editions
1629, 1633, have actton.

?I have here followed Mr. Spedding’s amendment of as for ts,
which is no doubt correct, and far the best solution of the difficulty
of the passage in the original.

Advancement of Learning 187

have a great and more particular representation of business
than either chronicles or lives. Thus have we spoken both
of the matter and form of this part of civil knowledge,
touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient.

But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth
as much from that whereof we have spoken as sapere and
sibt sapere, the one moving as it were to the circumference,
the other to the centre. For there is a wisdom of counsel,
and again there is a wisdom of pressing a man’s own fortune;
and they do sometimes meet, and often sever. For many
are wise in their own ways that are weak for government
or counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature for itself,
but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans
did take much knowledge of: Nam pol sapiens, saith the
comical poet, fingit fortunam sibi ;1 and it grew to an adage,
Faber quisque fortune propre ;* and Livy attributed it to
Cato the first, 7% hoc viro tanta vis animt et ingen inerat, ut
quocunque loco natus esset sibt ipse fortunam facturus
videretur.®

This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and
professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky,
as was observed in Timotheus the Athenian, who, having
done many great services to the estate in his government,
and giving an account thereof to the people, as the manner
was, did conclude every particular with this clause, And in
this fortune had no part.4- And it came so to pass, that he
never prospered in any thing he took in hand afterwards:
for this is too high and too arrogant, savouring of that which
Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, Dicis, Fluvius est meus et ego fect
memet tpsum :* or of that which another prophet speaketh,
that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares: ® and that
which the poet expresseth,

Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint! ’?

for these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed:
and therefore those that were great politiques indeed ever
ascribed their successes to their felicity, and not to their
1Plaut. Trin. ii. 2, 48.
2 JT have not met with this. It is attributed to Appius Claudius.
PLAY. XXKIX. 40; 4 Plutarch, Sylla, c. 6.
eEzek, Six. 3. * Habak. i. 16.
7 Virg. En. X. 773.

188 Bacon

skill or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not
Magnus: so Cesar said to the master of the ship, Cesarem
portas et fortunam ejus.+

But yet nevertheless these positions, Faber quisque for-
tune sue: sapiens dominabitur astris:? invia virtuti nulla
est via,® and the like, being taken and used as spurs to
industry, and not as stirrups to insolency, rather for resolu-
tion than for presumption or outward declaration, have
been ever thought sound and good; and are, no question,
imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this
opinion, as they can scarce contain it within. As we see
in Augustus Cesar, (who was rather diverse from his uncle,
than inferior in virtue,) how when he died, he desired his
friends about him to give him a plaudite, as if he were
conscient to himself that he had played his part well upon
the stage. This part of knowledge we do report also as
deficient: not but that it is practised too much, but it hath
not been reduced to writing. And therefore lest it should
seem to any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is
requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some
heads or passages of it.

Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted
argument to teach men how to raise and make their fortune;
a doctrine wherein every man perchance will be ready to
yield himself a disciple, till he see the difficulty; for
fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is as
hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly
moral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly,
both in honour and in substance: in honour, because prag-
matical men may not go away with an opinion that learning
is like a lark, that can mount, and sing, and please herself,
and nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well
of the hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and
strike upon the prey: in substance, because it is the perfect
law of inquiry of truth, that nothing be in the globe of
matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of crystal,
or form; that is, that there be not any thing in being and
action, which should not be drawn and collected into

1 Plutarch, Cesar.

* Mr. Spedding states that this quotation is ascribed by Cognatus
to Ptolemy.

3 Ovid, Met. xiv. 113. 4Sueton. Vit. Aug. c. 99.

Advancement of Learning 189

contemplation and doctrine. Neither doth learning admire
or esteem of this architecture of fortune, otherwise than as
of an inferior work: for no man’s fortune can be an end
worthy of his being; and many times the worthiest men do
abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but
nevertheless fortune, as an organ of virtue and merit,
deserveth the consideration.

First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most
summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain
that window which Momus did require: ! who seeing in the
frame of man’s heart such angles and recesses, found fault
that there was not a window to look into them; that is, to
procure good informations of particulars touching persons,
their natures, their desires and ends, their customs and
fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby they
chiefly stand: so again their weaknesses and disadvantages,
and where they lie most open and obnoxious; their friends,
factions, and dependencies; and again their opposites,
enviers, competitors, their moods and times,

Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras; ?

their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and
this not only of persons, but of actions; what are on foot
from time to time, and how they are conducted, favoured,
opposed, and how they import, and the like. For the
knowledge of present actions is not only material in itself,
but without it also the knowledge of persons is very
erroneous: for men change with the actions; and whiles
they are in pursuit they are one, and when they return
to their nature they are another. These informations of
particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the minor
propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency
of observations, which are as the major propositions, can
suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mis-
taking in the minors.

That this knowledge is possible, Salomon is our surety;
who saith, Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda ;
sed vir prudens exhauriet illud. And although the know-
ledge itself falleth not under precept, because it is of indivi-
duals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of it may.

1 Lucian. Hermot. 20. *Virg. 42n. iv. 423.
7 ELOVe ES, 5:

190 Bacon

We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to
the ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness
of belief and distrust; that more trust be given to coun-
tenances and deeds than to words: and in words rather
to sudden passages and surprised words than to set and
purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is said,
Fronti nulla fides :+ which is meant of a general outward
behaviour, and not of the private and subtile motions and
labours of the countenance and gesture; which as Q. Cicero
elegantly saith, is Animi ganua, the gate of the mind.2, None
more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus,
Etenim vultu offenstonem congectaverat.* So again, noting
the differing character and manner of his commending
Germanicus and Drusus in the senate, he saith, touching
his fashion wherein he carried his speech of Germanicus,
thus; Magis im speciem adornatis verbis, quam ut penitus
sentive crederetuy: but of Drusus thus: Paucioribus, sed
intentior, et fida oratione : * and in another place, speaking of
his character of speech, when he did any thing that was
gracious and popular, he saith, that in other things he was
velut eluctantium verborum ; but then again, solutius vero
loquebatur quando subveniret.© So that there is no such
artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded coun-
tenance, vultus jussus, that can sever from a feigned tale
some of these fashions, either a more slight and careless
fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious and
wandering, or coming from a man more drily and hardly.

Neither are deeds such assured pledges, as that they
may be trusted without a judicious consideration of their
magnitude and nature: Fraus sibi in parvis fidem prestruit,
ut majore emolumento fallat:® and the Italian thinketh
himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is
better used than he was wont to be, without manifest cause.
For small favours, they do but lull men asleep, both as
to caution and as to industry; and are, as Demosthenes
calleth them, Alimenta socordig.’ So again we see how

1 luV.SaL, i. 6. 2 De Petit. Consul. xi. 44.
* tactc. Ann. 1, 12. © Tbtd. 3. 52:
© Tbid. 1v. 3. © Liv. XXvul 42.

7 See Mr. Spedding’s note on the De Augm. Sc. (p. 681), where
these words are quoted with context, and traced through H. Wolf’s
translation of Dem. Phil. ii—the Greek being simply éort raira 7a
Thy Exdorou paduulav eravédvovTa. .

Advancement of Learning Ig!

false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular which
Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow
and unfaithful reconcilement which was made between
them; whereupon Mutianus advanced many of the friends
of Antonius: simul amicis ejus prefecturas et tribunatus
largitur : + wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he did
desolate him, and won from him his dependences.

_ As for words, though. they be like waters to physicians,
full of flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be de-
spised, especially with the advantage of passion and affec-
tion. For so we see Tiberius, upon a stinging and incensing
speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his dissimulation,
when he said, You are hurt because you do not reign ; of
which Tacitus saith, Audita hec raram occulti pectoris vocem
elicuere , correptamque Greco versu admonutt, ideo ledi, quia
non regnaret.2, And therefore the poet doth elegantly call
passions, tortures that urge men to confess their secrets:

Vino tortus et ira.?

And experience showeth, there are few men so true to
themselves and so settled, but that, sometimes upon heat,
sometimes upon bravery, sometimes upon kindness, some-
times upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open
themselves; especially if they be put to it with a counter-
dissimulation, according to the proverb of Spain, Dz men-
tira, y sacaras verdad (Tell a lie and find a truth).

As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from
reports; men’s weaknesses and faults are best known from
their enemies, their virtues and abilities from their friends,
their customs and times from their servants, their conceits
and opinions from their familiar friends, with whom they
discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions
conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such
men are more masked: Verior fama e domesticis emanat.4

But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is
by their natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men
are best interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by
their ends. For it was both pleasantly and wisely said,

1 ‘Tacit. Hist. iv. 30.

* Tacit. Ann. itv. §2; Suet. Vet. T1b. c. 53.
8’ Hor. Epist. 1. xviii. 38.

*Q. Cic. De Petit. Consul. v. 17.

192 Bacon

though I think very untruly, by a nuncio of the pope,
returning from a certain nation where he served as lidger;
whose opinion being asked touching the appointment of
one to go in his place, he wished that in any case they did
not send one that was too wise; because no very wise man
would ever imagine what they in that country were like
to do. And certainly it is an error frequent for men to
shoot over, and to suppose deeper ends and more compass-
reaches than are: the Italian proverb being elegant, and
for the most part true:—

Di danari, di senno, e di fede,
Ce ne manco che non credi.

There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good
faith than men do account upon.

But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted
by their natures, and private persons by their ends. For
princes being at the top of human desires, they have for
the most part no particular ends whereto they aspire, by
distance from which a man might take measure and scale
of the rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the
causes that maketh their hearts more inscrutable.! Neither
is it sufficient to inform ourselves in men’s ends and natures,
of the variety of them only, but also of the predominancy,
what humour reigneth most, and what end is principally
sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself out-
stripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of
pleasures, metus ejus rimatur,? he wrought upon Nero’s
fears, whereby he brake the other’s neck.

But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way
resteth in three things: the first, to have general acquain-
tance and inwardness with those which have general
acquaintance and look most into the world; and especially
according to the diversity of business, and the diversity of
persons, to have privacy and conversation with some one
friend at least which is perfect and well intelligenced in every
several kind. The second is, to keep a good mediocrity in

EProv; XX¥. 3.

2 Tacit. Ann. xiv. 57. Mr. Markby notices that Tacitus speaks
“ of the intrigues of Tigellinus against Plautus and Sulla, by which
he induced Nero to have both of them murdered. Petronius Tur-
pilianus was put to death by Galba, solely because he had enjoyed
Nero’s confidence, Vid. Tacit. Hist. 1. 6.”

Advancement of Learning 193

liberty of speech and secresy; in most things liberty;
secresy where it importeth; for liberty of speech inviteth
and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth
much to a man’s knowledge; and secresy, on the other
side, induceth trust and inwardness. The last is, the
reducing of a man’s self to this watchful and serene habit,
as to make account and purpose, in every conference and
action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would
have a philosopher in every particular action to say to
himself, Et hoc volo, et etiam institutum servare,' so a politic
man in everything should say to himself, Et hoc volo, ac
etiam aliquid addiscere. I have stayed the longer upon
this precept of obtaining good information, because it is a
main part by itself, which answereth to all the rest. But,
above all things, caution must be taken that men have a
good stay and hold of themselves, and that this much
knowledge do not draw on much meddling; for nothing
is more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling
in many matters. So that this variety of knowledge
tendeth in conclusion but only to this, to make a better and
freer choice of those actions which may concern us, and to
conduct them with the less error and the more dexterity.

The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for
men to take good information touching their own person,
and well to understand themselves: knowing that, as
St. James saith, though men look oft in a glass,” yet they
do suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine glass
is the word of God, so the politic glass is the state of the
world, or times wherein we live, in the which we are to
behold ourselves.

For men ought to take an impartial view of their own
abilities and virtues; and again of their wants and impedi-
ments; accounting these with the most, and those other
with the least; and from this view and examination to frame
the considerations following.

First, to consider how the constitution of their nature
sorteth with the general state of the times; which if they
find agreeable and fit, then in all things to give themselves
more scope and liberty; but if differing and dissonant, then

1Vid. Epictet. Enchir. c. 4.—(Aovcac@a:) Oé\w, Kai Thy ewavTod
mpoalpeoir kara puow Exovcay rnpjoat.
*St. James i. 23, 24.

194 Bacon

in the whole course of their life to be more close, retired, and
reserved: as we see in Tiberius, who was never seen at a
play, and came not into the Senate in twelve of his last
years; whereas Augustus Cesar lived ever in men’s eyes,
which Tacitus observeth, alia Tiberio morum via.»

Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with
professions and courses of life, and accordingly to make
election, if they be free; and, if engaged, to make the
departure at the first opportunity: as we see was done by
Duke Valentine,? that was designed by his father to a
sacerdotal profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of
his parts and inclination; being such, nevertheless, as a
man cannot tell well whether they were worse for a prince
or for a priest.

Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they
are like to have competitors and concurrents; and to take
that course wherein there is most solitude, and themselves
like to be most eminent: as Cesar Julius did, who at first
was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the excellency
of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others, for eloquence,
and saw there was no man of reputation for the wars but
Pompeius, upon whom the state was forced to rely, he
forsook his course begun towards a civil and popular great-
ness and transferred his designs to a martial greatness.

Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependences,
to proceed according to the composition of their own nature:
as we may see in Cesar; all whose friends and followers
were men active and effectual, but not solemn, or of
reputation.

Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves
by examples, in thinking they can do as they see others do;
whereas perhaps their natures and carriages are far differing.
In which error it seemeth Pompey was, of whom Cicero
saith, that he was wont often to say, Sylla potuit—ego non
potero ?? Wherein he was much abused, the natures and
proceedings of himself and his example being the unlikest
in the world; the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the
fact; the other solemn, and full of majesty and circum-
stance, and therefore the less effectual.

1Tac. Ann. i. 54.
* Sc. Cesar Borgia, son of Alexander VI. See Guicciardini, vi. 3.
Cie aa All. ix.10,

Advancement of Learning 195

But this precept touching the politic knowledge of our-
selves, hath many other branches, whereupon we cannot
insist.

Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man’s
self, there followeth the well opening and revealing a man’s
self; wherein we see nothing more usual than for the more
able man to make the less show. For there is a great
advantage in the well setting forth of a man’s virtues,
fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial covering of a
man’s weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the
one, sliding from the other; cherishing the one by circum-
stances, gracing the other by exposition, and the lke:
wherein we see what Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the
greatest politique of his time, Omnium que dixerat fecerat-
que arte quadam ostentator :+ which requireth indeed some
art, lest it turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so as ostenta-
tion, though it be to the first degree of vanity, seemeth to
me rather a vice in manners than in policy: for as it is said,
Audacter calumniare, semper aliquid heret :* so, except it
be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, Audacter te vendita,
semper aliquid heret. For it will stick with the more
ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom
and rank do smile at it, and despise it; and yet the
authority won with many doth countervail the disdain
of a few. But if it be carried with decency and govern-
ment, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion;
or at times when it is mixed with some peril and unsa ety,
as in military persons; or at times when others are most
envied; or with easy and careless passage to it and from it,
without dwelling too long, or being too serious; or with an
equal freedom of taxing a man’s self, as well as gracing
himself; or by occasion of repelling or putting down others’
injury or insolence; it doth greatly add to reputation:
and surely not a few solid natures, that want this ventosity,
and cannot fail in the height of the winds, are not without
some prejudice and disadvantage by their moderation.

But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as
they are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least neces-

+ Tacit. Hest. 11. So.

* Mr. Spedding considers that this comes from the advice given
by Medius to Alexander’s sycophants.—Plutarch, Quomodo quis
dtscernere, etc., C. 24.

196 Bacon

sary that virtue be not disvalued and imbased under the
just price; which is done in three manners: by offering
and obtruding a man’s self; wherein men think he is
rewarded, when he is accepted; by doing too much, which
will not give that which is well done leave to settle, and in
the end induceth satiety; and by finding too soon the fruit
of a man’s virtue, in commendation, applause, honour,
favour; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him
hear what is truly said: Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus
videaris, st hac te res parva sicutt magna delectat.*

But the covering of defects is of no less importance than
the valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in
three manners, by caution, by colour, and by confidence.
Caution is when men do ingeniously and discreetly avoid
to be put into those things for which they are not proper:
whereas, contrariwise, bold and unquiet spirits will thrust
themselves into matters without difference, and so publish
and proclaim all their wants. Colour is, when men make a
way for themselves, to have a construction made of their
faults or wants, as proceeding from a better cause, or
intended for some other purpose: for of the one it is well
said,

Seepe latet vitium proximitate boni,?

and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see
that he pretend the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be
dull, he must affect gravity; ifa coward, mildness; and so
the rest: for the second, a man must frame some probable
cause why he should not do his best, and why he should
dissemble his abilities; and for that purpose must use to
dissemble those abilities which are notorious in him, to
give colour that his true wants are but industries and
dissimulations. For confidence, it is the last ? but surest
remedy; namely, to depress and seem to despise whatso-
ever a man cannot attain; observing the good principle
of the merchants, who endeavour to raise the price of their
own commodities, and to beat down the price of others.
But there is a confidence that passeth this other; which is,
to face out a man’s own defects, in seeming to conceive that

1Cic. ad Heren. iv. 4. 2 Ovid, Art Am. ii. 662.
3 7.e, the last which should be made use of; “‘ impudens certe est
remedium, sed tamen, etc.”

4

Advancement of Learning 197

he is best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to
help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath
least opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best:
like as we shall see it commonly in poets, that if they show
their verses, and you except to any, they will say, that that
line cost them more labour than any of the rest ; and presently
will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line,

which they know well enough to be the best in the number.

But above all, in this righting and helping of a man’s self
in his own carriage, he must take heed he show not himself
dismantled, and exposed to scorn and injury, by too much
dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some
sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of forti-
fied carriage, with a ready rescuing of a man’s self from
scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by
somewhat in their person or fortune; but it ever succeedeth
with good felicity.

Another precept of this knowledge is, by all possible
endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to
occasion; for nothing hindereth men’s fortunes so much as
this: Idem manebat, neque idem decebat,1 men are where
they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to Cato,
whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth,
that he had versatile ingenium.? And thereof it cometh that
these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves, and
cannot make departures, have more dignity than felicity.
But in some it is nature to be somewhat viscous and in-
wrapped, and not easy to turn; in some it is a conceit, that
is almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make
themselves believe that they ought to change their course,
when they have found good by it in former experience.
For Machiavel noted wisely, how Fabius Maximus would
have been temporizing still, according to his old bias, when
the nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit.®
In some other it is want of point and penetration in their
judgment, that they do not discern when things have a
period, but come in too late after the occasion; as Demos-
thenes * compareth the people of Athens to country fellows,
when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow,
then they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before.

1Cic. Brut. 95 (327). * Livy, xxxix. 40.

3 Mach. Discorsi sopra Livio, ili. 9. * Demosth. Phil. i. 51.

0 719

198 Bacon

In some other it is a lothness to leese labours passed, and a
conceit that they can bring about occasions to their ply;
and yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, then
they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that
gave for the third part of Sibylla’s books the treble price,
when he might at first have had all three for the simple.
But from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind
proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial; and nothing is
more politic than to make the wheels of our mind concentric
and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some
affinity with that we last spake of, but with difference, is
that which is well expressed, Fatis accede Deisque,* that
men do not only turn with the occasions, but also run with
the occasions, and not strain their credit or strength to
over hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions
that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from
foil, not occupy them too much about one matter, win
opinion of moderation, please the most, and make a show
of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake; which cannot
but mightily increase reputation.

Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some
repugnancy with the former two, but not as I understand
it; andit is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms ;
Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum ducat imperator,
sic et a cordatis viris res tps@ ducend@ ; ut que tpsis videntur,
ea gerantur, et non ips eventus tantum persequi cogantur.®
For, if we observe, we shall find two differing kinds of
sufficiency in managing of business; some can make use
of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some
can urge and pursue their own plots well, but cannot
accommodate nor take in; * either of which is very imperfect
- without the other.

Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good
mediocrity in the declaring, or not declaring a man’s self:
for although depth of secrecy, and making way, qualis est
via navis in mart,® (which the French calieth sourdes menées,

1 For the same price, according to the Legend, Aul. Gell. i. 19.

2 Lucan, vill. 486. 3 Demosth. Phil. i. 51.

4Explained by the Latin ‘‘ qui occasiones que opportune in-
cidunt non arripiunt,”’

® Prov. xXx. 19.

Advancement of Learning 199

when men set things in work without opening themselves
at all,) be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet
many times dissimulatio errores parit, qui disstmulatorem
ipsum illaqueant, and therefore, we see the greatest
politiques have in a natural and free manner professed their
desires, rather than been reserved and disguised in them.
For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession,
that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his
Jriends or enemies. So Cesar, when he went first into Gaul,
made no scruple to profess that he had rather be first 1n a
village, than second at Rome.’ So again, as soon as he had
begun the war, we see what Cicero saith of him, Alter (mean-
ing of Cesar) non recusat, sed quodammodo postulat, ut, ut
est, sic appelletur tyrannus.2, So we may see in a letter of
Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cesar, in his very entrance
into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in his
harangues to the people would swear, [ta parentis honores
consequt liceat,?.which was no less than the tyranny; save
that, to help it, he would stretch forth his hand towards
a statua of Cesar’s that was erected in the place: and ‘4
men laughed, and wondered, and said, Is it possible? or,
Did you ever hear the like? and yet thought he meant no
hurt; he did it so handsomely and ingenuously. And
all these were prosperous: whereas Pompey, who tended
to the same end, but in a more dark and dissembling
manner, as Tacitus saith of him, Occultior, non melior,°
wherein Sallust concurreth, ore probo, animo inverecundo,®
made it his design, by infinite secret engines, to cast the
state into an absolute anarchy and confusion, that the state
might cast itself into his arms for necessity and protection,
and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and he never
seen in it: and when he had brought it, as he thought, to
that point, when he was chosen consul alone, as never any
was, yet he could make no great matter of it, because men
understood him not; but was fain, in the end, to go the
beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by colour of the
doubt of Czsar’s designs: so tedious, casual, and unfor-
tunate are these deep dissimulations: whereof it seemeth

' Plutarch, A pophthegms. *Cic. ad Ait. x. 4, 2.

3 Ad Alt. xvi. 15, 3.

“I follow edition 1605 in this passage.

* Tacit. Hest. ii. 38. * (Sueton] de Clar. Gram. § xv.

200 . Bacon

Tacitus made his judgment, that they were a cunning of
an inferior form in regard of true policy; attributing the
one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius; where speaking
of Livia, he saith, Et cum artibus marti stmulatione fila
bene composita :1 for surely the continual habit of dissimula-
tion is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly
politic.

Another precept of this architecture of fortune is, to
accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or value
of things, as they conduce and are material to our particular
ends: and that to do substantially, and not superficially.
For we shall find the logical part, as I may term it, of some
men’s minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous;
that is, they can well judge of consequences, but not of
proportions and comparisons, preferring things of show
and sense before things of substance and effect. So some
fall in love with access to princes, others with popular fame
and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase:
when in many cases they are but matters of envy, peril,
and impediment. So some measure things according to
the labour and difficulty, or assiduity, which are spent
about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that they
must needs advance and proceed; as Cesar saith in a
despising manner of Cato the second, when he describeth
how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose;
Hec omnia magno studio agebat.2, So in most things men
are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest
means to be best, when it should be the fittest.

As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits towards
their fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold them
to stand thus: first the amendment of their own minds.
For the remove of the impediments of the mind will sooner
clear the passages of fortune, than the obtaining fortune
will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second
place, I set down wealth and means; which I know most
men would have placed first, because of the general use
which it beareth towards all variety of occasions. But
that opinion I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel *
doth that other, that moneys were the sinews of the wars;
whereas, saith he, the true sinews of the wars are the sinews

1 Tacit. Annal. v. I. * Ces. de Bell. Cev. 1.30.
3 Machiav. Disc. sopr. Liv. ii. 10.

Advancement of Learning 201

of men’s arms, that is, a valiant, populous, and military
nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of Solon,
who, when Crcesus showed him his treasury of gold, said
to him, that if another came that had better iron, he would
be master of his gold. In like manner it may be truly
affirmed, that it is not moneys that are the sinews of fortune,
but it is the sinews and steel of men’s minds, wit, courage,
audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In
the third place I set down reputation, because of the
peremptory tides and currents it hath; which, if they be
not taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, it being
extreme hard to play an after game of reputation. And
lastly, I place honour, which is more easily won by any of
the other three, much more by all, than any of them can be
purchased by honour. To conclude this precept, as there
is order and priority in matter, so is there in time, the pre-
posterous placing whereof is one of the commonest errors:
while men fly to their ends when they should intend their
beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they
come on, but marshal them according to greatness, and not
according to instance; not observing the good precept,
Quod nunc instat agamus.}

Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any
matters which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but
to have that sounding in a man’s ears,

Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus: ?

and that is the cause why those which take their course of
rising by professions of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful
divines, and the like, are not commonly so politic for their
own fortune, otherwise than in their ordinary way, because
they want time to learn particulars, to wait occasions, and
to devise plots.

Another precept of this knowledge is, to imitate nature,
which doth nothing in vain; which surely a man may do
if he do well interlace his business, and bend not his mind
too much upon that which he principally intendeth. For
a man ought in every particular action so to carry the
motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another,
as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet
to have it in a second, or so in a third; and if he can have

1 Virg. Ecl. ix. 66. * Ib. Georg. ili. 284.

202 Bacon

no part of that which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it
to somewhat else; and if he cannot make anything of it for
the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time
to come; and if he can contrive no effect or substance from
it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that
he should exact an account of himself of every action, to
reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed and confused if
he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more im-
politic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he
that doth so leeseth infinite occasions which intervene, and
are many times more proper and propitious for somewhat
that he shall need afterwards, than for that which he urgeth
for the present; and therefore men must be perfect in that
rule, Hec oportet facere, et illa non omittere.

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a
man’s self peremptorily in anything, though it seem not
liable to accident; but ever to have a window to fly out at,
or a way to retire: following the wisdom in the ancient
fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash
was dry whither they should go; and the one moved to go
down into a pit, because it was not likely the water would
dry there; but the other answered, True, but if it do, how
shall we get out again ?

Another precept of this knowledge is, that ancient pre-
cept of Bias, construed not to any point of perfidiousness,
but only to caution and moderation, Et ama tanquam
imimicus futurus, et odt tanquam amaturus ;* for it utterly
betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves too far
in unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish
and humorous envies or emulations.

But I continue this beyond the measure of an example;
led, because I would not have such knowledges, which I
note as deficient, to be thought things imaginative or in
the air, or an observation or two much made of, but things
of bulk and mass, whereof an end is hardlier made than a
beginning. It must be likewise conceived, that in these
points which I mention and set down, they are far from
complete tractates of them, but only as small pieces for
patterns. And lastly, no man, I suppose, will think that
I mean fortunes are not obtained without all this ado; for
I know they come tumbling into some men’s laps; and a

2 Matth: xxili. 23. * Aristot. Rhet. ii. 13, 4.

Advancement of Learning 203

number obtain good fortunes by diligence in a plain way,
little intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross
errors.

But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect
orator, doth not mean that every pleader should be such;
and so likewise, when a prince or a courtier hath been
described by such as have handled those subjects, the
mould hath used to be made according to the perfection
of the art, and not according to common practice: so I
understand it, that it ought to be done in the description
of a politic man, I mean politic for his own fortune.

But it must be remembered all this while, that the
precepts which we have set down are of that kind which
may be counted and called Bone Artes. As for evil arts,
if a man would set down for himself that principle of
Machiavel,! that a man seek not to attain virtue ttself, but the
appearance only thereof, because the credit of virtue 1s a
help, but the use of it 1s cumber: or that other of his
principles, that he presuppose, that men are not fitly to be
wrought otherwise but by fear ; and therefore that he seek to
have every man obnoxious, low, and in strait, which the
Italians call seminar spine, to sow thorns: or that other
principle, contained in the verse which Cicero citeth,
Cadant amici, dummodo inimict tintercidant,? as the trium-
virs, which sold, every one to other, the lives of their
friends for the deaths of their enemies: or that other pro-
testation of L. Catilina, to set: on fire and trouble states, to
the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their
fortunes, Ego st quid in fortunts mets excitatum sit incendium,
id non aqua sed ruina restinguam ;* or that other principle
of Lysander, that children are to be deceived with comfits, and
men with oaths :* and the like evil and corrupt positions,
whereof, as in all things, there are more in number than of
the good: certainly with these dispensations from the laws
of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man’s fortune
may be more hasty and compendious. But it is in life as
it is in ways, the shortest way is commonly the foulest,
and surely the fairer way is not much about.

1 Prénce, C. 17, ¥8. * Pro Reg. Detot. ix. 25.

3 Cic. pro Mur. xxv. (51).

‘ Plut. Lys.—rovs pév maidas dorpayddos, rails dé Avdpas spKos
éiamarav.

204 Bacon

But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and
sustain themselves, and be not carried away with a whirl-
wind or tempest of ambition, ought, in the pursuit of their
own fortune, to set before their eyes not only that general
map of the world, that all things are vanity and vexation of
spirit,1 but many other more particular cards and direc-
tions: chiefly that—that being without wellbeing is a curse
—and the greater being the greater curse; and that all
virtue is most rewarded, and all wickedness most punished
in itself: according as the poet saith excellently:

Que vobis, que digna, viri, pro laudibus istis
Premia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum
Di moresque dabunt vestri.?

And so of the contrary. And, secondly, they ought to
look up to the eternal providence and divine judgment,
which often subverteth the wisdom of evil plots and
imaginations, according to that Scripture, He hath conceived
mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing And although
men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts,
yet this incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man’s
fortune leaveth not the tribute which we owe to God of our
time; who we see demandeth a tenth of our substance, and
a seventh, which is more strict, of our time: and it is to
small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, and
a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust, as
doth the serpent,

Atque affigit humo divine particulam aure.*‘

And if any man flatter himself that he will employ his
fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as was said
concerning Augustus Cesar, and after of Septimius Severus,
that either they should never have been born, or else they
should never have died,> they did so much mischief in the
pursuit and ascent of their greatness, and so much good
when they were established; yet these compensations and
satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be
purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men in their

Eccl u. 11. 4 Vig. 72. 1k. 262.

* Jopexv. 35- “Hor. Sat. t.-2, go:

5 Aurel. Victor, Eptt. i. for Augustus; for Severus, see his life by
Lampridius. :

Advancement of Learning 205

race toward their fortune, to cool themselves a little with
that conceit which is elegantly expressed by the Emperor
Charles the Fifth, in his instructions to the king his son,
That fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that
_ af she be too much wooed, she ts the farther off.1 But this last
is but a remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let
men rather build upon that foundation which is a corner-
stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close,
namely, that same Primum quente. For divinity saith,
Primum querite regnum Det, et ista omnia adjicrentur
vobis :? and philosophy saith, Primum quenite bona anim ;
cetera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt. And although the
human foundation hath somewhat of the sands,? as we
see in M. Brutus, when he brake forth into that speech,

Te colui, Virtus, ut rem; at tu nomen inane es; *

yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may
serve for a taste of that knowledge which I noted as
deficient.

Concerning Government,® it is a part of knowledge
secret and retired, in both these respects in which things
are deemed secret; for some things are secret because they
are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to
utter. We see all governments are obscure and invisible:

Totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.®

Such is the description of governments. We see the
government of God over the world is hidden, inasmuch
as it seemeth to participate of much irregularity and con-
fusion: the government of the soul in moving the body is
inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be
reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity,

1 See Ellis and Spedding on this in the De Augm. bk. viii. 2.

? Matth. vi. 33.

3 So editions 1629, 1633; edition 1605 has same.

4 & rAijuov aperh, Aoyos dp’ Hod’, eyw dé ce,

ws Epyov Haoxouv’ 5’ dp’ édovNeuvs TUyXy.
Dio. Cass. xlvii. 49.

5 This upon Government is very differently given in the Latin;
the main subject is postponed; and two desiderata are discussed—
the question of Enlarging an Empire, and that of Universal Justice.

*Virg. Zn. vi: 726.

206 Bacon

(the shadows whereof are in the poets,) in the description
of torments and pains, next unto the crime of rebellion,
which was the giants’ offence, doth detest the offence of
futility, asin Sisyphus and Tantalus.1_ But this was meant
of particulars: nevertheless even unto the general rules
and discourses of policy and government there is due a
reverent and reserved handling.

But contrariwise, in the governors toward the governed,
all things ought, as far as the frailty of man permitteth,
to be manifest and revealed. For so it is expressed in the
Scriptures touching the government of God, that this
globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady body, is in
the view of God as crystal: Et in conspectu sedis tanquam
mare vitreum simile crystallo.2 So unto princes and states,
especially towards wise senates and councils, the natures
and dispositions of the people, their conditions and necessi-
ties, their factions and combinations, their animosities
and discontents, ought to be, in regard of the variety of
their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations, and
the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in
great part clear and transparent. Wherefore, consider-
ing that I write to a King that is a master of this science,
and is so well assisted, I think it decent to pass over this
part in silence, as willing to obtain the certificate which
one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being
silent, when others contended to make demonstration of
their abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for
his part, that there was one that knew how to hold Its peace.

Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government,
which is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency;
which is, that all those which have written of laws, have
written either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none as
statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary
laws for imaginary commonwealths; and their discourses
are as the stars, which give little light, because they are so
high. For the lawyers, they write according to the states
where they live, what is received law, and not what ought
to be law: for the wisdom of a lawmaker is one, and of a
lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain foun-
tains of justice, whence all civil laws are derived but as
streams: and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes

1 Vid. Pind. Ol. i. 55. 2 Rev. iv. 6.

Advancement of Learning 207

from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws
vary according to the regions and governments where they
are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains.
Again, the wisdom of a lawmaker consisteth not only in a
platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking
into consideration by what means laws may be made
certain, and what are the causes and remedies of the
doubtfulness and incertainty of law; by what means laws
may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are
the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws;
what influence laws touching private right of mewm and
tuum have into the public state, and how they may be made
apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and delivered,
whether in ¢exts or in acts, brief or large, with preambles, or
without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from
time to time, and what is the best means to keep them from
being too vast in volumes, or too full of multiplicity and
crossness; how they are to be expounded, when upon
causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon
responses and conferences touching general points or
questions; how they are to be pressed, rigorously or
tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity and good
conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be
mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts;
again, how the practice, profession, and erudition of law
is to be censured and governed; and many other points
touching the administration, and, as I may term it, anima-
tion of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I
_ purpose, if God give me leave, (having begun a work of this
nature in aphorisms,) to propound it hereafter, noting it
in the meantime for deficient.

And for your Majesty’s laws of England, I could say much
of their dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they
cannot but excel the civil laws in fitness for the govern-
ment: for the civil law was non hos quesitum munus in
usus ,;* it was not made for the countries which it governeth:
hereof I cease to speak because I will not intermingle
matter of action with matter of general learning.

1Virg. 4En. iv. 647.

208 Bacon

Tuus have I concluded this portion of learning touching
civil knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded
human philosophy; and with human philosophy, philo-
sophy in general. And being now at some pause, looking
back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth
to me, st nunquam fallit 1mago,' (as far as a man can judge
of his own work,) not much better than that noise or
sound which musicians make while they are tuning their
instruments: which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is
a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards: so have I
been content to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they
may play that have better hands. And surely, when I set
before me the condition of these times, in which learning
hath made her third visitation or circuit in all the qualities
thereof—as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this
age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the
travails of ancient writers; the art of printing, which
communicateth books to men of all fortunes; the openness
of the world by navigation, which hath disclosed multi-
tudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the
leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men
so generally in civil business, as the states of Grecia did,
in respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome, in
respect of the greatness of their monarchy; the present
disposition of these times at this instant to peace; the
consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies
of religion, which have so much diverted men from other
sciences; the perfection of your Majesty’s learning, which
as a Phoenix may call whole vollies of wits to follow you;
and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more
and more to disclose truth—I cannot but be raised to this
persuasion that this third period of time will far surpass
that of the Grecian and Roman learning: only if men will
know their own strength, and their own weakness both;
and take one from the other, light of invention, and not
fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition of truth
as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament;
and employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and
excellency, and not to things vulgar and of popular estima-
tion. As for my labours, if any man shall please himself
or others in the reprehension of them, they shall make
EN iTS. Cle 1. 27,

Advancement of Learning == 209

that ancient and patient request, Verbera, sed audi ;+ let
men reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them:
for the appeal is lawful, though it may be it shall not be

_ needful, from the first cogitations of men to their second,

and from the nearer times to the times farther off. Now
let us come to that learning, which both the former times
were not so blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity,
the Sabbath and port of all men’s labours and peregrinations.

THE prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as
to the will of man; so that as we are to obey His law, though
we find a reluctation in our will, so we are to believe His
word, though we find a reluctation in ourreason. For if we
believe only that which is agreeable to our sense, we give
consent to the matter, and not to the author; which is no
more than we would do towards a suspected and discredited
witness; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham
for righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah
laughed,? who therein was an image of natural reason.
Howbeit, if we will truly consider it, more worthy it is
to believe than to know as we now know. For in know-
ledge man’s mind suffereth from sense; but in belief it
suffereth from spirit, such one as it holdeth for more
authorized than itself, and so suffereth from the worthier
agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man glorified; for
then faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are known.
Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology, (which in
our idiom we call divinity,) is grounded only upon the word.
and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature: for
it is written, Celi enarrant gloriam Det ,* but it is not written,
Celi enarrant voluntatem Det: but of that it is said, Ad
legem et testimonium: st non fecerint secundum verbum
wstud,* etc. This holdeth not only in those points of faith
which concern the mysteries of the Deity, of the Creation,
of the Redemption, but likewise those which concern the
moral law truly interpreted: Love your enemies: do good
to them that hate you ; be like to your heavenly Father, that

' 1Themistocles to Eurybiades, Plut. Reg. e¢ Imper. Apop.—
mdaratov uev ody, dxovgoy 5é.
* Vid. Gen. xviil. PPS, Xe, * Isai. viii. 20.

210 Bacon

suffereth his rain to fall upon the just and unjust. To this
it ought to be applauded, nec vox hominem sonat :2 it is a
voice beyond the light of nature. So we see the heathen
poets, when they fall upon a libertine passion, do still
expostulate with laws and moralities, as if they were
opposite and malignant to nature;

Et quod natura remittit,
Invida jura negant.®

So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander’s messengers,
That he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other
of the wise men of Grecia, and that he held them for excellent
men : but that they had a fault, which was that they had in too
great reverence and veneration a thing which they called law
and manners. So it must be confessed, that a great part
of the law moral is of that perfection, whereunto the light
of nature cannot aspire: how then is it that man is said to
have, by the light and law of nature, some notions and
conceits of virtue and vice, justice and wrong, good and
evil? Thus, because the light of nature is used in two
several senses; the one, that which springeth from reason,
sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven
and earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the
spirit of man by an inward instinct, according to the law
of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first
estate; in which latter sense only he is participant of some
light and discerning touching the perfection of the moral
law: but how? sufficient to check the vice, but not to
inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as well
moral as mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration
and revelation from God.

The use, notwithstanding, of reason in spiritual things,
and the latitude thereof, is very great and general: for
it is not for nothing that the apostle calleth religion our
vyeasonable service of God ;* insomuch as the very ceremonies
and figures of the old law were full of reason and significa-
tion, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and magic,
that are full of non-significants and surd characters. But
most especially the Christian faith, as in all things, so in

1Matth, v. 44. 2 Virg. Aen. i. 328. 3 Ovid, Met. x. 330.

4 Plut. Alexander. 65—evqueis uev alto yeyovévar Soxotcw oi dvdpes,
Nav 5é rods vouous alcxuvépevor BeBiwkévar.

= Root. x1. 1.

Advancement of Learning 211

this deserveth to be highly magnified; holding and preserv-
ing the golden mediocrity in this point between the law of
the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have embraced
the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no
constant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of
argument; and the religion of Mahomet, on the other side,
interdicteth argument altogether: the one having the very
face of error, and the other of imposture: whereas the faith
doth both admit and reject disputation with difference.

The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the
former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries
of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and
deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. The former
extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by way
of illustration, and not by way of argument: the latter
consisteth indeed of probation and argument. In the
former, we see, God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity,
in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible
unto us; and doth graft his revelations and holy doctrine
upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspirations
to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the
ward of the lock: for the latter, there is allowed us a use of
reason and argument, secondary and respective, although
not original and absolute. For after the articles and
principles of religion are placed and exempted from exam-
ination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make
derivations and inferences from and according to the
analogy of them, for our better direction. In nature this
holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by
induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and
besides, those principles or first positions have no discord-
ance with that reason which draweth down and deduceth
the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in religion
alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller
nature, namely, wherein there are not only posita but
placita ; for in such there can be no use of absolute reason.
We see it familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or the like:
the draughts and first laws of the game are positive, but
how? merely ad placitum, and not examinable by reason;
but then how to direct our play thereupon with best
advantage to win the game, is artificial and rational. So
in human laws, there be many grounds and maxims which.

212 Bacon

are placita juris, positive upon authority, and not upon
reason, and therefore not to be disputed: but what is most
just, not absolutely but relatively, and according to those
maxims, that affordeth a long field of disputation. Such
therefore is that secondary reason, which hath place in
divinity, which is grounded upon the flacets of God.

Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath
not been, to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and
handled the true limits and use of reason in spiritual things,
as a kind of divine dialectic: which for that it is not done,
it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true conceiving
that which is revealed, to search and mine into that which
is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences
and contradictories, to examine that which is positive:
the one sort falling into the error of Nicodemus, demanding
to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth God
to reveal them, Quomodo possit homo nasct cum sit senex ?}
the other sort into the error of the disciples, which were
scandalized at a show of contradiction, Quid est hoc quod
dicit nobis? Modicum, et non videbitis me,; et itterum
modicum, et videbitis me, etc.”

Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great
and blessed use thereof; for this point, well laboured and
defined of, would in my judgment be an opiate to stay and
bridle not only the vanity of curious speculations, where-
with the schools labour, but the fury of controversies,
wherewith the church laboureth. For it cannot but open
men’s eyes, to see that many controversies do merely
pertain to that which is either not revealed, or positive;
and that many others do grow upon weak and obscure
inferences or derivations: which latter sort, if men would
revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the Gentiles,
would be carried thus, ego, non dominus ;* and again,
secundum consilium meum, in opinions and counsels, and
not in positions and oppositions. But men are now over-
ready to usurp the style, non ego, sed dominus ; and not so
only, but to bind it with the thunder and denunciation of
curses and anathemas, to the terror of those which have not
sufficiently learned out of Salomon, that the causeless curse
shall not come.

1 Joh. iil. 4. + On. Vita.
* + Cor. vii. 12, 40. Prov. xxvi. 2.

Advancement of Learning 213

Divinity hath two principal parts; the matter informed
- or revealed, and the nature of the information or revelation:
and with the latter we will begin, because it hath most
coherence with that which we have now last handled. The
nature of the information consisteth of three branches;
the limits of the information, the sufficiency of the informa-
tion, and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto
the limits of the information belong these considerations;
how far forth particular persons continue to be inspired;
how far forth the Church is inspired; how far forth reason
may be used: the last point whereof I have noted as defi-
cient. Unto the sufficiency of the information belong two
considerations; what points of religion are fundamental,
and what perfective, being matter of further building and
perfection upon one and the same foundation; and again,
how the gradations of light, according to the dispensation of
times, are material to the sufficiency of belief.

Here again I may rather give it in advice, than note it
as deficient, that the points fundamental, and the points
of farther perfection only, ought to be with piety and
wisdom distinguished: a subject tending to much like
end as that I noted before; for as that other were like to
abate the number of controversies, so this is likely to abate
the heat of many of them. We see Moses when he saw the
Israelite and the AXgyptian fight, he did not say, Why
strive you? but drew his sword and slew the gyptian:
but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, You are
brethren, why strive you? If the point of doctrine be an
AZgyptian, it must be slain by the sword of the spirit, and
not reconciled; but if it be an Israelite, though in the wrong,
then, Why strive you? We see of the fundamental points,
our Saviour penneth the league thus, He that is not with us,
ts against us ;* but of points not fundamental, thus, He
that 1s not against us, ts with us. So we see the coat of our
Saviour was entire without seam,’ and so is the doctrine
of the Scriptures in itself; but the garment of the Church
was of divers colours, and yet not divided: we see the
chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear,

1 Exod. ii. 11-14. * Matth. xii. 30.
* Luke ix. 50. * Toh, xix. .23.
* See Ps. xlv. 10, 14; or it may refer to Joseph’s coat of many
colours—Gen. xxxvii. 3.
P 7"9

214 ~ Bacon

but the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the
field.1 So as it is a thing of great use well to define what,
and of what latitude those points are, which do make men
merely aliens and disincorporate from the Church of God.

For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon
the true and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which
are the fountains of the water of life. The interpretations
of the Scriptures are of two sorts; methodical, and solute or
at large. For this divine water,? which excelleth so much
that of Jacob’s Well, is drawn forth much in the same kind
as natural water useth to be out of wells and fountains;
either it is first forced up into a cistern, and from thence
fetched and derived for use; or else it is drawn and received
in buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth.
The former sort whereof, though it seem to be the more
ready, yet in my judgment is more subject to corrupt.
This is that method which hath exhibited unto us the
scholastical divinity; whereby divinity hath been reduced
into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams of doctrine
or positions fetched and derived from thence.

In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity,
a compacted strength, and a complete perfection; whereof
the two first they fail to find, and the last they ought not
to seek. For as to brevity we see, in all summary methods,
while men purpose to abridge, they give cause to dilate.
For the sum or abridgment by contraction becometh
obscure; the obscurity requireth exposition, and the expo-
sition is diduced into large commentaries, or into common
places and titles, which grow to be more vast than the
original writings, whence the sum was at first extracted.
So, we see, the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much
than the first writings of the fathers, whence the Master
of the Sentences * made his sum or collection. So, in like
manner, the volumes of the modern doctors of the civil

1 Matth. xiii. 29. * Joh, 1V.714, 14.

3 Peter Lombard received this name after writing a work en-
titled ‘‘ The Sentences’’; a summary of Theology in four Books.
The object of the work was the settlement of all disputed doctrines
by a collection of sentences from the Fathers. It is perhaps super-
fluous to add that the work has not as yet fulfilled its object. Still
he deeply affected Theology, for he laid by it the foundations of the
Scholastic Philosophy. He was born at the beginning of the twelfth
century; Bishop of Paris 1159; died 1164.

Advancement of Learning OLS

law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which
Tribonian! compileth the digest. So as this course of
sums and commentaries is that which doth infallibly make
the body of sciences more immense in quantity, and more
base in substance.

And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced
into exact methods have a show of strength, in that each
part seemeth to support and sustain the other; but this is
more satisfactory than substantial: like unto buildings
which stand by architecture and compaction, which are
more subject to ruin than those which are built more strong
in their several parts, though less compacted. But it is
plain that the more you recede from your grounds, the
weaker do you conclude: and as in nature, the more you
remove yourself from particulars, the greater peril of error
you do incur: so much more in divinity, the more you
recede from the Scriptures by inferences and consequences,
the more weak and dilute are your positions.

And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it
is not to be sought; which makes this course of artificial
divinity the more suspect. For he that will reduce a
knowledge into an art, will make it round and uniform:
but in divinity many things must be left abrupt, and con-
cluded with this: O altitudo sapientie et scientie Der!
guam incomprehensibilia sunt qudicia equs, et non investi-
gabiles vie equs!* So again the apostle saith, Ex parte
scomus :*® and to have the form of a total, where there is
but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies by
supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude,
that the true use of these sums and methods hath place
in institutions or introductions preparatory unto know-
ledge: but in them, or by deducement from them, to
handle the main body and substance of a knowledge, is
in all sciences prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous.

As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at
large, there have been divers kinds introduced and devised ;
some of them rather curious and unsafe than sober and
warranted. Notwithstanding, thus much must be con-

1 Tribonian, Questor, Consul and Master of the Offices to Jus-
tinian. With sixteen others he compiled the Digest—promulgated
it in 533.

* Rom. xi. 33. * 1 Cor. 21, 6.

216 Bacon

fessed, that the Scriptures being given by inspiration, and
not by human reason, do differ from all other books in the
author: which, by consequence, doth draw on some differ-
ence to be used by the expositor. For the inditer of them
did know four things which no man attains to know;
which are, the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the
perfection of the laws of nature, the secrets of the heart of
man, and the future succession of all ages. For as to the
first it is said, He that presseth into the light, shall be oppressed
of the glory. And again, No man shall see my face and live.»
To the second, When he prepared the heavens I was present,
when by law and compass he inclosed the deep.» To the
third, Neither was 1t needful that any should bear witness
to him of man, for he knew well what was in man. And
to the last, From the beginning are known to the Lord all
his works.4

From the former two have been drawn certain senses
and expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained
within the bounds of sobriety; the one anagogical, and
the other philosophical. But as to the former, man is not
to prevent his time: Videmus nunc per speculum in enig-
mate, tunc autem facie ad facilem:*® wherein nevertheless
there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as
the polishing of this glass, or some moderate explication
to this enigma. But to press too far into it, cannot but
cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of man.
For in the body there are three degrees of that we receive
into it, aliment, medicine, and poison; whereof aliment is
that which the nature of man can perfectly alter and over-
come: medicine is that which is partly converted by nature,
and partly converteth nature; and poison is that which
worketh wholly upon nature, without that, that nature
can in any part work upon it. So in the mind, whatsoever
knowledge reason cannot at all work upon and convert is
a mere intoxication, and endangereth a dissolution of the
mind and understanding.

But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot
of late time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others,
that have pretended to find the truth of all natural philo-
sophy in the Scriptures; scandalizing and traducing all

1 Exod. xxxill. 20. * Prov... Vill, 27. 3 Joh. ii. 25.
+ Acts xv. 15. * 1 Cor. xill. 12.

Advancement of Learning 217

other philosophy as heathenish and profane. But there
is no such enmity between God’s word and His works;
neither do they give honour to the Scriptures, as they
suppose, but much imbase them. For to seek heaven and
earth in the word of God, (whereof it is said, Heaven and
earth shall pass, but my word shall not pass,‘) is to seek
temporary things amongst eternal: and as to seek divinity
in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the dead,?
so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst
the living: neither are the pots or lavers, whose place was
in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the
holiest place of all, where the ark of the testimony was
seated. And again, the scope or purpose of the spirit of
God is not to express matters of nature in the Scriptures,
otherwise than in passage, and for application to man’s
capacity, and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true
rule, auctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas ; for it were a
strange conclusion, if a man should use a similitude for
ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from nature or
history according to vulgar conceit, as of a Basilisk, an
Unicorn, a Centaur, a Briareus, an Hydra, or the like, that
therefore he must needs be thought to affirm the matter
thereof positively to be true. To conclude, therefore, these
two interpretations, the one by reduction or enigmatical, the
other philosophical or physical, which have been received
and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and cabalists,?
are to be confined with a noli altum sapere, sed time.4

But the two latter points, known to God and unknown
to man, touching the secrets of the heart, and the
successions of time, do make a just and sound difference
between the manner of the exposition of the Scriptures and
all other books. For it is an excellent observation which
hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ
to many of the questions which were propounded to him,
how that they are impertinent to the state of the question
demanded; the reason whereof is, because, not being like
man, which knows man’s thoughts by his words, but know-
ing man’s thoughts immediately, he never answered their

1 Matth. xxiv. 35. . * Luke xxiv. 5.

5 Cabalists—expounders of the Jewish Cabala, or hidden science
of divine mysteries, said by the Rabbins to have been delivered to
Moses with the Law. + Rom Xi. 20.

218 Bacon

words, but their thoughts: much in the like manner it
is with the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts
of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a foresight
of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the
church, yea and particularly of the elect, are not to be
interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper
sense of the place, and respectively towards that present
occasion whereupon the words were uttered, or in precise
congruity or contexture with the words before or after, or
in contemplation of the principal scope of the place;
but have in themselves, not only totally or collectively,
but distributively in clauses and words, infinite springs
and streams of doctrine to water the church in every part.
And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were, the main
stream or river; so the moral sense chiefly, and some-
times the allegorical or typical, are they whereof the church
hath most use; not that I wish men to be bold in allegories,
or indulgent or light in allusions: but that I do much con-
demn that interpretation of the Scripture which is only after
the manner as men use to interpret a profane book.

In this part, touching the exposition of the Scriptures,
I can report no deficience; but by way of remembrance
this I will add: in perusing books of divinity, I find many
books of controversies; and many of commonplaces and
treaties; a mass of positive divinity, as it is made an art;
a number of sermons and lectures, and many prolix com-
mentaries upon the Scriptures, with harmonies and con-
cordances: but that form of writing in divinity which in
my judgment is of all others most rich and precious, is
positive divinity, collected upon particular texts of Scrip-
tures in brief observations; not dilated into commonplaces,
not chasing after controversies, not reduced into method
of art; a thing abounding in sermons, which will vanish,
but defective in books which will remain; and a thing
wherein this age excelleth. For I am persuaded, (and I
may speak it with an absit invidia verbo,’ and no ways in
derogation of antiquity, but as ina good emulation between
the vine and the olive,) that if the choice and best of those
observations upon texts of Scriptures, which have been
made dispersedly in Sermons within this your Majesty’s
island of Britain by the space of these forty years and

AVY; 1%. 19:

ee ey

Advancement of Learning 219

more, leaving out the largeness of exhortations and applica-
tions thereupon, had been set down in a continuance, it had
been the best work in divinity which had been written since
the Apostles’ times.

The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds; matter
of belief and truth of opinion, and matter of service and
adoration; which is also judged and directed by the former:
the one being as the internal soul of religion, and the other
as the external body thereof. And therefore the heathen
religion was not only a worship of idols, but the whole
religion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul, that is, no
certainty of belief or confession: as a man may well think,
considering the chief doctors of their church were the poets:
and the reason was, because the heathen gods were no
jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted into part, as
they had reason. Neither did they respect the pureness
of heart, so they might have external honour and rites.

But out of these two do result and issue four main
branches of divinity; faith, manners, liturgy, and govern-
ment. Faith containeth the doctrine of the nature of God,
of the attributes of God, and of the works of God. The
nature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of God-
head. The attributes of God are either common to the
Deity, or respective to the persons. The works of God
summary are two, that of the creation and that of the
redemption : and both these works, as in total they appertain
to the unity of the Godhead, so in their parts they refer
to the three persons: that of the creation, in the mass of
the matter, to the Father; in the disposition of the form,
to the Son; and in the continuance and conservation of
the being, to the Holy Spirit. So that of the redemption,
in the election and counsel, to the Father; in the whole
act and consummation to the Son; and in the application,
to the Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ con-
ceived in flesh, and by the Holy Ghost are the elect regene-
rate in spirit. This work likewise we consider either
effectually, in the elect; or privatively+ in the reprobate;
or according to appearance, in the visible church.

For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law,

; 1 All old editions have privately ; but I cannot find that this word
is ever used as the sense of this passage requires it, and so have sub-
stituted privatively.

220 Bacon

which discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according
to the edition thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral,
and the law positive; and according to the style, into
negative and affirmative, prohibitions and commandments.
Sin, in the matter and subject thereof, is divided according
to the commandments; in the form thereof, it referreth to
the three persons in Deity: sins of infirmity against the
Father, whose more special attribute is power; sins of
ignorance against the Son, whose attribute is wisdom;
and sins of malice against the Holy Ghost, whose attribute
is grace or love. In the motions of it, it either moveth to
the right hand or to the left; either to blind devotion, or
to profane and libertine transgression; either in imposing
restraint where God granteth liberty, or in taking liberty
where God imposeth restraint. In the degrees and pro-
gress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, or act.
And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law
of God to cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be
a breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the bread of life.
But that which quickeneth both these doctrines of faith
and manners, is the elevation and consent of the heart;
whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation,
Christian resolution, and the like.

For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal
acts between God and man; which, on the part of God,
are the preaching of the word, and the sacraments, which
are seals to the covenant, or as the visible word; and on
the part of man, invocation of the name of God; and under
the law, sacrifices; which were as visible prayers or con-
fessions: but now the adoration being 7m spiritu et verttate,+
there remaineth only vttuls labiorum ;? although the use
of holy vows of thankfulness and retribution may be
accounted also as sealed petitions.

And for the government of the church, it consisteth of
the patrimony of the church, the franchises of the church,
and the offices and jurisdictions of the church, and the laws
of the church directing the whole; all which have two
considerations, the one in themselves, the other how they
stand compatible and agreeable to the civil estate.

This matter of divinty is handled either in form of in-
struction of truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood.

P Jonn 1v.<24. ? Hosea xiv. 2.

Advancement of Learning 221

The declinations from religion, besides the privative,
which is atheism, and the branches thereof, are three;
Heresies, Idolatry, and Witchcraft ; heresies, when we serve
the true God with a false worship; idolatry, when we wor-
ship false gods, supposing them to be true: and witchcraft,
when we adore false gods, knowing them to be wicked and
false: for so your Majesty doth excellently well observe,
that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And yet we see
though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that

_ they are all of a nature, when there is once a receding

from the word of God; for so he saith, Quast peccatum
ariolandi est repugnare et quast scelus tdololatrie nolle
acquiescere.+

These things I have passed over so briefly because I can
report no deficience concerning them: for I can find no
space or ground that lieth vacant and unsown in the
matter of divinity: so diligent have men been, either in
sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares.

Tuus have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual
world, as truly and faithfully as I could discover: with a
note and description of those parts which seem to me not
constantly occupate, or not well converted by the labour
of man. In which, if I have in any point receded from
that which is commonly received, it hath been with a
purpose of proceeding im melius, and not 1m aliud ; a mind
of amendment and proficience, and not of change and
difference. For I could not be true and constant to the
argument I handle, if I were not willing to go beyond others;

- but yet not more willing than to have others go beyond

me again: which may the better appear by this, that I
have propounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not
seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men’s judgments by
confutations. For in anything which is well set down,
I am in good hope, that if the first reading move an objection,
the second reading will make an answer. And in those
things wherein I have erred, I am sure I have not prejudiced
the right by litigious arguments; which certainly have

¥y Sam. xv..23.

222 Bacon

this contrary effect and operation, that they add authority
to error, and destroy the authority of that which is well
invented: for question is an honour and preferment to
falsehood, as on the other side it is a repulse to truth. But
the errors I claim and challenge to myself as mine own:
the good, if any be, is due tanguam adeps sacrificti,) to be
incensed to the honour, first of the Divine Majesty, and
next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am most bounden.

1Tsaiah xliii. 24.

DEO GLORIA

GLOSSARY

OF WORDS EITHER OBSOLETE OR USED IN SENSES NOT NOW ALLOWED
(The numbers refer to the pages)

ACCEPTION, 90, =acceptation.

ACCOMMODATE, I13, an adjective in use in Bacon’s day, but here
equivalent to the participle and almost=adjusted.

ADVENTIVE, 92,=adventitious—from the verb to advene, which is
also obsolete.

AFFECTS, 107,=affections—not used here with any sense of in-
sincerity.

AMBAGES, 90, IOI, ‘‘ ambiguities of speech, subterfuges, evasions: ”’
Richardson, who quotes Chaucer,—

‘“ And but if Calcas lede us with ambages,
That is to saine, with double words slie,’’ etc.
Trot. and Cress. Bk. v.

Bacon uses the word according to its derivation—ambe (du¢i),
agere (dyew)—‘‘ nature worketh by ambages,’’ 1.e. circuitous
aths.

Beas, 12, of the dwellers on the other side of the earth, not of
that other side itself. So Holland, Plinize, B. ii. c. 65,—‘‘ The
Antipodes should marvaile why we fell not down.”

APPROMPT, 129, to stir up, quicken.

ASPERSION, 38, 168, sprinkling, now used chiefly, if not entirely
metaphorically, and in a bad sense—then frequently in a good,—

‘““ No sweet aspersitons shall the heavens let fall.’’
SHAKES., Tempest, iv. i.
ATTEND, 185, used actively,—“‘ I have attended them with observa-
tions.”

BirD-WITTED, 151, incapable of continuous attention. Bp. Fisher
uses the compound gross-wttted—Hall, subtil-witted. (Not in
Richardson.)

BLANCH, 150,=blink, to avoid or evade; also=blench. So Shake-
spere, Measure for M. iv. 5. ‘‘ Do you blench from this? ”’

BrIBER, 184, here a receiver, not a giver, of bribes. This agrees
with the origin of the word (see Richardson)—be-reaver, or be-
vobber, the original usage being=thief. So, as the word changed
meaning, it became “‘a receiver of unlawful gain.’’ Then in
modern English it is transferred to the agent who bribes.

CAPTION, 131, quibbling and deceit—used in fallacies.

CARNOSITIES, 114, a medieval term, for growth of fleshy substances,
as wens. (The word is not noticed in Richardson.)

CAUTELS, 165, tricks and frauds—the word having drifted away from
cautela, while caution has continued to represent the Latin. So

223

224 Bacon

Hall, Henry VI., anno 26,—‘‘ By this praty cautele and slight
imposture was the town taken.”

““So now no soil, nor cautel doth besmirch
The virtue of his will.”,—SnHakes., Hamlet, i. 3.

CEASE, 32, used transitively, “‘ to cease progression,” equivalent to
““ put a stop to.”

CENSURE, 207,=to be kept under censorship—not=blame.

CEREMONIES, 120, used of superstitious usages, intended to invoke
the aid of spirits. So Shakespere, Jul. Cas. ii. 1:—

“‘ For he is superstitious grown of late,
Quite from the main opinion he held once
Of phantasy, of dreams, and ceremonies.”

CIVIL ESTATE, 2, condition as member of a civitas. The highest use
of the term is now almost, it not entirely, gone. See Trench,
Glos. verbo. A “‘ civil opinion,’ =received, 119.

CHAMPAIGN, 99, plain land—locus campestris. In Bacon’s day both
a substantive and (as here) an adjective.

CIRCUMFER, 85, almost=/vansfer, a rare verb, though its sense is
plain enough, and its derivative common.

COARCTATION, restraint.

CoEVALS, 80, coincident in point of time—used as a substantive.
Hakewill, Apologize, ‘‘ taunted at by his coevals.”’

COLLIQUATION, 93, melting —opposed (by Sir T. Brown, Vulgar
Evvors, Bk. ii. c. 1) to coagulation.

COLUMBINE, 165, dove-like—the innocency of the dove, as opposed
to “‘ serpentine wisdom.”’ This is the only instance of the use of
this adjective.

CoMPASS, 127,=(now) a pair of compasses. By the change of use
we distinguish between this instrument and the mariner’s compass.

COMPASS-REACHES, 192. This compound is not noticed in Richard-
son. Its sense is that of roundabout steps taken towards the
accomplishment of any object—reaching forth to compass it.

COMPLEXION, 134,=(probably) temperament or disposition. The
word has now been degraded from the inward parts of a thing
or person to the tint of the outward countenance. The transition
is marked in Richardson (quoting Cook’s Voyages, vol. i. c. 10),
‘““ without the least appearance of what is called complexion ”’—
where he is speaking of a man’s skin as dead white, without colour.

CONFECTIONARY, 170, the maker of confections, not the confections
made. So1 Sam. viii. 13, ““ He will take your daughters to be
confecttonaries.’’ The word confection is not rightly limited to sweet
stuff. Bacon here uses it as equal to apothecary (a word formed in
the same manner)—and in medieval Latin the apothecary was
confectionarius. Comfit is derived from the same source.

CONSCIENT, 188,=comscious. Richardson does not acknowledge
the existence of this word; but, quoting the passage whence it
comes, alters it to conscious.

CONSIST IN, I19,=depend upon. Richardson quotes Ford—

“ Tho’ the use
Of such set entertainments more consists
In custom, than in cause; yet,” etc.

Glossary 225

' CONTENTATION, =contentment.

CoNTESTATIONS, 18,=contests, contentions.

CONTINENT, 105,=the whole extent of anything. So here “ the
continent of Nature” is ‘‘all that comes within the limits of

» Nature.”

CONTRISTATION, 4,=trouble or distress. In Eccles. i. 18, the word
which Bacon englishes by contristation, the Authorized Version
renders grtef.

CopliE, 24, 126, 135,=plenty—a French word imported into England
in the sixteenth century. We still retain its adjective copious—
and copy is really another form of the same word, though its
usage is different. To copy is “‘ coptam facere exscribendi,” and
perhaps carries us back to the days of the multiplication of
“copies ’”’ of books by the hand.—See Dean Trench’s Glossary.
There is a curious use of the word in p. 182—‘‘ howsoever a man
change copy, he can no ways quit himself well of it’ (of contending
with a fool). The Latin simply has “‘ quocunque nos vertamus.”’

CORROBORATE, 17, =strong, matured.

DECARDED, 103, =discarded—de or dis—carta, to throw away one’s
hand at cards. Richardson quotes Macklin’s Dumb Knight,—
‘““ Indeed, mine are two queens, and one, I’ll throw away—
: Can you decard, madam? ”’
DEDUCEMENTS, 186, =deductions.

DEFUNCT, 122, a substantive, now only used as an adjective.

DFSIGNMENTS, 19, intentions.

_ DEsTITUTED, 106,=abandoned.

DEVOTE, 34,=devoted (not devout, as one ed. reads it), given up to
any matter—then (especially) to the worship of God.

DIFFICILE, 179,=difficult.

DIGLADIATION, 27,=fencing, with swords, properly: thence with
sharp instruments—as the tongue.

DILATATION, 96, power of expansion. Bacon, in saying that God
is ‘‘ Holy in the description or dilatation of his works,’ seems to
use these words as synonyms, whereas they are more properly
used, dz/atation—of the expansion of the thing itself; description
—of the limitation of the thing by investigators.
DIscouRSE, 23, 186. See Trench’s Glossary, ‘‘ Might have received

large discourse,’ illustration or investigation of a subject. So
again, “‘ discourse of government,” “‘ discourse of business,’’ and
“discourse of reason,’’ are all phrases used by Bacon in the
original sense of the word, springing out of the Latin discursus—
—the passing from thought to thought, subject to subject; or,
as in logic, from premise to conclusion; and thence the word
descends to the modern usage—of discussion by talk. There is
a Curious usage of discoursing in p. 97, where Bacon uses it (unless
some words have been omitted) as=/final causes.

Droumy, 203,=disturbed, troubled, “to fish in droumy waters.”’
The Latin has “in aquis turbidis piscari.”” The word is not found
in Richardson’s dictionary, nor can I trace its history.

DULCENESS, 197,=Sweetness. I find no other example of this
substantive, though dulcet and the verb to dulce are not un-
common in old writers. (This substantive is not in Richardson.)

226 Bacon

EASILIEST, 34,=most easily.

ELENCH, 131, a technical term—refutation of an argument or
position.

EMBASE, see Imbase.

ENABLEMENT, 64,=aid or means.

ESTUATION, 161,=heat and commotion.

EXCEED, 108,—pass beyond the bounds of moderation—used
without a case after it.

EXPULSED, 143,=expelled.

EXQUISITE, 29,=carefully fought out (not refined, as now).

EXTERN, 86, 164, 170,=foreign or outward.

EXTIRPER, 42,=extirpator—the old verb being to extirp, not to
extirpate.

FACTURES, 107, 113,=fashion or features of a thing. For the word
feature is only another form of the word facture.

FANTASTICAL, 23,=(in this place) false—based upon the fancy alone,
without any basis of fact or truth.

FLEXUOUS, 96, = bending and pliant.

FRIPPER, 145,=broker. We retain the word in our frippery—
from frivolus, a seller of frivolous or worthless goods. See Trench’s
Glossary.

GAMESTER, 163,=player—not with the sightest sense of gambling.
So in Shakespere,—
‘““ Sirrah, young gamestey, your father was a fool.”
Taming of the Shrew, ii. 1.
And,—
“You are a merry gamester.”’—Henry VIII., i. 4.

The word is still used in its right sense in the West of England.

GIGANTINE, 160,=gigantic, giant-like. (This adjective is not in
Richardson.)

GRAVELLED, 71,=Stuck or set fast in gravel; then, embarrassed.
So Shakespere, As you Like It, iv. 1, ‘‘ Gravelled for lack of
matter.’”’ Dean Trench quotes the Rheims version of the Acts
xxvii. 41, ‘‘ When they were fallen into a place between two seas,
they gravelled the ship.’”’ The word has now passed out of the
original sense. Gravel is derived either from glareola or from
gvavave—the loading of ships for ballast—or from to grave or dig
out—(to grub)—a doubtful suggestion of Serenius. The first
seems to be the most probable.

GROUND, 162,—an accompaniment with an instrument in music—
the metaphor being somewhat similar to that which would connect
bass with base or ground-floor of anything. The basso part is
simply the Jow part—as distinct from tenore, midway; alto, high;
soprano, above all. Thus bass or ground would be the foundation
on which all rests.

HOLDING OF, 2,=pertaining to.

HuMOUR, HUMOROUS, I5, 41,170. This word (Lat. humor, moisture)
was originally used of the four ‘‘ humours ”’ of the body, blood,
phlegm, choler, melancholy; it came to a morbid state of the mind |

Glossary 227

arising from excess of these; and so Bacon here uses it; “ the
censure of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity ’’ where it is not
=ill-humour in our sense, but rather=a diseased or jaundiced
condition of mind. We apply the word in medicine to a moist
diseased state of the body :—in common language, to good and ill
humour, or a cheerful or morose condition of temper;—and to a
quality of mind, difficult to define—a deep, almost solemn, sense
of the incongruities which coexist in the world. ‘“‘ The humorous
man (t.e. the melancholy man) shall end his part in peace.’’—
Hamlet, ii. 2.

ILLAQUEATION, 131, 146,=entanglement. The chief part of the
glossary under this letter must be taken up with Latin words which
entered into our language, when learned men began to use it
instead of Latin for literary purposes. The early part of the
seventeenth century, under a pedantic king, was the time when
this transition was most marked. As the English tongue gathered
strength by greater use in philosophical writings, it threw off
these excrescences of unnatural words, and we are rid of con-
siderable numbers of them.

IMAGINANT, 108,—person who imagines—a good word, though
perhaps not now in actual use.

IMBAR, 38,=bay or hinder.

IMBASE (or embase), 30, 78, 103, 196, 217,=—to lower, degrade;
almost = debase.

IMPERTINENT, 97,=out of place, according to the acceptance of the
word among other writers.

IMPOSTHUMATION, 114,=tumour or cyst formed in any part of the
body by the humours withdrawn from the other parts.

IMPROFICIENCE, 97,==want or absence of progress.

INCEPTION, 160, 175,=beginning.

INDIFFERENT, 17,=impartial. Thence it came naturally to=
moderate ; thence, of course, lukewarm and careless. So hard is
it for one who feels to help being a partisan—and so rare is a
really impartial and judicial spirit.

INFIRM, 131,=to deprive of strength. Used by Bacon as the
opposite of affirm. The method of Socrates, he says, was to
“infirm that which was affirmed by another.”

INFLUENCE INTO, 207, used in a sense of its derivation, as of one
stream flowing into another.

INGURGITATION, 114,=a greedy swallowing. So Burton, Anatomy
of Mel. (p. 235), has, “‘ to eat and ingurgitate beyond all measure.”

_ Ingurre, 115, used as our “ inquire into.”’

j

;

INSATISFACTION, 173,=disappointment or absence of satisfaction.

INSINUATION, 83,=bending of oneself, so as to correspond with the
form of a thing—(not in a bad sense).

INTEND, 180, 201,=attend to.

INTRINSIC, 31,=internal (not as now=vreal).

INVENT, 122,=discover (tnvenire); the wider use of the term, now
limited to the productions of man’s ingenuity and skill.

JOCULARLY, 117,=pertaining to jugglery, to which form it has been

228 Bacon

contracted in course of time. The joculatoy in low Latin was the
merry-andvew, or juggler (jocus).

JURISCONSULTS, 69,=lawyers—professors of law; being the Latin
word simply transferred into the English tongue.

LEESE, 30, 59, 62, 148, 168, 198. ‘This is the old spelling of the
same verb as “‘ to lose’’; akin to it are loss, less, to loose. In p:
30, Bacon uses it as equivalent to waste, or diminish a thing; in
Pp. 59, 148,=to lose. (So, too, the termination Jess comes from
this verb—blame-less, etc.) ; so Germ. los, free.

LEVANT, THE, 20,=the East, not part of the Mediterranean sea.

LIDGER, 192,=legate (a corrupt form of the word not noticed by
Richardson). In Bailey’s Dict. it is spelt ledger.

LIKER, 49,=more likely.

LIMNED, 24,=illuminated; the derivation being the same.

Lust, 85, used by Bacon of Poesy, which “ is as a plant that cometh
of the lust of the earth.’’—so used as nearly equivalent to its
German meaning.

MACHINATION, 40,=machine. The bad sense of the term is met with
early. Richardson quotes Sandy’s Psalms, p. 96,—

“ How long will you machinate,
Persecute with ceaseless hate! ”’

MAGISTRAL, 34,=our dogmatic.

MAGISTRALITIES, 115. Magisteryy was a term used by chemists.
Paracelsus describes it thus—‘‘ a preparation whereby the whole
or very near the whole of any body, by the help of some addita-
ment, greater or less, is turned into a body of another kind.”
(Boyle, Works, i. p. 637.) This explains Bacon’s use of the term;
but in p. 103, he uses it as almost equivalent to dogmatism.

MANIABLE, {4,=manageable, tractable (through the French manier,
from manus). This French form of the word never took root.

MANURED, 68, 151. The same word as manceuvre—e@uvre into ure,
To manure, then, is to work by hand, or cultivate—first land, then
intellects. Richardson quotes Bishop Hall, who, in one of his
Satires, Bk. v. Sat. i. speaks of ‘‘ many a load of marle and
manure.’ This brings in the modern usage of the term—a very
restricted and debased use.

MIRABILARIES, 71, works containing things marvellous. (?) Note-
books of Marvels.

Mog, 18, 136. See Richardson, v. More. Bacon uses the word as a)
comparative. It is (according to the etymologists) that which is_
mow-en, or mow-ed, into a heap (mawan, to mow, A.S.). Then:
mo; mo-er, (more); mo-est, (most). Our much is a derivation of |
mo—mickle. The general use of the word is comparative and=
more.

MoRAL, 21,=(perhaps) customary—a Latinised use ‘“‘ secundum)
morem ’’—deriving the adjective from the singular, not from the)
plural of mos. |

MORIGERATION, 2I1,=complaisance or compliance; ‘‘ morem gerere:
alicui,’”? to humour him. |

Moucht, 78, 79, 113,=might.

Glossary 229

” Non-PROMOVENT, 144. This is not Latin, as one edition seems to
make it, but an English word, formed after the type of such
compounds as non-proficient, non-conforming, etc. Bacon himself
interprets it by “ incurring into themselves.” The meaning is=
“not advancing ”’ as are arguments 1m circulo.

OccuPATE, 108,=occupy. Used as an adjective in 221,=occupied.

PAINFUL, 201,=painstaking, industrious—here and elsewhere an
epithet of the clergy.

PALLIATE, 113,=palliated, or mitigated.

PANTOMIMUS, I11, the person, not the thing. See Trench’s
Glossary.

PARCEL, = part.

PaRTICIPLES, 86,=partaking of more kinds than one; _ used
generally and not solely of grammar.

PasQguil, 47,=pasquinade, or lampoon (from an image at Rome, to
which libels and satires were affixed).

PEDANTES, 10, 17. This word was written thus by Bacon as a
foreign word (Italian or Spanish, probably the latter), newly
introduced into the English tongue and not acclimatised. It does
not seem to carry its modern notion of affectation joined with
learning, in the use Bacon makes of the word pedantical (p. 151).

PERCASE, 172, =perchance.

PLY, 198. This word is again used as a substantive by Bacon in
the Essay on Custom: ‘“‘ Late learners cannot so well take the
ply; except it be in some minds, that have not suffered them-
selves to fix.’”” Where we see the same sense as in the compound
apply—the bending or turning the mind to any matter. In this
passage Bacon uses the word | as almost=purpose: ‘‘can bring
occasion to their ply,’’—+#.e. ‘can bend circumstances to their
gervice,”’ etc.

POPULARITY, 208,=populousness. Sir T. Browne uses populosity—
which, ugly as it is, would be the more correct form of the word.

PRAGMATICAL, 188,=officious, busy—now solely “ priggish,’”—
word which perhaps comes from it. See Trench’s Glossary.

PRENOTION, 106, a subdivision of that part of human science which
treats of the sympathy between mind and body. Also, 206, the
process of marking off beforehand what has no connection with
the subject. Used by Bacon as one of the two “ intentions ”’ or
means in the received Arts of Memory.

PREPOSTEROUS, 201, used in its exact sense of wrong order of things.

PRESENTION, 118,=presentiment, or previous perception inwardly
of that which is about to occur. (Not in Richardson.)

PROFICIENCE, 62, 79, 221,=a making of progress. (Profit is the
same word under another form.)

PROPRIETY, 3, 208, property in its logical sense.

PUNCTUAL, 21,=to a point—thence exact even to littleness; later
confined to time only, in sense of accurate. See Trench’s Glossary.

Punto, 180, (Spanish) ceremony, punctilio. Another example of
the Spanish connection with England about this period of our
history.

PURGAMENT, 113,=that which purges or cleanses.

Q 719

2,30 Bacon

Quit, 182,=acquit. So in the Bible, A.V.—‘‘ Quit you like men.”
—1 Cor. xvi. 13.

REDARGUTION, 64, 131,=refutation.

RE-EDIFY, 46,=rebuild. The verb edify being used in its original ©

signification, as edifice still is.

REGIMENT, 2, 108, 173,=rule, government (regimen)—When did ©
the technical use of the term for a body of men under strict —

government first obtain? Dryden uses it.
REINTEGRATE, 90, 138,=re-establish anew. (Not merely to renew,

but to go back to the beginning—as Bacon uses it of the term |
revive and reintegrate,” 7.e. to —

ce

magia which he proposes to
bring back to its original sense.)

RELUCTATION, 37, 155, 209,=—resistance. We use reluctant still, of —

one struggling against what he dislikes, yet is driven to.

REMORA, 97 (remorare, mora), a little fish, as was thought, which,
clinging to a ship’s keel, stayed her course. Thence metaphor of
any hindrance.

“‘ All sodainly there clove unto her keele
A little fish, that men call remora,
Which stopt her course, and held her by the heele,
That winde nor tide could move her thence away.”’
SPENSER, The World’s Vanttte.

REMOVE, 200, =removal.

RESPECTIVE, I,=respectful (almost)—more exactly, having due
respect or regard to the worth of the person dealt with. The
honour which would be respective to a king would scarcely be
respective to a squire.

SAD, 181,=grave, firm, and fixed; derived from the A.-S. fet—so
that sad is that which is set or fixed; then grave or sedate; then
serious, mournful. See French’s Glossary.

SAKE, 29 (if the reading be correct), either=szde (which has been
suggested as an emendation), or=quest—following its derivation
from the verb seek, ‘“‘ on the other sake ’’ would then be “‘ on the
other side of the investigation,’ referring to Aristotle’s two
treatises—one on Natural History, the other (attributed to him)
of Prodigies, etc.

SAPIENCE, 36,= wisdom.

SCHOLASTICAL, 49,= pedantic, not necessarily in a bad sense.

SECURED, =free from care or hindrance (?).

SEEN, TO BE WELL, I11,=to be esteemed.

SEGREGATE, 178, as opposed to congregate, or aggregate—separated
part from part.

SEVER, TO, 178,=to be disjoined, or dissevered; ‘“‘seldom meet,
and commonly sever.’

SLUG, TO, 97,=to render sluggish; slug is from the same root as
slow.

SOLUTE, 214,=loose and unrestrained.

Sort, 185, 211. ‘‘ In sort that ’’—we now use “‘ in such sort.”’

SORTABLE, 48, =agreeable to, corresponding with.

SPIAL, 65,=Spy. "Shakespere uses esptal, Hamlet, iii. 1.

——e

Glossary 231

SPINOSITY, 121,=prickliness, as of thorns.

STATUA, 69, 167, 199,=statue. The English form was in use long
before Bacon’s time, so that he might as well have written it
instead of disfiguring his text with an unnecessary Latin word.
Shakespere (according to Collier and Knight) wrote statue, not

statua, in Julius Cesar, iii. 2,—‘‘ Even at the base of Pompey’s
statua.”’
STOND, 173. ‘‘ Knots and stonds of the mind.”’ Richardson says

it=standing-place or station; stay, stop. It seems to be more
like the joints and divisions of the stem of a plant.

SUPPEDITATION, 169,=support and supply.

SURD, 210, almost=absurd—.e. without proper significance,
“idolatry and magic, that are full of non-significants and surd
characters.’”” So in mathematics, suvds are ‘‘ roots incapable of
being exhibited in a finite form,’”’ and incommensurable.

SYNTAX, 150,=arrangement in relation to one another. Bacon
uses it of the “‘ order of pursuit ’’ in which studies may be under-
taken.

TABLE, 47,=picture (tableau). So Holland’s Pliny, xxxv.c.9. So
Tablet (ibid.).

TARRASSE, 35,=terrace. So spelt, following the pronunciation, etc.,
of the French ¢ervasse, or of the Spanish terrazo.

TAX, TO, 16, 19, 21, 110, 195, used absolutely, (almost =depreciated).
‘“The imposter is prized, and the man of virtue taxed.’ So
Barrow, vol. iii. fer. 3,—‘‘ He was not like those masters of
philosophy, so frequently taxed and derided by the satirists.”’
Is it equivalent to “‘ taxed with folly,” or (following the original
sense), weighed, or rated, and found wanting? So Bacon uses
taxation, pp. 77, 128.

TERRENE, 39,=earthly.

THEORY, 91, used in the original sense of @ewpia investigation,
chiefly of things abstract.

THWART, 14,=perverse, twisted. The verb ¢o thwart is in general use,
the adjective has now disappeared. The substantive thwart of a
boat (cross piece of board whereon the rowers sit), and athwart
are also in use. A.S. thweortan, to wrest; thweort, past participle.
Shakespere, King Lear, i. 4,—‘‘ And be a thwart disnatured
torment.”

TRACTATES, 202,=treatises—we now have cut the word down to
tract, and its meaning down to a flimsy or short paper of a
few pages. A tvactate was a complete work on some special
subject.

TREACLE, 115, not our syrup of molasses, but a medicine composed
of viper’s flesh, as an antidote to the viper’s bite—see note, p. 115.

TRIVIAL, 144,=common and well-known:—not in Bacon’s use=
worthless; but (according to its derivation) of things in the
high-way, beaten down by many feet: the sense worthless is later.
Richardson notices the similarity of sense and sound with trifle;
but the words are not really connected.

Typocosmy, 145,=a figure or representation of the world; xécyov
TUTOS.

232 Bacon

UNDERVALUE, 3, the verb is common enough,—the substantive is —
not nowin use. Bacon takes it in the sense of deficiency in worth :
“what defects and undervalues I find in such particular acts.”

UNPERFECT, 73,=imperfect.

UNPROPER, 33, =improper.

URE, 124, 141, (if this reading be allowed, instead of use). There ©
are two derivations suggested—usura, which is improbable;
and @wuvre, as manure from main, euvre. The meaning is much
the same as that of use. Chaucer, Complaint of the Black Knight,
uses it thus :—

“he so piteously gan cry
On his fortune and on ure also.”’
i.e. fortune=chance, and uve=labour, not of chance. So Milton, ©
Paradise Lost, uses the verb inure (or enure) not as derived from —
ure, but (as above) from @uure.

VASTNESS, 98 (vastitudo), a waste or desert—following the deriva-
tion of the word. (Richardson gives no example of this usage of
the term.)

VENTOSITY, 77, 195,=windiness, or lightness, as of air.

VERDOR, 39, said by Mr. Spedding to be a different word from
verdure, but this seems to be very doubtful.

VERMICULATE, 26. Bacon is drawing a comparison between the ©
corruption of some solid substances into worms, and the tendency
of sound knowledge to putrify into idle and unwholesome “ and,
as I may term them, vermiculate questions; ’’ where the word
clearly signifies questions that are corruptions of knowledge,
though some notion of entanglement and intricacy may possibly
also enter in.

VOLLIES OF WITS, 208,=flights (as of birds) of men of learning and
wisdom. This sense is rare, if not peculiar to Bacon. The
ordinary meaning of discharges of flying shot is at the bottom of
all the passages mentioned by Richardson.

VOLUBLE, 198, volubility, 165 (volubilis), apt or easy to roll—
“voluble with the wheels of Fortune.’ Volubility is used by
Bacon as an epithet of the serpent. Now used chiefly, if not
entirely, of speech, and that too in rather a disparaging sense.

WHIFFLER, 125,=piper—connected with whiff, a slight breath of
wind; also perhaps with waft—such a current of air as may be
made by the waving of a fan—(Richardson). Mr. Markby, very
appositely to the passage in Bacon, quotes Shakespere, King
Henry V. v. (chorus)—

““ The deep-mouthed sea,
Which, like a mighty whzffler before the king,
Seems to prepare his way.”

+ ih ill iia el

INDEX

ABEL, type of the contemplative
State, 38

‘Abraham, 209

Academic philosophers, why popular,
126

Acatalepsy in philosophy, 126

Accidents of words, an appendix to
grammar, 138

Achilles, envied by Alexander, 48;
educated by Chiron, 84

Active good better than passive, 159

Adonis, Venus’ minion, 25

Adrian, ‘master of thirty legions,”’
22; a learned prince and great
inquirer, 45

Advancement of Learning, compared
to the tuning of instruments
before a concert, 207

ZEschines’ sneer at Demosthenes, 13

7Esculapius and Circe, fable of, 110;
son of the sun, 112

#Esop, fable of the cock, 60; fables
are parabolical poesy, 83

Affections, inquiry respecting the,
171; insufficiently handled by the
ancients, 1b.; best treated by
poets and historians, 1b.

Agesilaus, 54; speech to Pharna-
bazus, 17

Agrippa, half a Christian, 46

Agrippina, detestable choice of, 60;
stung Tiberius by a speech, rg1

Ahasuerus, his journals, 78

Albertus Magnus, too credulous in
natural history, 29

Alchemists depend on Vulcan, 65, 90

Alchemy, 33; related to POAsnEHOG,

29

Alexander Borgia’s saying respecting
the French expedition, 102

Alexander the Great, Aristotle’s
scholar, 9, 48; his expedition into
Asia, 32, LY e: his estimate of learn-
ing, 48; his letter to Aristotle, 1b. ;
examples of his acuteness, 49; his
saying about Greek wars, 55; his
allowance to Aristotle, 65; the
journals of his house, 78; his
title of predo, 92; sends messen-
gers to Dendamis, 210

Alexander Severus, I1, 47

Anabaptists (of Munster), their evil
tenets, 158

Analytics, their place in logic, 131

Anatomy, too much neglected, 113

Angels in a hierarchy, 37; our know-
ledge limited, 89; fell by aspiring
to be like God in power, 177

Annals of Tacitus, 78

Anthropomorphites, heresy of, 133

Antipater, 50; a bad ruler, 7b.

Antipodes, 12

Antiquities are history defaced, 73;
of the world, 75

Antiquity worshipped by some, 313
not to be neglected, gr

Antitheta, or theses argued pro and
con., 149

Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius, 3, 46

Antoninus Pius, most learned, 46;
became half a Christian, 47; died
a peaceful death, 114

Antonius over-reached by Mucianus,
IgI

Anytus, accuser of Socrates, 9

Aphorisms are knowledge in growth,
43; compared with methodical
writings, 142

Apollo ruled over music and medi-
cine, I10

Apollonius, 45

Apophthegms,
mon’s, 182

Apotheosis of the learned, 42

Appendices to history, 81

Arabian philosophers, 29

Archimedes, 30

Architecture illustrates man’s per-
sonal relation with society, 163

Ariosto’s conceit of posthumous
fame, 77

Aristipp.s? reply after having fallen
at Dionysius’ feet, 22

Aristotle, 30, 33; Aiexander’s tutor,
0; dictator over the schoolmen,
26; not too credulous, 29; mixes
philosophy with logic, 44. OF:
helped in his inquiries by Alex-
ander, 65; his De Miris Auscult.,
70; on small things, 72; contra-
dicts antiquity, 91; too fond of
final causes, 97; his Problemata a

Cesar’s, 81; Solo-

233

234

valuable work, 102; compared to
the Turkish Sultan who murders his
brethren, 103; notices the growth
of observation in children, 104;
wrote on prediction, 107; but not
on gesture, 2b.; on imagination
and reason, 121; on the mind, 122;
derides the sophists, 128; ex-
pounds the fable of Atlas, 130;
on elenches, 131; on argument in
a circle, 135; on speech, 136;
taxes Democritus, 143; on rheto-
ric, 146; compares logic and rhe-
toric together, 148; his collections
of signs of good and evil (in the
topics), 7b.; not well worked out,
149; said that the young only can
be happy, 155; blames Herodicus,
158; on moral culture, 167; on
magnanimity, 169; does not duly
consider the relations of age, for-
tune, etc., to morals, 171; but
touches on these points in the
Rhetoric, +b.; does not duly dis-
cuss the affections, 7b.; except
casually in the Rhetoric, #b.; care-
less in his discussion as to custom
and habit, 173; gives precepts for
habituation, 174; caution required
in training youth, 7b.; on heroic
or divine virtue, 176

Arithmetic, 99

Arts, history of, 71; calendar to be
made, ror; their duty to exalt
nature, 125

Ascham’s veneration for Cicero and
Demosthenes, 24

Astrology related to imagination
rather than reason, 29; has a
noble aim, 71b.; divides men’s
natures according to the planets,
169

Astronomy, can be explained either
by the “received,” or by the
Copernican hypothesis, 104

Atalanta, 35

Atheism, 8

Athletic art, 117

Atlas, fable of, 130

Atticus, 199; his advice to Cicero
on bearing, 180

Augustine, St., not so great a teacher
as ecclesiastical history is, 70

Augustus Cesar, his eloquence de-
scribed by Tacitus, 2; praised by
Virgil, 57; desired euthanasia, 114;
requested a plaudite when dying,
188; lived before men’s eyes, 194;
his feigned frankness, 199; hoped

Bacon

to employ well his
fortune, 204

Authority in science is too highly
credited, 30

Axioms applicable to more than one
science, 86, 87

Babel, 38

Bacon, Lord, promises a work on
Laws, 207

Basilisk, fable of the, 165

Baths, medicinal, 116

Beasts get the credit of most inven-
tions, 123

Behaviour like a garment, 179

Bias, precept of, concerning friend-
ship, 202

Biography, 77, 186

Bird-witted (or inattentive) people
cured by mathematics, 151

Blesus, 152

Books to be cherished in a state,
62; plentiful, but not good, 67

Briareus, the hundred-handed, 84

Brutus, Lucius, his act towards his
sons, 166

Brutus and Cassius, their images
absent from Junia’s funeral, 16;
their supper and discourse on
tyrants, 166; Brutus’ speech on
fortune, 205

Business, wisdom of, much neglected,
181, 182

ill-gotten

Czsar, Augustus (see Augustus)

Cesar, Julius (see Julius)

Cain, type of the active life, 38

Calendar of knowledge to be made,
tor; and of doubts, 103; and of
popular errors, 4b.’

Callisthenes attended Alexander, 48;
his eloquence, 50

Car, of Cambridge, almost deified
Cicero, 24

Caracalla, 47

Cardan, too credulous, 29

Cardinals, their temperaments noted
in the accounts of conclaves, 170

Carneades, ambassador to Rome, 9

Cassander, argued with Alexander,

50
Cassius (and Brutus), their images
not shown at Junia’s funeral, 16;
their supper and discussion on
assassination of tyrants, 166
Casuistry, cases of, 165, 166
Categories, their use, 132
Catiline, 74; wished to “fish in
droumy waters,” 203

Index

Cato the censor, 8; wished to learn
Greek in his old age, 14; his judg-
ment on his countrymen, 179;
Livy’s judgment on him, 187, 197

Cato the second (of Utica), his errors
in judgment, 12, 18; praised
by Cicero, 167; censured by
Czsar, 200

Catulus, the orator, 194

Causes, the four, how investigated,

93

Celsus, condemned anatomia vivorum,
113; acknowledges that logic has
nothing to do with medicine,
123

Ceremonies not lawful, 120

Chance gets the credit of most
inventions, 124

Characters of men to be studied by
the moral philosopher, 169

Charity, ‘‘ the very bond of virtues,”

177

Charles V. on fortune, 205

Charms, how supposed to act, 120

Cherubim, angels of light, 37

Chess, 211

Chinese characters, 137

Chiron, the centaur, Achilles’ pre-
ceptor, 84

Christianity, has settled the question
as to summum bonum, 154; exalts
social above private good, 156

Chronicles, 74

Chrysippus tried to interpret the
fables of the poet, 84; followed
a bad way of persuading men to
virtue, 147

Church, the, charged with the
excesses of heretics, 22; befriended
learning, 40, 41

Church History too credulous, 28;
how divided, 80

Cicero, M. Tullius, 33, 124, 194, 203;
had no resolution, 12; best or
second best of orators, 14; his
philosophy adorned by eloquence,
25; on posthumous fame, 77;
his complaint against Socrates,
106; an academic, 126; com-
mends_ rhetorical preparations,
128; on rhetoric, 146; on faulty
exercise of the faculties, 151; his
Oratio pro Marcello, 165; praises
Cato the Second, 167; his judg-
ment on Cato, 175; his interview
with Cesar, 180; his Ad Aitticum
useful for wisdom of business,
186; censures Pompey, 194; calls
Cesar tyrannus, 199; relates how

235

Augustus feigned frankness, 1b.;

his perfect orator, 203

Cicero, Quintus, his advice to his

brother, 180; his book De

Petitione Consulatus, 182; calls

the face animt janua, 190

Ciceronian style revived at the
Reformation, 23, 24

Ciphers, 139

Circe and Aésculapius, 110

Civil History, 73; knowledge, 179

Clement VII., 12

Cleon hated eloquence, 147

Coat of Christ without a seam, 213

Cobwebs of learning, 26

Columbus, 32

Commentaries, 73; in theology are
bad, 214

Commodus, 47

Common-place Books, 135

Conclaves, 170

Confusion of tongues the second
curse of man, 138

Conscience, 210

Constantinenicknamed Trajan Parie-
taria, 46

Contemplation, the best state, 33-38;
Aristotle placed it above active
life, Christianity places it below it,
156; reserved for God anda angels,

157

Contradictory instances not to be
neglected in induction, 125

Controversies in religion nearly
extinct, 208; an affliction to the
Church, 212

Copernicus’ theory of astronomy,
104, 106

Corruption of learning a great evil,
26

Coruncanius used to walk in the
dare to be consulted on business,
181

Cosmography, history of, 97

Countenance, the, a tell-tale, 190

Craterus, Alexander’s friend, 51

Credulity, akin to imposture, 28

Cretans, how judged by St. Paul, 170

Critics, advice to, 150

Croesus’ interview with Solon, 201

Curius, 181

Custody of knowledge, art of, 142

Custom and habit, 173

Cyrenaic school, wherein it placed
happiness, 157

Cyrus Minor, 74

Deedalus, 65

Dancing answers to versifying, 139

236

- Darius, 48

De Petitione Consulatus of Quintus
Cicero, the one work on business
written among the ancients, 182

Death, preparation for, 162

Dedications of books, 21

Deeds of men not to be trusted, 190

Defects of character, 196

Definitions, necessary, 134

Democritus, 30, 103; of the truth
of N ature, go; said that there was
no ruling mind in the universe, 97;
his philosophy, 7+b.; based his
philosophy on numbers, 98; taxed
by Aristotle, 143

Demosthenes, his reply to Aschines,
13; counsel to the Athenians, 18;
prepared beforehand prefaces for
his orations, 128; his examples of
eloquence, 146; cares more for
eloquence than for praise, 154;
rallied by Philocrates, 178;
exhorts men to govern circum-
stances, 198

Dendamis the Indian, 210

Diagoras the atheist, his wise reply,
133

Diascordium, 115

Differences, "the object of meta-
physics, 94

Diogenes, his defence of philosophers,
22; interview with Alexander, 49;
on self-restraint, 158

Dionysius had his ears in his feet, 22;
speech about philosophy, 27

Dionysius the Areopagite, 37

Direction (or guidance), the chief
help tolearning, 61

Divination, 118

Divines have objected to learning, 4

Divinity, briefly discussed, 209;
two chief parts, 213; four main
branches thereof, 219

Domitian’s dream, 44

Donius, 105

Doubt and suspension of judgment
wholesome, 34; should always
be registered, 102

Dreams, exposition of, the only true
part of prenotion, 107

Drusus, commended by Tiberius, 190

Du-Bartas on flattery, 21

Duty, the good of man as regards
society, 163

Eccentrics and epicycles, 104

Ecclesiastical History, too credulous,
28; a great teacher, 7o; its
divisions, 80

Bacon

Eden, man’s labour in, 37

Education, honourable and import-
ant, 16; of youth, affects the
character, 152

Egypt, a most learned land, 38;
why so few human figures in her
temples, 123

Egyptian priest’s judgment on the
Greeks, 38; hieroglyphics, 137

Elenchs, a method of judgment, 198;
can be used to guard against
metaphorical ambiguities, 131

Elizabeth, Queen, and King James I.,
are Castor and Pollux, 15; a most
learned princess, 47; the glories
and dangers of her reign, 48; her
good government seen in its last-
ing effects, 61; her masculine rule,

6

vs

Elogies, barren, 77

Eloquence, desired above sense, 24;
not to be condemned, 25; based
on imagination, 121

Emblem, one of the foundations on
which memory rests, 136

Empedocles, 103

Empirics, in physic, 10;
craft, 4b.

England, history of, during Tudor
period, 75, 76

Enoch, the first contemplative
person, endowed the Church with
prophecy, 157

Enquiry, power of wise, is the half of
knowledge, 129

Epaminondas, general and scholar, 9

Epictetus’ philosophy censured, 158;
his precept on self-government,
193

Epicurus, his manner of death, 114;
thought the gods to be of human
shape, 133; wherein his school
placed happiness, 157; held that
virtue had much to do with it, 161

Epitomes, the moths of history, 74

Erasmus’ colloquy of Juvents and
Echo, 24

Essays are ruminated history, 78

Ethics, how divided, 154

Euclid, 30; his propositions seem
strange till proven, 32

Euthanasia, much desired, 114

Evil, knowledge of, necessary, 165;
arts, precepts of, 203.

Exercises at the Universities. very
defective, 66

Experimental philosophy, 100

Exstatic visions, etc., 119

Extremes to be avoided, 31

in state-

Index

Ezekiel on Pharaoh’s arrogance, 187

“Faber quisque fortune su@,’’ 187, 188

Fabius Maximus would have carried
on his policy too long, 197

Fable of Ixion, 12; of the giants, 84;
of Jupiter attacked by the Gods,
#b.; of the bringing up of Achilles,
ib.: expounded, 1b.; of the horse-
leeches, 184; of the frogs, 202;
invented as substitutes for histori-
cal examples, 280

** Facta non verba,” 183

Faith, its objects, 219

Fall of Man, 37, 177; of angels, 4b.

Fallacies, 131, 132

Falsity in substance a great fault,
25 Sqq.

Fame, why created, 84

Fantastical learning, 23

Fascination, 119

Fasting, retained under the Gospel,
108

Felicity, what it is, determined by
Christianity, 158

Final causes, their study misplaced
and misdirected, 96

Fire, how generated in the West
Indies, 123

Flattery, its grossness, 21; some
instances of it, 1-3, 61, 206, 208;
must be fine, if it is to succeed, 185

Forms, essential, their discovery the
object of metaphysics, 94

Forms of substances are infinite, 94

Formule, or set passages, fit. for
different subjects in rhetoric, 150

Fortune, good, hard to be borne
wisely, 170; men can fashion it,
187; may be too much despised,
#b.; rules for making one’s, 188
sqq.; not an end worthy of man’s
being, #b.; falls into some men’s
laps, 202

Fracastorius, 105

Friends, caution in choosing, 184

Frivolous learning, 23

Fulfilments of prophecy, gradual, 80

Fundamental truths, 213

Galen and final causes, 97

Gallus, 190

Games, a part of civil life, 117

Geometry, 99

Germanicus and Drusus, 190

Gestures stand instead of speech, 137

Gilbert, on the magnet, 33; revived
the views of Xenophanes, 105

God, His secret things not to be

237

reached by the senses, 6; His
word and His work both to be
studied, 7; His power and wisdom,
36; His ‘providence not impeached,
98; to be imitated in His goodness
and love, 177; His providence
controls and changes evil counsels,
204; demands one-tenth of our
substance, and one-seventh of our
time, #b.; sees all things clearly,
206
Godliness ranks before fortune, 205
Gold, the attempt to make it has
caused many inventions, 30
Gonsalvo’s speech to his soldiers, 158
Good, nature of, 154; is either pri-
vate or relative, 156; active or
passive, 159; that of the mind and
that of the body are analogous, 178
Good-nature and its contrary, 169
Gordianus the younger, rz
Government, carried on by acting
on men’s ’affections, 172; moves
slowly, 179; a secret part of know-
ledge, 205; of the Church, 220
Grammar, produced by the require-
ments of speech, 138
Greece and Rome, exemplar states,

y fe)

Gregory, St., his hostility against
learning, 40; his prayers for
Trajan’s soul, 4

Guise, Henry, Duke of, his ambition,
51

Habituation, reer. 173;
cepts for, 174

Hannibal thousnt Title of Phormio’s
views on war, 163

Happiness, its ‘nature, étc., deter-
mined by Christianity, I 57: ; not to
be so pursued as to destroy mag-
nanimity, 162

Heathenism has no fixed belief, 210;
is like an idol, soulless, 219

Heliogabalus, 47

Henry VII., reign of, 76

Henry VIII. , reign of, 76

Hephestion, ” Alexander’s friend, 51

Heraclitus, the profound, 7; his
censure of intellectualists, 33

Hercules despised Adonis’ image, 253
his pillars, 61

Heresies, 221

Herillus, wherein he placed happi-
ness, 157

Hermes Trismegistus, 3

Hermogenes, the rhetorician, 24

Herodicus and Aristotle, 158

pre-

238
Heteroclites, or irregulars of nature,

70
Hieroglyphics, 83, 137
Hippocrates, 30; treated of pre-
notion, 106; kept notes of cases,
EI2; ‘his aphorism on serious
illness, 167
Historians and poets have best
treated of the affections, 172
History, related to memory, 69;

divisions of, 1b.; of learning,
deficient, ib.: civil, 73; perfect,
74; modern, 74, 75; antiquities

of, 7b.; of England, Tudor period,
75,76; ruminated, 79; ecclesiasti-
cal, how divided, 80; appendices
to, 81; true, as compared with
feigned (or poetry), 82

Holy Spirit, expressed by the gift of
tongues, 40; sin against, 219

Homer’s Iliad, viii. 19; alluded to, 8;
how estimated by Alexander, 48;
has given a living to many, 58; his
fame more lasting than that of
conquerors, 59; akind of scripture
to the later Greeks, 84

Hope, the portion of all who under-
take great things, 51

Horse-leeches, fable of the, 184

Hortensius, the orator, 194

Human philosophy, or self-know-
ledge, 105; or humanity, 106; its
divisions, 2b.

Humility, needed, but avoided, in
things divine and human, 125

Idolatry, 221

“Idols”? of the mind, 132; of the
tribe,1b.; of the cave, 133; of the
market-place, 134

Images, how supposed to affect
worshippers, 120

Imagination, how it affects the body,

108; its power, 119; hath two
faces towards reason and action,
120; in religion is above reason,
1b.; affects judgment, 132

Immortality, 5

Imposture akin to credulity, 28

Impression, a part of the sympathy
between body and mind, 107

Induction, as in use, cannot discover
arts, 124; natural answers better,
125; how judgment is applied to
it, 129

Inquisitiveness, 28

Insight into men’s characters needful
to him who would make his
fortune, 189

Bacon

Inspiration, 213

Instinct of ‘animals, I24

Invention of arts, 122; of speech,
127; placed after judgment by
the schoolmen, 2b.; art of it ex-
pands with it, 129

Inventors, honoured by God before
the flood, 38; deified by the
ancients, 123

Italians, suspicious of kind deeds,190

Ixion, fable of, 12; interpreted, roo

James, St., quoted, 193

James I., his praises, 1-3, 61, 206,
208; his sentiment as to gestures,
107; on a king’s duty, 164; on
the true law of free monarchies, 4b.

Jason, the Thessalian, 54; his judg-
ment on doing evil to bring about
good, 166

Jesuits, their wisdom in education,
17; have promoted learning, 41

Jeweller’s skill, 162

Job’s question ’to his friends, 7; his
learning, 39

Journals in history, 78

Judge, a corrupt better than a facile,

184

Judgment, acts of, 129; defined, 1303
methods of, 131; affected by the
imagination, 132

Julian the emperor, interdicted
Christians from learning, 40; his
book entitled C@sares, 47

Jupiter, planet of civil society and
action, 35; his chain, 89

Justinian, ultimus Romanorum, 75

Kindness, sometimes assumed, 190

Kings, to be regarded reverently, 20;
if learned, are best, 43; their duty,
according to James I., 164

Knowledge, only remembrance
according to Plato, 1; St. Paul
warns against misuse, 4; bounds
and limitations, 6; does not lead
to atheism, 7; its strength, 26;
hindrances to its growth, 31-36;
mistakes as to the ends of, 34; its
true end, “35; should produce
fruit, 1b.; ‘‘ a little , knowledge is
a dangerous thing,’”’ whence this
saying comes to be attributed to
Bacon, 55; it never palls, 58;
seems ‘immortal, even to atheists,
59; isasa pyramid, 96; has three
stages, 96; of ourselves, 105; is
continuous and entire, 1b.; is
pabulum animt, but still distaste-

40]
;

Index

ful to the carnal mind, 121;
rational, 122; arts for attaining
thereto are four, 122 sqq.

Lelius, 181

Languages, their study revived at
the Reformation, 23; are vehicula
sctentia@, 40

Laws of England, 207; hitherto
handled only by philosophers or

- lawyers, not by statesmen, 206;
how to be treated, 207; of nature,
moral and positive, 219

Lawyers write of law as it is, not as
it should be, 206

Learned men, their manners not
necessarily rude, 17, 18; apt to
fix too high a standard, 18; their
follies, 22 sqg.; to be cherished
in a state, 62

Learning, flourishes best in company
with arms, 10; of use to statesmen,
4b.; does not cause sloth, 12; nor
lessen respect for law, 13; not
really discredited by learned
clowns, tb.; teaches men their
smallness, 19; itspeccant humours,
31-36; pursued for mean ends, 34;
is acquired knowledge, 36; its
dignity, 36 sqq.; cherished by the
Church, 40; helps faith, 41; seats

- of, are faulty in several respects,
63 sqq.; distribution of, 69; three
periods of, Greek, Roman, and
ee ‘century, 207; divine,

209

Lectures, but iff provided for in
places ‘of learning, 64

Legends, too readily believed in the
Church, 28

Leprosy, the law respecting, 38

Letters, like ships, carry wealth
from age to age, 59; most useful
to teach wisdom of business, 186

Levant, the, 20

Lex Paptia, 31

Libraries, shrines of true saints, 63

Life, how to be prolonged, ror

Light, first created, 37; of nature, an
insufficient guide, 209, 210; used
in two senses, 210

Liturgy or service,
divinity, 220

Livy, best of historians, 14; makes
but little of Alexander, 32; his
dictum on behaviour, 180; judg-
ment on Cato the censor, 187, 197

Lodestone, why does it attract iron?
156; has only a limited power, 1b.

a part of

eae

Logic (and Rhetoric) too early
studied at the universities, 66;
discusses things in notion, but
confusedly, 86; does not profess
to invent sciences, 123; the syllo-
gism, what, 126; compared with
Rhetoric, 148

Longanimity, 169

Love, the bond of all virtues, 177

Lucian, on the Stoic and the lap- dog,
2%} his objection to the gods, who
begat no children in his day, 31

Lucretius (quoted), 58

aed, Raymond, his false method,

145
rather awakened all antiquity to
help him, 23
Lysander on the art of deceit, 203

Machiavelli on the poverty of the
friars, 15; interprets the fable of
Achilles and Chiron, 84; on the
means of preserving governments,
87; writes what is valuable as a
warning, 165; on questions of
policy shuts his eyes to moral good
and evil, 175; his form and sub-
ject of writing the best for civil
prudence, 186; his note on the
policy of Fabius Maximus, 197;
on money as the “ sinews of war,”’
200; his precept asto the disadvan-
tage of virtue, etc., 203

Magic, Natural, 119; related to
imagination rather thanreason,29;
has a noble aim, 30; Persian, what
it was, 86; its true sense, 90;
present degradation 100

Magnanimity, 169

Mahomet’s law regarding diet, 107;
interdicts all argument and use of
reason, 211

Man, a microcosm, 88, 109

Manichzan heresy, 107

Manners (mores) in divinity, 219

Mariner’s compass, 102, 122

Master of the sentences, 214

Mathematique, * 98; handmaid to
many sciences, 99

Medicine, science of, apt to be too
empirical, 106; discussed, 109;
its uncertainty gives room for
imposture, 110; analogous to
morality in order of its investiga-
tions, 171

Memorials, or history unfinished, 73

Memory, art of, 135

Menander on love, 177

Menenius Agrippa, fable of, 64

240

Mental philosophy, how divided, 117

Metaphysique, used in a different
sense from itsordinary acceptation,
91; how limited, 92, 93; distin-
guished from physics, 93; its
functions, 94; abridges the multi-
tudeofparticulars, 95; enfranchises
man’s powers, 96

Metellus, how addressed by Cesar, 53

Method, a hindrance to learning, 32

Method of tradition of arts, 140; its
place in logic, 7b.; of probation, 1b.;
enigmatical, 141; compared with
aphorisms, 7b., 142; varies accord-
ing to different subjects, 143;
useful in limiting propositions,
144; a false kind of, 145

Microcosm, man said to be a, 88, 109

Midas’ judgment, 60

Mind, its nature, 117; functions,
120;. is naturally full of super-
stition and imposture, 132;
Georgics of the, 154

Mirabilaries, 71

Miracles, 71; not wrought for
atheists, but for the idolatrous
and superstitious, 88

Misitheus, a pedant, ruled wisely, 11

Mithridatum, 115

Modern History, 74; times are truly
the most ancient, 31

Momus, wanted a window to look
into men’s hearts, 185

Monastic life, not good unless joined
with action, 157

Money, 138; not the ‘“‘sinews of
war,’ 200; its value for advance-
ment, 10.

Monodica, many things in nature are
such, 133

Monstrosities, 70

Moral Philosophy, 116 sqg.; a
handmaid to divinity, 167; must
consider what is possible, 167;
characters must be studied by it,
168; should take note of age, sex,
etc., 169, 170

Moses, a learned man, 38; on the
mount, 157; a pattern for con-
troversialists, 213; his law
regulated questions of diet, etc.,
108

Moss, 39

Mc antchanue: preferred to physi-
cians, IIo

Music, 162; cadences in, 87

Musician, the, who held the soul to
be a harmony, 33

Mutianus, overreached Antonius,

Bacon

191; his character in Tacitus,

195
Mysteries, 83

Naples, Gonsalvo at, 158

Narrations of particular actions |
(monographs), 78 |

Narrowness of mind a hindrance to —
learning, 33 |

Natural History, 70; philosophy is ©
of the mine and furnace, 90; how
subdivided, 91; magic, 7b.; pru-
dence, what, 100

Nature, book of God’s works, 8, 41;
helps us to understand the Scrip-
tures, tb.; how divided, 93; her
summary law, 91; refuses to be
enchained by syllogism, 126; light
of, insufficient, 209, 210; used in
two senses, 210

Negociation, part of civil prudence,
181

Nero, in his minority governed by
Seneca, II, 19

Nerva, a good and learned prince,

44

Nicodemus, his error, 212

Novelty, to be avoided in extremes,
31; not to be distrusted, 7b.

Nuncio, the advice of a papal, 192

Olympian games, 117

Orations, appendices to history, 81

Orators, compared with sophists,
131; stir the passions of republics,
as the wind the sea, 171

Organs, of sense and reflection akin,
87; of the body, are they seats
of corresponding mental faculties?

10
Orpheus’ theatre, 43
Ortelius of Antwerp, 145
Osorius, his ‘‘ watery vein,”
Ostensive reduction, 130
Ostentation, a fault of manners, 195
Ottomans, the Sultan of the, 103

24

Papia Lex, 31

Paracelsus’ philosophy reduced by
Severinus, 105; held that man is
a microcosm, 109; exalted the
imagination, 119; views of his
school on theology, 216

Paris, judgment of, 60

Parmenides, 103; his speculation as
to the ultimate unity of all things,

96
:Parmenio’s advice to Alexander, 50,

oye !

,

Index

Particulars, pursuit of, a hindrance
to learning, 32

Paul, St., a learned man, 40; wished

himself anathema for his brethren,
156; judgment on the Cretans,
170; his wisdom, 212

-“* Pedantes,”’ successful as governors,

10; styled the “‘ apes of tyranny,”
I

7
Pedantical knowledge, 150, 151
Percennius and Vibulenus, 152
Periander’s advice as to the pre-
serving a tyranny, 137
Persian magic, 87
Phalynus, brought Artaxerxes’ mes-
sage to the Greeks, 54
Pharaoh’s arrogance, 187
Philip of Macedon, 45
Philo-Judzus, on knowledge, 7
Philocrates, 178
Philopcemen, 75

| Philosophers too cautionary in their

precepts, 161; not wise writers on
laws, 206

Philosophia prima, 32, 85;
character not satisfactory,
defined, +).

Philosophy, mental, tends towards
degeneracy, 30; related to reason,
69; threefold, 85; divine, 88;
ancient, to be investigated, 104;
not to be treated as a profession,
158; moral, 166 sgg.; what part
is in our power, 167

its
86;

_ Phocion’s obstinacy, 12

Phormio’s theory of wars, 163

Physicians, if wise, will consider the
effect of mind on body, 108; must
not despair of cure, 114; must
endeavour to lessen pain, 7b.

Physics, distinguished from meta-
physics, 93; limited to the
material, 96

Physiognomy, the only sound part
of prediction, 107

Pindar on sudden fortune, 170

Pius Quintus, rr

Places of learning to be helped by
the state, 62

Plato, 30, 38; his doctrine of remem-
brance, 1; would not bear office,
18; on Socrates, 21; adorned
philosophy with his eloquence, 25;
mixed philosophy with theology,
33,97; held that kings should be
philosophers, or philosophers kings,
43; derides men’s contempt for
common things, 72; held that
forms are the true objects of know-

241

ledge, 94; his speculation as to
the ultimate unity of all things, 96;
makes too much of final causes, 97;
on the feats of the different facul-
ties in the body, 109; commends
middle propositions in sciences, as
fruitful, 123; hisinduction vicious,
124, 125; saw the advantage of
well-directed enquiry, 129; why
he introduced Socrates and the
sophists, 131; his supposition of
the cave, 134; despised rhetoric,
147; his saying as to the beauty of
virtue, 7b.

Platonists mix philosophy with
mathematics, 33

Plautus, marvels at beneficence in
old age, 170; (quoted), 187

Pleasure, how related to happiness,

157

Pliny, too credulous, 29; saved the
Christians from persecution, 45;
his panegyric, 176

Plutarch, adorned philosophy with
his eloquence, 25; has fagotted
together the ancient philosophies
unsatisfactorily, 104

Poesy related to imagination, 69,
121; is feigned history, 82; com-
pared with history, 7b.; its effects
even on barbarians, #b.; its divi-
sions, 83; fables of, have they an
inward meaning? 85; regarded as
to its form, 139; called vinum
demonum by one of the fathers,

17
Poets and historians have _ best
handled the affections, 172
Politicians, why they object to
learning, 8; the corrupt sort of
them seek only their own gain,

19

Pompey, his saying when charged
with the relief of Rome from
famine, 156; wisely burned Ser-
torius’ papers, 182; the only great
captain when Cesar began his
career of war, 194; erred in follow-
ing Sylla’s example too far, 1b.;
damaged himself by closeness, 199

Positive precepts of lawand theology,
212

Poverty, its praises fit subject for
friars, 15; honoured in the best
days of Rome, 1b.; “ paupertas
virtutis fortuna,” 1b.

Power, varies according to the de-
gree and position of the governed,

56

242

Preaching, fostered by the Reforma-
tion, 24

Predicaments, their use, 132

Prediction and prenotion, arts refer-
ring to the connection between
body and mind, 106

Prenotion, foundation to the art of
memory, 136

Priesthood, of weight in empire, 58

Princes, best seen into by watching
their natures, 192

Proclus and the Platonists, 33

Prometheus, his inventions, 123

Promus and condus in Roman house-
keeping, 159

Prophecy, is divine history, 69, 80

Proteus, 73

Proverb (Spanish), 191; (Italian), 192

Providence, history of, 80

Proxenus, Xenophon’s friend, 54

Pygmalion’s frenzy, 25

Pythagoras based his philosophy on
numbers, 98; his praise of a con-
templative life, 157

Pythagorean superstitions as to diet,
etc. 107

Quickness of dispatch most useful
for rising in the world, 183
Quirites, 52

Rabbins, their labours in the law, 38;
their interpretations to be re-
strained, 217

“* Ragtont di stato,’ 11

Ramus did well in reviving the rules
of propositions, 144

Raven, the, his instinct, 124

Raymond, Lully, his false method,
145

Readerships in sciences, 64

Reason, subordinate to divine truth,
89; not yet enough enquired into,
212

Reduction in logic, of two kinds,
ostensive and ad absurdum, 130

Reformation, the, awakened learning
and a classical style, 23, 41

Registers, 73

Religion, 107

Remedies, much confused, 115

Republics, stirred by any wind, 171

Revelation, 209, 210

Reverence, a hindrance to learning,

33
Rewards, a help to learning, 61
Rhetoric, 66; separated from philo-}
sophy by Socrates, 106; engaged

on imaginative reason, I21; re-

Bacon

quires store of places (or topics),
128; discussed at length; 146;
defined, 1b.; despised by Plato,
4b.; helps to keep the passions in
order, 148; compared with logic,
1b.; Aristotle’s treatise thereon
discusses the affections, 171

Rhetorical surprises, 87

Romans, the, were professors of a
wisdom of business, 181; their
wisest men used to walk in the
forum giving advice to their fel-
low citizens, 7b.

Rome and Greece, the two exemplar
states, 75; under the six kings she
prepared for her greatness, 151

Romulus, 75

Sallust, on royal fancies, 170;
censures Pompey’s reserved and
dark ways, 199

Samuel, 125

Saracens, foes to learning, 41

Sarah, an image of natural reason,
209

Saturn, planet of rest, 35

Saviour, our, the great physician,
132; ‘commends rhetorical prepa-
ration, 128

Sayings, or brief speeches, appen-
dices to history, 81

Scale or ladder of knowledge, 91

Sceptic philosophers had good
grounds for becoming such, 126

Schoolmasters held in little honour,
16

Schoolmen, rudeness of their style,
24; held in contempt, 1b.; their
degenerate or ‘‘ vermiculate”’
learning, 26; their useless sub-
tilty, #b.; drew from their own
minds, not from nature, 27; their
voluminous writings, 214

Scornful, the, will not
correction, 185

Scotland, history of, ill handled, 75

Scriptures, the, a well of life, 214;
how interpreted, 7b.; plentifully
expounded in England, 218

Sculptor, the, compared with Nature,

receive

176
Scylla, a type of scholastic learning,
27

Self-advancement, rules for, 188 sqq.
Seneca governed wisely during
Nero’s minority, 11, 19; on weak-
ness of character, 13; adorned
philosophy with eloquence, 25;
his subtilty of mind, 26; com-

|
|
|

Sa

oe,

Index

pares fallacies to juggling tricks,
131; condemns eloquence for
display, 154; feigned too high an
elevation for man’s nature, 155;
complains that men care little for
reformation of manners, 167

Seraphim, angels of love, 37

Sermons in King James I.’s time, 218

Serpent, his nature, 165

Sertorius’ papers burnt by Pompey,

282

Seven Sages, their sayings akin to
poesy parabolical, 83

Severinus the Dane, 105

Severus (Septimius), 204

Sextus Quintus, 11

Sibyl, the, selling her books, 198

Sin, its divisions, 220

Sisyphus, his offence of futility, 206

Sleep, the gates of, 178

Sloth, its drawbacks, 183

Small things best discover great, 72

Socrates, accused of corrupting
youth, 9; reaction in his favour
when dead, 14; his ugliness and
goodness, 21; his irony, 34, 126;
called philosophy down from
heaven, 35; his reply to Hippias,
72; charged with separating
philosophy and rhetoric, 106; his
method of refutation, 131; where-
in he placed true felicity, 157;

disputes with a sophist, 161;
quoted, 153, 165, 180, 212
Solomon, his learning, 39; his

aphorisms on civil wisdom, 182

Sqq.

Solon’s Laws, their wisdom, 18; his
just judgment as to Croesus’
wealth, 2o1

Sophism is equivocation, 131

Sophists compared with orators, 131

Soul, nature of the, 118

Spanish proverb, 191

Speech, an organ of tradition, 136

Spirits in divers ranks, 37; evil, not
to be dealt with, 89

Standing point for argument, men
desire a, 130

Statesmen, learned and experienced,
compared, 43

Stoics, their dogmas fitted to the
fables of the poets by Chrysippus,
84; their dispute with the Epi-
cureans as to felicity settled by
Christianity, 158; seem to have
discussed the affections well, 172

Sturmius studied Cicero and Hermo-
genes, 24

24.3
Suetonius not so credible as Tacitus,

104

Suffering, when wise,
difficulties, 168

Summary law of Nature, 95

“Summum bonum,” the, not to be
discussed by us, 155

Superstitious narrations not always
despicable, 71; divination, 118

Sun, the, is never defiled, see what
he may, 71

Sylla, 119, 183; how judged by
Czesar, 53; never condemned so
many to die as physicians do in
their ignorance, 114; a troubler
of the world, 160; modest towards
Fortune, styling himself Felix, not
Magnus, 188; his assumed frank-
ness, 199

Syllogism, cannot invent arts, 126;
Nature refuses to be enchained by
it, 2b.; use of judgment in, 130

Sympathies between body and mind
discussed, 106 sqq.

overcomes

Tacitus, 109, 152; on the eloquence
of Augustus, 2; his judgment on
Nerva, 44; his annals, 78; his
note on the retention of ancient
terms and titles, 92; far more
trustworthy than Suetonius, from
the form of his narrative, 104; on
sudden prosperity, 170; observa-
tion on Tiberius and Agrippina,
191; on Tiberius’ reserved man-
ners, 194; his judgment on
Mutianus, 195; on Pompey’s dark
dealing, 199; on Livia, 200

Talk, the common, is sometimes
wiser than books, 167

Tantalus, 206

Tarquin buys the Sibyl’s books, 198

Telesius, 105

Tennis gives quick eye and body, 99

Thales, 72

Themistocles, his saying as to music
and government, 20

Theology, how divisible, 69; dis-
cussed briefly, 209

Theseus, 75

Thirty Tyrants, the, 14

Thucydides on Cleon’s hatred of
eloquence, 147

Tiberius concealed his power at first,
126; jealous of his heir, 183;
closest of men, 190, 194; quarrels
with Agrippina, IgI

Tigellinus intrigues against Tur-
pilianus, 192

244

Time, the author of authors, 30;
devours his children, 31; as a
river, sinks things weighty, and
carries down what is light and
worthless, 32

Timotheus, the Athenian, 187

Topics, not deficiently handled, 129;
of two sorts, 7b.; the ‘‘ particular ”’
ones commended, 129

Tradition of knowledge, faulty, and
a hindrance to learning, 34; art

36

Trajan, though not learned, a patron
of learning, 44; nicknamed “ wall-
flower’ by pee 49; how
praised by Pliny, 1

Travels, much multirlied of late, 79

Treacle, II5

Tribonium, 215

Trisagion of knowledge, 96

Triumvirs, the, sold their friends to
one another, 203

Trust and distrust slowly, if you will
make your fortune, 190

Truth of being and of knowing are
one, 27; demands much severity
of investigation, 103, 104

Tudor period of history, 75, 76

Tumblers and rope-dancers can do
with the body what “ memoria
technica’’ enables men to do with
their minds, 136

Turpilianus destroyed through Tigel-
linus’ intrigues, 192

Ulysses’ judgment, 60

Union of England and Scotland, 76

Universal propositions in sciences,
144

Universities to be cherished, 62;
teach logic and rhetoric to minds
not stored with subject-matter, 66;
their exercises faulty, 67

Untruth in learning, 28

Urbanity too much considered, 180

Valentine, Duke (Czsar Borgia), 194

Valour, false, lies in the eyes of its
beholders, 13

Varro, best of antiquaries, 14

Velleius, the epicurean, 34; his
question as to the ordering of stars
by God, inconsistent with his
principles, 133

THE TEMPLE PRESS, PRINTERS, LETCHWORTH, ENGLAND

Bacon

|

Verus, Elius (sc. Ceionius Comil
modus), patron of Martial, 46;
L. Commodus (sc. Aurelius), a
learned prince, 4b.

Vibulenus, 152

Virgil prejudiced against learning, 9;
best of poets, 14; quoted, 56;
lines on Augustus, 57; got great
glory by singing of humble
matters, 154

Virtue, not to be undervalued, 196;
is rewarded, 204

Visions, prophetic, 11g

Visitors of colleges, etc., neglectful,
65

Vitality, how to be increased, ror

Voluptuary arts flourish most in a
decaying state, 117

Vulcan, god of alchemists, 65, 90

Whiteness, the causes of, 95

Wisdom, an attribute of God, 36; |
three kinds of, in civil life, 179, |
18r; true, compared with verbal,
185; prudence, best drawn froma}
history, 186; helps much towards
self-advancement, 187

Witchcraft, the height of idolatry,
221

Women judge by fortune rather than {
excellence, 184

Wonder, seed of knowledge, is broken
knowledge, 5

Word of God, the, 209

Words, images of matter, 24; tokens
of current notions of things, 126,
138; apt to impose on us, 134; of ;
others, not to be unnoted, if you
will build your fortune, 191

World, the, wrongly judged to be an
image of God, 88 |

Writing, art of, 135

a LT

Xenophon, a general and scholar,
9, 54; adorned philosophy with ©
eloquence, 25; on the good effects)
of love, 177

Young men not fit auditors of ques-
tions of morals or policy, till their)
good habits are formed, 174

Zeno, 157

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